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ABSTRACT
ON WHETHER OR NOT MERLEAU-PONTY’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIVED
BODY EXPERIENCE CAN ENRICH ST. THOMAS AQUINAS’S
INTEGRAL ANTHROPOLOGY

By
Joshua F. Miller
May 2009

Dissertation Supervised by Professor James Swindal
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of lived body experience can be
used to enrich Aquinas’s integral anthropology. In Chapter One I lay out the possibilities
of such an enrichment by examining contemporary philosophers of mind who draw on
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty in strikingly similar ways. Analytical Thomists, as
represented by Eric LaRock, and thinkers seeking to integrate neuropsychology and
phenomenology, like Ralph Ellis, argue that the concept of form (taken from Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty respectively) is necessary for properly understanding the human being as
an integral unity of intellectual principle and body. I then pose potential objections to my
project: 1) that Aquinas’s method of syllogistic demonstration and dependence on
tradition is not compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s use of phenomenological description
and insistence that philosophy be grounded in immediate subjective experience; 2) that
their basic anthropological terms (e.g. soul, body, consciousness, form) might radically
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differ; 3) that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, if a form of idealism or materialism,
might preclude compatibility leading to enrichment. In Chapter Two I outline the broad
metaphysical structure of Aquinas’s thought and then present his argument that the
intellectual soul is form of the body. In Chapter Three I outline Merleau-Ponty’s basic
philosophical methodology and then present his phenomenological explorations of
consciousness (or soul) as form of the body. Chapter Four is devoted to overcoming the
objections raised in Chapter One. I argue, for example, that there is a foundation for
compatibility between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty in that both believe perception is the
basis for any philosophical knowledge and both appeal to interior experience for
concluding that the human being is an integral union of intellectual principle and body. I
conclude by arguing that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions of lived body
experience can enrich Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology in at least three ways: 1)
they richly illustrate Aquinas’s position that the intellectual soul is form of the body; 2)
they can offer better practical examples for Aquinas’s arguments than he himself
provides; 3) they can be used to extend Aquinas’s claims regarding the intellect’s
knowledge of itself.
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Introduction
One of the developments John Paul II calls for in his encyclical, Fides et Ratio, is
the exposure of “continuity between contemporary philosophy and…philosophy
developed in the Christian tradition.”1 He goes on to say that revealing such continuity
(where it can be found) is necessary to help overcome several problems with which
contemporary thought is confronted. One problem is that of eclecticism, which occurs
when thinkers draw haphazardly from ideas in a wide range of different modes of thought
“without concern for their internal coherence, their place within a system or their
historical context.”2 One of the risks of such an approach is a “failure to distinguish the
part of a truth of a given doctrine from elements of it which may be erroneous.”3 A
second problem John Paul II points to is that of historicism, a claim that “the truth of a
philosophy is determined on the basis of its appropriateness to a certain period and a
certain historical purpose.”4 The history of philosophy becomes, therefore, a way of
cataloguing certain teachings not universally applicable but only apropos for the time
they were developed, rather than a way to identify authentic growth in philosophical
truth. A third problem is that of scientism, which “refuses to admit the validity of forms
of knowledge other than those of the positive sciences.”5 According to this perspective
real knowledge on the basis of philosophical speculation, or divine revelation, or
aesthetic intuition is impossible; what counts is that which can be scientifically verified.

1

John Paul II, Fides et Ratio: On the Relationship Between Faith and Reason, Vatican
translation, (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1998), #86.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., #87.
5
Ibid., #88.
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As a Catholic philosopher I am committed to the Church’s call, as articulated in
Fides et Ratio, to show continuity (where it can be found) between the Catholic
intellectual tradition and contemporary thinkers who tend to be outside this tradition. This
dissertation is an exercise in a kind of dialogue leading to such continuity from the
standpoint of my basic Thomistic orientation. Certainly I do not equate the philosophy of
St. Thomas with the Catholic intellectual tradition. Indeed many Catholic philosophers
within the pale of this tradition would firmly resist the label of Thomist: e.g. many
Augustinian, Franciscan, Existentialist, and phenomenological thinkers. The dialogue I
pursue is between the Catholic intellectual tradition in a Thomistic vein and a
representative of contemporary thought, Merleau-Ponty, who is outside that tradition.
The primary purpose of dialogue is to establish shared truth, to indicate common
ground, and to pave the way for mutual growth toward the truth. In this dissertation I
specifically attempt to do that by examining whether or not St. Thomas Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty’s respective teachings regarding the integral unity of body and intellectual
soul are compatible enough for Merleau-Ponty’s thought to enrich Aquinas’s. Thus, I
approach the writing with the presupposition that Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology
is basically correct, although not complete, and that it is possible for the Thomist to
develop Aquinas’s insights into the nature of the human being.
Showing agreement among thinkers who express truth, especially when they
come from diverse traditions, develops philosophical knowledge (as it avoids the
eclecticism heretofore mentioned) and is therefore a worthy task for a doctoral
dissertation. Why do I believe this? Basically because philosophical positions that are
true shine brighter when their common ground is exposed, like separate lights when they
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are brought together. If philosophy is the search for wisdom and wisdom involves
dwelling in truth, then a movement to expose truth across very diverse philosophical
disciplines (in this case Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology and Thomism) is a
worthy task. Furthermore, comparisons of the sort I am attempting often open up new
questions and new ways to interpret the respective thinkers under comparison and
therefore can provide a springboard for additional dialogue.
Although I will be making comparisons between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty in
order to expose common ground in their respective thinking about the human being’s
integral unity, the purpose of the dissertation is not a comparison for its own sake. My
primary purpose is to examine whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s thought might deepen and
enrich Aquinas’s teaching. The objective I lay before myself with this dissertation has
been called for but not, to my knowledge, carried out. Recently John Haldane has
stressed the value of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology for contemporary philosophical
anthropology as well as noted its potential for enriching Aristotelian and/or Thomisic
philosophy. Haldane points to the current disarray in analytic philosophy and argues that
a return to hylomorphism and Merleau-Ponty’s insights into the lived body experience
could help resolve this disarray. In this context he declares his sympathy with “the
possibility of incorporating Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological and Wittgenstein’s
‘grammatical’ insights within a broadly Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics.”6 In addition
to Haldane,7 the Thomistic metaphysician W. Norris Clarke, S.J. recently declared that
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John Haldane, “Insight, Inference and Intellection,” Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 73 (2000), 42.
7
I should also note that Alasdair MacIntyre speaks disappointedly about the
contemporary loss of the Aristotelian/Thomistic notion that the human being is first and
foremost an animal and suggests that this lesson may need to be relearned “perhaps from
3

“the most significant challenge and opportunity for Thomism today [is its] relationship
with phenomenology.”8 Here Clarke speaks about a reciprocity of enrichment between
the two methods. On the one hand he holds that “the rich and insightful analysis of
contemporary phenomenology can be a wonderful complement to enlarge and refine
Thomas’s own base of analysis.”9 He also argues that phenomenology requires a
metaphysical grounding provided by Aquinas’s philosophy which it cannot supply for
itself. Given the necessarily limited scope of a dissertation I will neither be exploring
how phenomenology in general nor how Merleau-Ponty’s particular version of it could be
enriched by Aquinas’s thinking, but I do hope to fulfill in some way what Haldane and
Clarke have called for regarding a phenomenological enrichment of Aquinas’s thinking.
I now briefly touch upon what I will not be doing with this dissertation. First, I
will not attempt to force Merleau-Ponty into Thomistic categories or, on the other hand,
to claim that Aquinas is a phenomenologist. Some Thomists have argued that whatever is
good in modern and contemporary philosophy is somehow latently present in Aquinas’
work. Although I am sympathetic with this perspective I will not be arguing that
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights are present, though in seminal form, in
Aquinas’s work.
Second, in the light of comparing Aquinas to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology I
will have occasion to draw attention to an overlooked element of Aquinas’s thought,
namely, the importance of subjectivity. But I will not conduct an exhaustive examination
those phenomenological investigations that enabled Merleau-Ponty also to conclude that I
am my body.” See his Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues, (Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1999), 6.
8
W. Norris Clarke, “Thomism and Contemporary Philosophical Pluralism,” New
Scholasticism 67 (January 1990): 130.
9
Ibid, p. 129.
4

of interiority or inner awareness in Aquinas even though this might be helpful for a
broader comparison of Aquinas with phenomenology. It will be enough for me to
establish that Aquinas is open to the kind of explorations of subjective experience which
are central to the phenomenological method.
Third, the dissertation does not fall into the category of philosophy of mind.
Obviously the questions I raise are intimately related to this contemporary philosophical
issue and my primary interlocutors in Chapter One, Ralph Ellis and Erick LaRock, draw
upon Merleau-Ponty and Aquinas respectively but this work is not a direct exercise in
philosophy of mind. It is closely related, but neither Merleau-Ponty nor Aquinas
thematize mind per se (mens – Latin; esprit – French) in their respective philosophical
anthropologies. Merleau-Ponty is wont to speak of the human being according to its
embodied nature (“body-subject,” “lived body”) and usually refers to the thinking part of
the human being as consciousness but never does he separate “mind” from its incarnate
state. To categorize Merleau-Ponty and Aquinas’s respective anthropologies as
philosophy of mind would be to disengage them from their mutual commitment to
considering the human being as an essential unity.

5

Chapter One: Fruitful Compatibility or Mere Comparison?
I begin with a statement of justification about the title of this first chapter as well
as a short example of what fruitful compatibility between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty
could look like. Some might claim that even to attempt an examination of Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty’s respective philosophies in order to find similarities or differences
between them leading to some kind of compatibility would be a waste of time. I am
thinking now of certain secular scholars whose outlines of the history of philosophy jump
from Aristotle to Descartes and who assume that philosophical thinking among the
medieval scholastics is so grounded in theological presuppositions that it simply cannot
count as philosophy. In the next chapter I will address this charge with regard to
Aquinas’s thinking but for now I want simply to point out that, at the very least, some
kind of comparison between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty is possible and likely to be
philosophically interesting because some degree of comparison between any two kinds of
things is possible and philosophically interesting. A thought and a potato can be
compared at one level – in that they both have some kind of existence. The potato has a
real organic existence and the thought a mental existence. And even though this
comparison depends upon the broadest of common denominators, existence itself, it is
still philosophically interesting because it draws our attention to a most significant
metaphysical claim: everything shares in some form of being.
Furthermore, even if Aquinas is a pure theologian and fails to ground his
philosophical anthropology on principles established by the human mind there are at least
two reasons why it would likely be philosophically valuable to examine similarities and
dissimilarities between his notion of the human being and Merleau-Ponty’s. First, the
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comparison could help us understand how both philosophical and theological lines of
argument can reach similar conclusions. Second, it could help draw a distinction between
philosophically legitimate claims about the human person and those that depend upon
revelation. So, at least some philosophically interesting form of comparison between the
anthropological thinking of Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty is probable.
However, it is another thing altogether to show “fruitful compatibility” between
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty. What do I mean by this phrase? Let me draw on an analogy
from horticulture, already suggested by this chapter’s title, to further explain. Experts in
the art of grafting tell us that “the more closely...plants are related botanically, the better
the chances are for…graft union to be successful.”10 Grafting involves inserting a living
shoot or scion from one plant into the rootstock of another plant. Ideally, the rootstock
takes hold of the scion and gives it life so that the shoot develops alongside the other
branches or stalks growing on the rootstock. The plant growing its own branches as well
as the scions from another plant will obviously produce a more varied array of leaves
and/or fruit than the plant that only develops its own original branches. Thus, the
MacIntosh apple tree that grows Winesap scions alongside its original branches can
produce an enriched yield due to the Winesap branches in the sense that the overall
harvest of fruit is more diverse than it would have been without the grafting. Now, inter
species grafting—e.g. within the apple trees just mentioned--is apparently almost always
successful. Grafting between species within a genus often works well although to a lesser
extent than that between plants of the same species. For example, grafting within the
Citrus genus is regularly performed; orange tree branches grown on lemon tree rootstock
Hudson T. Hartmann, et al., Plant Propagation: Principles & Practices, (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 415.
10
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give hearty yields as commercial citrus farmers well know. Sometimes, however,
reciprocal grafts between species of the same genus are not successful: “‘Marianna’ plum
on peach roots makes an excellent graft combination, but the reverse—grafts of the peach
on ‘Marianna’ plum roots—either soon die or fail to develop normally.”11 Plants of the
same family but of different genera can sometimes be successfully grafted together but
here the chances of success become far less likely. For a successful graft to take place
there must the right genotype combination between rootstock and scion; grafting within
species is usually successful because of the close genetic similarities between scion and
rootstock. Obviously the possibility of a strong genotype combination weakens as the
genetic similarities between scion and rootstock also weaken. The question of whether or
not there can be “fruitful compatibility” between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty can be
likened to the question posed by the horticulturalist who wishes to propagate plants via
grafting. He or she must ask whether or not there is enough genetic similarity between the
scion and rootstock for the latter to “take hold” of the former and allow it to develop and
thus be enriched by it. In similar fashion I am asking whether or not there is enough
“genetic” similarity between the philosophical anthropologies of Aquinas and MerleauPonty for the former to take hold of the latter and be enriched by it. Can Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological insights be inserted into the rootstock of Aquinas’ philosophical
system? Is Merleau-Ponty’s thought, written in a distinctly modern philosophical idiom,
able to find a place within the medieval scholastic language of Aquinas? Are the core
anthropological terms both thinkers use—e.g. soul, form, body—and their notions of

11

Ibid., 415.
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what grounds philosophical claims and constitutes truth so different that Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty can only be compared from a distance but not brought into fruitful union?
As I said in the introduction I believe that Merleau-Ponty’s anthropological insights can
find a place with Aquinas’s thought, that they are not so foreign to his philosophy that
they cannot enrich it. What might this enrichment look like?
As an example of the kind of “fruitful compatibility” that I would like to
demonstrate by the end of the dissertation I turn to two of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological descriptions of lived body experience. I want to show how these
insights might enrich the experiential base of Aquinas’s argument that the intellect is the
form of the body.
First, let us first look at our experience of bodily movement. Merleau-Ponty
describes how we do not push ourselves about like a table or chair that we can grasp in
one place and then shift to another. “My body itself I move directly,” he says, “I do not
find it at one point of objective space and transfer it to another, I have no need to look for
it, it is already with me.”12 Another way to say this is that I find in myself no distance in
either space or time between my intention to move my body and the movement itself.
There is instead an immediacy between the decision and the physical act itself.
Merleau-Ponty also describes how the body is expressive of our selves. Our emotions,
not simply visceral emotions but those that are heartfelt, are so keenly manifest in our
bodies that we can often see, for example, the joy of persons in their whole bearing –
their eyes, walk, and gestures. Here our body parts are imbued with a distinctly spiritual
affection. Do we not also sometimes experience that joy simply must be expressed in
12

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, (London: Routledge
& Kegan, 1962), 108. Hereafter referred to as Phenomenology of Perception.
9

bodily comportment--e.g. dance--in order for us to be properly joyful? Here our very
limbs are in a way consciousness incarnate. As I thrust my hand forward with jubilation
my experience is not that “I” am somehow back here simply behind my eyes but am also
here in my extended hand. Further, it is in the very act of raising the hand or shouting or
dancing that the joy comes into existence.
These two phenomenological illustrations show how, in the words of MerleauPonty, “consciousness of the body invades the body [and] the soul spreads over all its
parts.”13 We could say then, as Merleau-Ponty does, that I am my body insofar as I
experience my body as co-extensive with my self.
I now move to Question 76 of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologica, where
Aquinas in his own way addresses the union of body and soul, and specifically Article
One where Aquinas asks “Whether the Intellectual Principle is United to the Body as Its
Form?” Aquinas answers in the affirmative and in the first part of his response gives
Aristotle’s demonstration that the intellectual principle is the form of the body. I will skip
this part of the argument and turn to a second stage of Aquinas’s response where he
seems to make a latently phenomenological turn. After giving Aristotle’s demonstration
he states that:
If anyone however wishes to say the intellectual soul is not the form of the
body he must explain how it is that this action which is understanding may
be the action of this man for every one knows by experience (experitur)
that it is himself who understands.14

13

Ibid., 87.
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica Ia.76.1, trans. Fathers of the Dominican
Province, (New York: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947), 371: Si quis autem velit dicere
animam intellectivam non esse corporis formam, oportet quod inveniat modum quo ista
actio quae est intelligere, sit huius hominis actio: experitur enim unusquisque seipsum
esse qui intelligit. In this case I have slightly modified the Benzinger translation.
14
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I, as a particular being made up of flesh and blood and existing at a given time and place,
recognize that I myself understand, that understanding somehow emerges from this
concrete manifestly embodied creature. I am conscious of being the same one who both
senses and thinks. This basic experience suggests that the intellect is the form of the
body, but it is not a complete argument for there may be other explanations to account for
it. However, let us note that the experience itself is not called into doubt. Aquinas, as
Merleau-Ponty does, trusts our primary perception of being embodied rational agents.
Now, the sentence from which I have just quoted is the beginning of a reductio ad
absurdum argument, the kind Aquinas so often uses. He will go on to address a variety of
explanations for our experience of being creatures who both understand and think. After
showing problems with these explanations he then concludes that “this [particular] man
understands because the intellectual principle is his form.”15
Compatibility is suggested between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty because both
believe that at the level of primary perception human beings experience themselves as
embodied rational agents. Further, both trust this basic experience which implies a
common epistemological grounding in the perceived world. Aquinas will go on to argue
that the only adequate explanation for this perception is that the intellectual principle is
the form of the body, whereas Merleau-Ponty is content to leave proof for our composite
nature at the level of phenomenological description. Aquinas may not need any additional
phenomenological analysis to make his argument, but I submit that the phenomenological
descriptions of the lived body provided by Merleau-Ponty can enrich the experiential
Hereafter, all translations of the Summa Theologica will be from this edition, unless
otherwise stated.
15
Summa Theologica Ia.76.4: “quod hic homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est
forma ipsius.”
11

base drawn on by Aquinas. The Thomist could declare, for example, that if anyone
wishes to say that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he or she must first
explain how it is that we are able to experience in ourselves an immediacy between our
decision to move our bodies and the movement itself. He or she might also say that those
who deny that the intellectual soul is form of our bodies must explain why it is that our
bodies are imbued with expressions of our conscious life to such an extent that we
sometimes experience that a spiritual emotion would be incomplete unless borne out in
our bodies.
This brief foray into an area of possible fruitful compatibility between Aquinas
and Merleau-Ponty is one way that enrichment between the two thinkers might take
place. However, at this point I remain more like the hopeful and amateur horticulturalist
thinking about how a new graft might work than the seasoned orange grove botanist
planning how to raise yet another crop of California Navels on the base of lemon trees. In
this chapter I plot out the likelihood of successful enrichment between Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty as well as raise potential objections to it.
A final word before getting into the possibilities of fruitful compatibility between
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty is that my attempt is not to create a hybrid that would draw
on both our thinkers while going beyond them to a new species of anthropological
thought. My main intention is to explore whether or not certain of Merleau-Ponty’s
anthropological ideas can fit within a Thomistic framework in such a way that they
remain distinctly Merleau-Pontian while also being compatible with Aquinas’s insights.
In Part One of this chapter I argue for the possibility of compatibility between Aquinas
and Merleau-Ponty while in Part Two I raise objections to this possibility.

12

Part I. Compatibility Between Aquinas & Merleau-Ponty Suggested by
Contemporary Mind-Body Theorists who Draw on these Thinkers in Strikingly
Similar Ways.
Much contemporary scholarship is highly critical both of computational theories
of mind and of Cartesian style dualism in which the human being is composed of two
distinct parts—unextended mental substance and extended bodily substance. In this part
of the dissertation I introduce two contemporary thinkers who stand together in critiquing
both mechanistic and dualistic notions of the human being: Eric LaRock, an Analytical
Thomist, and Ralph Ellis, a phenomenologist working at the intersection of
neuropsychology and philosophy. Ellis is part of a growing movement of scholars in the
fields of phenomenological psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience who recognize the
severe inadequacy of computational theories of mind for explaining consciousness. In the
article from which I will draw to represent Ellis’s position, “Phenomenology-Friendly
Neuroscience: The Return to Merleau-Ponty as Psychologist,” he reports that:
Neuropsychologists during the past decade have rediscovered the
importance of self-organization and self-energized movement in biology,
and the philosophy of mind has again begun to recognize that the
differences between consciousness and the unconscious information
processing of computers stem from the fact that conscious beings
understand their world by initiating action and then taking note of
environmental action-affordances; that is we understand what kinds of
actions could be “afforded” by a given object, just as an infant
understands when it finds an object that “affords” sucking.16
According to traditional neuroscience, consciousness can be explained by a bottom to top
sort of causality in which neurological activity is simply identified as consciousness or
leads to the epiphenomenal result of consciousness. But a current and blossoming
direction in neuroscience is to recognize the truth of top to bottom causality as identified
Ralph Ellis, “Phenomenology-Friendly Neuroscience: The Return to Merleau-Ponty as
Psychologist,” Human Studies 29 (2006), 33. Hereafter referred to as Ellis.
16
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by phenomenology. Our minds have the power to initiate human agency. Furthermore, by
understanding the “action-affordances” of those objects we encounter, our action can
continue as we recognize how and in what ways we are able to interact with them. Now,
a significantly influential reason for the recent change of direction among many
neuroscientists has been Merleau-Ponty and his understanding, achieved through
phenomenology, that human consciousness has the power to organize, integrate, and
direct its bodily systems. Ellis reports, for example, that Francisco Varela et al.17 dubbed
this new phenomenological turn in neuropsychology the “enactive” approach while
“specifically acknowledging their debt to Merleau-Ponty.”18 Further, Varela and Shaun
Gallagher have founded a new journal Phenomenology and Cognition “whose purpose is
to re-integrate phenomenology with cognitive science by means of this enactive
approach.”19 Ellis reports that there are a number of other important mind/body theorists
who have taken up the “enactive” approach and who have also acknowledged MerleauPonty’s influence on their work: Esther Thelen and Linda Smith,20 Eugene Gendlin,21
Thomas Natsoulas,22 Natika Newton,23 Kathleen Wider,24 and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone.25
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There is also a growing movement among Thomists (especially of the analytical
persuasion) to show that Aquinas’s work is critically relevant to contemporary
philosophy of mind. For example, the 2006 American Catholic Philosophical Association
meeting was devoted to Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind and included a number
of papers addressing the importance of Aquinas’s work to current discussions. In his
Presidential Address at the conference Anthony Lisska reports that “the late twentieth
century witnessed a renewed interest in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind within analytic
philosophy.”26 Furthermore, many predominant Thomists in the analytic tradition have
argued that Aquinas’s doctrine of the intellectual soul as form of the body should be
integrated into contemporary philosophy of mind. Peter Geach puts forward in his classic
work God and the Soul that “the only tenable conception of the soul is the Aristotelian
conception of the soul as the form.”27 Antony Kenny draws on Wittgenstein and Aquinas
to argue that thinking and willing are capacities of the body and the soul that informs the
body, rather than simply being actions of an immaterial mind.28 Eleanore Stump attempts
to show that Aquinas’s notion of the form/body composite is compatible with nonreductive materialism.29 In at least two recent articles30 John Haldane stresses that a
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Thomistic conception of form is necessary for rescuing contemporary philosophy of mind
from fragmentation and disarray resulting from the inadequacy of physicalism to explain
the relationship between consciousness and the body.
A full survey of the scholarly work among Thomists showing the relevance of
Aquinas’s anthropology to contemporary philosophy of mind would be out of place here.
I draw attention to some of this work merely to note that there is a basic similarity
between research in the fields of phenomenological psychology/neuroscience and work
being done by Thomists who address themselves to contemporary philosophy of mind.
Broadly speaking, both groups of thinkers, as I will show below, appeal to the notion of
form as critical for avoiding theoretical problems with mechanistic or dualistic concepts
of human nature. I turn now to a closer examination of two thinkers whose work is,
generally speaking, representative of these two movements: Ralph Ellis, whose article I
previously mentioned, and Erick LaRock.
I first turn to LaRock and his article, “Dualistic Interaction, Neural Dependence,
and Aquinas’s Composite View.” LaRock’s main objective in this article is to address
two standard objections to Cartesian dualism and then to show how Aquinas’s composite
view of human nature escapes these objections.31 The first major objection to Cartesian
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dualism, which LaRock takes from Patricia Churchland,32 is the dualistic interaction
objection. “Simply put, how can mind causally interact with brain, if the properties of
mind are so radically different than those of brain.”33 LaRock recognizes that Descartes
was familiar with this problem and sought to alleviate it by appealing to the mediation of
“animal spirits.” But this solution does not work since these “animal spirits” turn out to
be nothing but low-density material objects and thus the problem of how to explain
interaction between such profoundly different substances remains.
The second major objection, which LaRock takes from Paul Churchland,34
concerns neural dependence. “Consciousness is intimately associated with neural brain
activity, otherwise, it would not depend on the neurochemistry of the brain.”35 We know
that consciousness unquestionably depends upon the brain. Various sorts of psychotic
disorders are successfully treated through drug therapy. Substance abuse can cause neural
damage leading to lack of rationality. Emotions can be regulated by Prozac. “If
consciousness is a feature of mind-stuff (as Cartesian dualists claim), then why is it
affected by chemical manipulation or brain damage?”36 LaRock also points to evidence

Thomistic, for Aquinas conceived this form in the Aristotelian sense as the actuality of
matter which is entirely potential and of itself undetermined to any particular form
(material prima). For Descartes the soul does not stand in relation to the body. Rather,
the soul is actively present in the body and capable of moving it at will.” Thus, the charge
that Descartes holds to a “ghost in the machine” anthropology is inaccurate. Maurer does
show, however, that Descartes’ followers (e.g. Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz) do not
hold to any real substantial unity in the human being.
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showing “that the mind depends on specific neural regions of the brain to process visual
information.”37 When there is damage to those centers of the brain responsible for visual
processing, then agnosia or mind-blindness can result. He references one patient
diagnosed with agnosia who could see the clothes laid out on his bed but could not
understand what they were until his wife put them into his hands. Clearly brain damage to
a person can radically affect his or her consciousness. This and other examples lead
LaRock to conclude that “Churchland’s argument from neural dependence offers a
formidable challenge to Cartesian sorts of dualism.”38
However, LaRock does not accept Churchland’s conclusion that consciousness
can be reduced to brain activity. He sees this as a dubious claim and offers Aquinas’s
non-Cartesian dualism both to oppose the materialist reductionism of Paul Churchland
and Patricia Churchland and to show how Aquinas’s teaching withstands the dualistic
interaction and neural dependence objections.
According to LaRock, Aquinas offers a composite view of the human being that
“carves out a middle path between physicalism and Cartesian sorts of dualism.”39 This
middle path is achieved through the metaphysical co-principles of form and matter. We
must understand matter here in an equivocal sense for Aquinas uses the term to refer both
to prime matter and to non-living matter that is a composite of matter and form (e.g.
stones). Prime matter is “the underlying nebulous element out of which material objects
are organized into definite patterns or structures by form.”40 In scholastic language, the
act or esse of the form is responsible not for the creation of prime matter, but for shaping
37
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that matter into the kind of existence that is appropriate to the form.41 The form of the
human being is its soul while its matter is the body. Soul is not a specific part of the body
nor is it an epiphenomenal result of bodily parts interacting. The body (with all of its
parts) is completely lifeless by itself and is only animated by the soul. For Aquinas
“organized life is a feature of soul embodied in biological organisms and is irreducible to
physics and chemistry.”42 Thus, without soul the physical parts of an organism would
have no way to be a unified configuration. There is no such thing as an organism that is
not animated by soul.
LaRock uses an example from visual perception to illustrate the function of soul
in configuring bodily components. After the retina gathers and organizes visual data it
communicates these to the back of the brain. Then:
A variety of brain regions are involved in processing visual information in
the act of perception. For example, as one perceives a tree, the ventral
system, whose neural pathway runs from the occipital lobe down to the
inferior temporal lobe, processes object properties; object properties
include a tree’s shape and color. The dorsal system, whose neural pathway
runs from the occipital lobe up to the parietal lobes, processes spatial
properties, such as location and size. On Aquinas’s account of visual
perception, form organizes the retinal and neural material in visual
information processing. As the form of the body, the soul is the
organizational principle of the biological parts involved in visual
information processing.43
The soul is responsible for establishing the ventral and dorsal systems so that they carry
out their respective functions in visual information processing. Furthermore, there is no
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additional neural process responsible for synthesizing the contributions of the ventral and
dorsal systems in visual perception and yet in this perception both systems are integrated.
For Aquinas the soul, which is form as well as seat of consciousness, organizes
information processing from both systems into one act of perception while at the same
time experiencing what is seen.44 The ventral and dorsal systems are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for perception. Without the informing and organizing principle of the
soul there would be no perception.
Aquinas’s view is dualistic in that the human being is made up of two basic
components and is not reduced to a complex material system; rather, the human is a
composite of body parts that are animated and informed by the soul. But this dualism is
not Cartesian and we now turn to how LaRock shows that Aquinas’s view escapes the
dualistic interaction and neural dependence objections while providing a strong
explanation for the relationship between soul and body.
LaRock’s first major point is that for Aquinas a mediating mechanism between
soul and body is superfluous. Drawing from Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s De
Anima, LaRock states that “soul and body are unified and directly related in the sense that
wax and its impression constitute an integrated whole.”45 The analogy is not perfect
because soul differs from a device for impressing wax in that its power to inform remains
immediately present to the matter of the body; the soul does not do its work and then
separate from the “impressed” matter. But the analogy does work to show how the
formed lump of wax would be another thing altogether if the impression upon it were
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different. It is a singular being due to the irreducible components of the wax lump and the
impression. The human being too is one thing with all of its body parts exhibiting their
special characteristics because of the informing power of soul. Neurons exhibit causal
power because of the causal power of soul that organizes them. The soul, as form, is the
primary efficient cause of any bodily action; neurons, and other causal forces in the body
are, therefore, secondary efficient causes relative to the soul.
LaRock stresses that although the question of causal interaction between mind
and body confronts Cartesian dualism, for Aquinas the question itself does not even arise.
To ask this question assumes a separation between soul (S) and body (B) that is
precluded by Aquinas’s composite view. “Because the soul’s causal relation to body is
immediate,” says LaRock, “there is no spatial gap between mental events and brain
events”46 that would have to be explained in terms of a mediating causal mechanism
between soul and body.
LaRock assumes that this Thomistic retort to the dualistic interaction objection
would not satisfy the physicalist demand for a comprehensive explanation of how soul
relates to body and that the physicalist might argue that in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation we can conclude that S is not causally related to B. But such a retort would
be fallacious LaRock argues:
Even if one cannot give a ‘satisfying’ explanatory account of how S is
immediately and causally related to B, it would not follow that S is not
immediately and causally related to B. Such an inference is guilty of the
‘how-that fallacy.’ In the mind-body issue, the ‘how-that fallacy’ occurs
whenever one illegitimately assumes that if one cannot explain how mind
is causally related to body, then it follows that mind cannot be causally
related to body. Also, establishing that mind is irreducible to brain does
not depend on ‘satisfying’ the physicalist’s how-that objection. As
46
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implied earlier, satisfying such a concern would seem to require a
mechanistic account of mind’s relation to body. But since the causal
activity of form in relation to body is immediate on Aquinas’s composite
view, an intermediate set of physical steps between mind and brain with
respect to causation is gratuitous.47
LaRock is not here interested in establishing that mind is causally related to body, only in
eliminating an objection which assumes that this causal interaction must be explained in
physicalist terms. Such an explanation is precluded by the very nature of the soul as form.
However, he also shows that “it is not contradictory to assume that two different kinds of
things or events can causally influence each other.”48 For instance, if a mental property
(MP) can be traced to brain processes (BP) such that BP causes MP it remains possible
that the soul as form (F) of the brain processes is immediately and causally present with
BP such that BP and F causes MP. We might be able to track down the lines of causation
between BP and MP but this does not preclude another kind of causation occurring
simultaneously with BP.
LaRock then recalls that Patricia Churchland had rejected dualism because “she
thinks that dualists cannot offer an account of where mind-brain interaction occurs.”49 To
this LaRock provides three responses. First, he believes that Churchland commits a
category mistake. Asking where mind and brain action occurs is like asking where God
is. In a sense he is nowhere because God is not physical but in another sense God is
everywhere since he upholds the universe as an omnipresent spiritual Being. Likewise the
mind is nowhere because it is not a physical organ but also everywhere “in” the body
since it serves as form of the body. It is understandable that Churchland, as a physicalist,
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would ask the dualist where mind and brain action occur; LaRock is here assuming the
truth of an immaterial soul when he accuses Churchland of making a category mistake.
Second, her assumption that dualists cannot explain mind-body interaction is unfounded
because many dualists of the Cartesian sort have in fact attempted to argue that such
interaction does occur in a specific part of the brain.50 Finally, Churchland’s objection is
question begging for “it assumes that mental causation is located.”51
LaRock then argues that Aquinas escapes the objection from neural dependence
because “the brain and sense powers are only a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for acquiring knowledge in this life.”52 The intellect does depend upon the body’s ability
to sense and the brain’s powers to process sense information, hold memory, and enable
the imagination. However, the intellect cannot be reduced to these bodily powers since it
has the ability to understand universal forms (e.g. human nature) that are immaterial. We
may be able to track down the path of sense information in a person while she stares at
the moon and the color yellow registers on her retina and is then communicated to her
brain through visual processing but her own conscious experience of the yellow moon
cannot be reduced to neurons firing off in her brain. At the same time we can admit with
physicalists that the body and its parts have a deep impact upon the mind which would
not be true if the mind was fundamentally distinct from the body. Thus, Aquinas’s view
is not subject to the objection from neural dependence. Indeed, his view confirms a causal
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link between the body and the intellect but without being reductively materialistic
because the mind’s operations transcend bodily operations.
I turn now to an article by Ralph Ellis entitled “Phenomenology-Friendly
Neuroscience: The Return to Merleau-Ponty as Psychologist” in which Ellis’s
characterization of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of psychophysical form is similar to
LaRock’s presentation of form in Aquinas. Unlike LaRock, who argues that Aquinas’s
composite view of the human being escapes two major objections to Cartesian dualism
without being reductively materialistic, Ellis shows that there is a trend in contemporary
neuropsychology to depart from reductive materialism as it increasingly confirms
Merleau-Ponty’s integral anthropology. Although LaRock and Ellis draw on Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty’s respective ideas of form for separate reasons we will see that their
understandings of form’s function in the human being are remarkably similar. According
to LaRock and Ellis, form serves to organize and direct the biological parts of the human
being; it does not interact with the body as a distinct substance but is inseparable from the
body; it avoids problems associated with Cartesian dualism--e.g. the difficulty of
explaining interaction between a purely spiritual substance and a physical body—and
reductive materialism—e.g. the impossibility of explaining consciousness through
empirical observation. I now turn to a summary of the major parts of Ellis’s article.
Following that I will more closely examine LaRock and Ellis’s respective notions of
form.
Ellis starts by indicating how traditional neuropsychology was dominated by
computational theories of mind. According to these theories consciousness is achieved
through a bottom to top process of causality: neurological activity, which is itself caused
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in perception by sense data coming from outside the person, leads to consciousness. But
Ellis reports that these theories are now being completely reversed:
It is now recognized that conscious living beings process information very
differently from non-conscious and non-living systems, and that
consciousness drives and organizes the process rather than being a mere
causal by product or spin-off…this means that conscious processes again
must be seen as self-organizing phenomena resembling Merleau-Ponty’s
psychophysical forms.53
It is impossible to explain the phenomenon of consciousness within the positivist
framework of traditional neuroscience for in this framework reality consists of
empirically observable objects and nothing else. Because consciousness could never be
subsumed under empirical analysis, many neuropsychologists began to take seriously
phenomenological accounts of consciousness and in their own experimentation to
increasingly confirm Merleau-Ponty’s idea that the mind is not only the seat of
consciousness but also organizes the material dimensions of the body.
But how exactly does Merleau-Ponty define form? Ellis points to one definition
from the beginning of Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behavior that applies to all material
beings non-living and living alike:
‘Forms’…are defined as total processes whose properties are not the sum
of those which the isolated parts would possess…We will say that there is
form whenever the properties of a system are modified by every change
brought about in a single one of its parts and, on the contrary, are
conserved when they all change while maintaining the same relationship
among themselves.54
This definition does get at the ability of form to organize a system but it does not address
the connection between form and consciousness. So Ellis goes on to explain that “for
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Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is a further development of life,” meaning a form that is
self-aware, “which is self-organizing in the sense that it must appropriate the needed
material substrata to maintain its patterns of living.”55
After indicating the movement in contemporary neuroscience overturning
computational models of mind, Ellis points to anomalies which confront reductionist
accounts of consciousness. These anomalies have led to new directions in
neuropsychology which corroborate Merleau-Ponty’s notion of form derived from
phenomenology. First, neuroscientists have discovered via experimentation that
“consciousness is an enacting of rather than a passive reaction to the physical events that
serve as its substratum; neither is it the non-physical half of an ontological dualism.”56
This first “anomaly” is more like a fatal blow in that it demonstrates a complete reversal
of the traditional bottom to top causal link between body and mind. Another anomaly is
that “mechanistic causes..seem to overexplain consciousness.”57 According to
reductionist accounts of the human organism consciousness is simply complex
neurological activity and theoretically can be laid bare by empirical analysis. But as
phenomenologists have long known “it is impossible to know what a state of
consciousness is like merely by knowing everything that can be known empirically about
its underlying physical mechanisms.”58
The first anomaly is the “non-passivity of conscious attention.”59 Ellis points to
separate studies by Carl Aurell,60 Michael Posner and Mary Rothbart,61 Antonio
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Damasio,62 and Alexander Luria63 which demonstrate that information processing in the
brain is radically different when it is functioning on a conscious basis as opposed to a
non-conscious basis. During consciousness the organism directs informational input
through its own motivation:
Consciousness occurs only when efferent (outflowing) nervous activity
takes the lead in selecting and directing afferent (inflowing) activity;
conscious beings are self-organizing emotionally and motivationally
directed beings that actively direct their attention, and can imagine things
with no afferent input with neural substrates remarkably similar to the
imaging activities in perceptual consciousness...Consistent with Jean-Paul
Sartre’s suggestion in The Psychology of Imagination subjects form
perceptual imagery largely as a result of formulating their own questions
about reality rather than just passively reacting to “stimulus-response”
mechanisms.64
This research shows that the computational model of the mind in which mechanical
forces outside the body act upon it and cause afferent neural activity leading to the
epiphenomenal result of consciousness is backward. It shows that the organism initiates
action according to its own motivation and purposes which then leads to consciousness of
objects outside the organism that depend upon afferent activity. As Merleau-Ponty says,
“we must look in order to see.”65 This research is but one example drawn on by Ellis to
show that neuropsychology is moving away from epiphenomenalism. Instead, it now
confirms that consciousness plays an active role in determining the kinds of information
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processing that take place in the brain. Thus, consciousness functions as a kind of form
organizing its material substrates while at the same time using them to accomplish its
purposes.
The second anomaly I want to address from Ellis’s paper is that “mechanistic
causes..seem to overexplain consciousness.”66 A basic premise of traditional neuroscience
is that one set of neuropsychological properties is the sufficient condition for a
succeeding set of neuropsychological properties. Let us suppose that a conscious event
(C1) leads to another conscious event (C2)—e.g. the decision to raise my hand leads to
actually raising my hand. Underlying C1 and C2 are physiological correlates of these
states: P1 and P2. According to modernist neuroscience P1 causes C1 and is the
necessary and sufficient condition for P2 which itself causes C2. This means that nothing
else could be responsible for consciousness apart from its physiological substrates and
that there is no place whatsoever for the function of consciousness per se in a person’s
action. But our basic experience seems to undercut this claim for a person’s decision to
take a walk in fact leads to walking. Our experience that mind does have a role in
directing neurological activity indicates that traditional neuroscience makes an
overreaching claim when it reduces the mind to brain matter.
Ellis then examines three basic responses to this problem of causal
overexplanation: psychophysical identity, causal epiphenomenalism, and dualism. He
wants to shows their inadequacies in explaining the relationship between consciousness
and its physiological correlates. He then argues that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
psychophysical forms avoids the problem of physicalist causal overexplanation and offers
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a cogent explication of the relationship between consciousness and its physiological
correlates.
According to at least one theory of psychophysical identity, neurological activity
is consciousness. But this cannot avoid the problem of causal overexplanation because if
C1 and P1 were identical then a complete knowledge of brain physiology would yield a
complete knowledge of consciousness. This, however, is impossible Ellis argues, for “no
amount of empirical knowledge and explanation of a headache can reveal to someone
what it feels like to have a headache, unless that observer has also experienced something
like a headache in his or her own consciousness.”67 And even then the observer could still
not gain knowledge of the particular feeling that the one experiencing the headache has.
The solution of causal epiphenomenalism fares no better according to Ellis. If P1
leads to C1 and P2 to C2 then physiological correlates to consciousness could not be
exactly the same thing and “the question arises as to what sort of entity C1 is if it is to be
distinguished from a physical entity.”68 Ellis does not here explain why this question is
problematic. It appears that he wants to deny that consciousness is simply caused by
physical substrates while at the same time denying that consciousness is a non-physical
dimension of the human being. But in any case causal epiphenomenalism, along with the
psychophysical identity theory, still leaves no role for consciousness to cause
neurological activity. It simply denies that one’s intention to act really leads to action.
Ellis suggests that epiphenomenalism leads to metaphysical dualism, another
possible solution to the problem of causal overexplanation in traditional neuroscience.
According to this dualism (which Ellis casts in Cartesian terms) there is “some little bit of
67
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matter in the brain whose only purpose is to serve as a substratum for consciousness.”69
But this solution flies in the face of advances in contemporary neuroscience which show
that neurological activity during consciousness is globally distributed and not isolated to
a single part of the brain. “For example,” Ellis explains, “..when impulses caused by optic
stimulation set up patterns of activity in the occipital lobe, but without coordinated limbic
and frontal-cortex activity, no perceptual consciousness results from the occipital
activity.”70 Therefore, consciousness cannot be narrowly correlated with only a specific
part of the brain.
Ellis then goes on to explain that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of psycho-physical
forms or the “enactive approach” does provide a satisfactory account of the relationship
between consciousness and its physiological correlates:
The enactive approach, with its return to Merleau-Ponty’s psychophysical
forms, does avoid this problem of causal overexplanation. It avoids it by
allowing that a process can have causal power. In the case of the
conscious states C1 and C2, and their physical correlates, P1 and P2, the
enactive approach can allow that P1 is necessary and sufficient for P2
(under the given circumstances), while at the same time maintaining that
C1 can also be necessary and/or sufficient for C2 and for P2. The reason
is that, if C1 and P1 relate as process to substratum, then C1 and P1 are
“inseparable” from each other in the sense that they are necessary and
sufficient for each other.71
What does this mean that consciousness and its physical correlates are necessary and
sufficient for each other? For Ellis (and in his view for Merleau-Ponty as well)
consciousness is a process that organizes its physical substrates to achieve its purposes.
Now, a process is inseparable from its substratum elements. A wave on the ocean, for
example, is undividable from the water particles beneath it. If this is true then “the
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process will also be necessary and sufficient for whatever its substratum elements are
necessary and sufficient for.”72 The movement of some water particles is necessary and
sufficient for the movement of others but the whole process of the wave is “in” each
particle and each stage of causal movement. This does not mean of course that the
process is identical to its substrata. To keep with the aquatic example: “a wave on the
ocean may travel many miles in a horizontal direction, while its substratum elements, the
movements of particles of water, are very small vertical oscillations.”73 Of course the
fundamental difference between an ocean wave and the human being is that
consciousness is purposive; it directs and organizes the physical substrata beneath it
while at the same time being inseparable from it. By showing that consciousness as a
purposive process or psychophysical form does have causal power, Ellis provides a
theoretical explanation for our experience of effecting physical movement through our
intentions. He also avoids the problems associated with other attempts to resolve the
problem of causal overexplanation because consciousness is not identical with its
substrate, nor is it an epiphenomenal result of it, nor is it a separate substance.
It is clear that there are potentially significant differences between MerleauPonty’s notion of form as presented by Ellis and Aquinas’s notion of form as presented
by LaRock. For example, Aquinas believes that the form of the whole body is the soul (a
term not even mentioned by Ellis), that the soul is both immaterial and incorruptible and
that it acts as form both when the human being is conscious and when he/she is not
conscious. Ellis’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty is that consciousness is a physical form
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or process and he implies that considering it to be a non-physical entity would lead to
Cartesian dualism. Furthermore, consciousness as a formal power seems confined to
conscious states which means that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of form would be much more
restricted than Aquinas’s view in which the soul is the act of the body during conscious
and unconscious states. For Aquinas it is impossible even to speak about the body
without the soul for the very language of body means informed matter. If in MerleauPonty the formal power of consciousness only applies to conscious states of the body
then he might hold that it is possible to speak of the body apart from its relationship to
form.
Nevertheless, there are enough similarities in how LaRock and Ellis draw,
respectively, on Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty to suggest at least the possibility that these
latter thinkers have enough philosophical commonality for Merleau-Ponty to enrich
Aquinas’s thought. First, both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty recognize that a living
material being is self-organizing because of its form and that it is not a simple by-product
of causal forces outside it. Neither would deny that living material beings are subject to
influences from their respective environments; however, both hold that via its form an
organism acts into its environment to achieve certain objectives and orders all of its body
parts toward these ends. Thus, in LaRock’s presentation of Aquinas the matter of the
body “depends on form for life and organization”74 and Ellis writes that for Merleau
Ponty the form of living beings “is self organizing in the sense that it must appropriate
the needed material substrata to maintain its patterns of living, rather than merely [have]
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their forms be caused by those substrata.”75 In both cases the matter of the living being is
for the sake of the form and receives its direction from the form. A second similarity is
that (if LaRock and Ellis are correct) both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty do not consider
form and body separate substances but inseparable parts of one integrated whole. LaRock
writes that “soul and body are unified and directly related in the sense that wax and its
impression constitute an integrated whole.”76 Here the inseparability of soul or form and
body extends to both conscious and unconscious states. Now, Ellis also argues that form
and body are inseparable but restricts his explanations of this inseparability to conscious
states of living. He writes, as quoted above, that consciousness and its physiological
correlates “are ‘inseparable’ from each other in the sense that they are necessary and
sufficient for each other.”77 A third similarity in LaRock and Ellis’s accounts is that on
the basis of inseparability between form and body both scholars argue against
physicalism and various problems associated with Cartesian dualism. Aquinas’s rejection
of physicalism is absolute. For him the human form is clearly immaterial and
incorruptible. But Ellis, while interpreting Merleau-Ponty, directly opposes only a certain
kind of physicalism; he objects to the reductive billiard ball sort of materialism in which
consciousness is characterized as a mechanical result of various lines of linear causality.
Ellis seems unwilling to consider that consciousness might be immaterial but he doesn’t
establish any position of this sort using Merleau-Ponty. In any case, both Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty are together in opposing reductive physicalism and it is clear that both
avoid critical problems associated with Cartesian dualism. For example, on Aquinas and
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Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the form/body unity, there is no need to explain how soul
could be a causal power outside of observed physical causality since form is inseparable
from its physiological correlates. As both argue, conscious states can be correlated with
neurological activity without fallacy. Further, on both accounts the mind is dependent
upon the brain or body for its activity and so the problem of neural dependence between
an unextended mental substance and its extended body is avoided.
The similarities between LaRock and Ellis’s use of form from Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty provoke a number of interesting questions. Was Merleau-Ponty through
the examination of subjective experience in phenomenology able to identify what
Aristotle and Aquinas describe on the basis of naturalistic observation? Would
contemporary neuroscientists who draw on Merleau-Ponty also be open to Thomistic
insights into the mind-body problem? Did the scholastic notion of form influence
Merleau-Ponty’s own idea of form? Given the ongoing breakdown of reductive
physicalism in contemporary philosophy and a return, in John Haldane’s words to a
“philosophy of form,” is it possible that their two accounts could work together to
continue the happy demise of computational models of mind? Each of these questions
would be interesting to answer, although I do not take them up in the course of the
dissertation. I raise such questions in part to show possible philosophical benefits to a
further study of Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, the similarities between
LaRock and Ellis’s use of form on the basis of our two thinkers suggests to me the
possibility of compatibility between them. If Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty stand together
on critical points of anthropology, perhaps insights from the latter thinker, unknown to
Aquinas, might be fruitfully integrated into Aquinas’s own philosophical anthropology.
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In Chapter Four I argue that such enrichment can take place. But before I go further I
want to address potential barriers to such a project.
Part II. Counter Claim. Fruitful Compatibility Between Aquinas and MerleauPonty Hindered by Fundamental Philosophical Differences.
In this part of the dissertation I raise several objections to the possibility of a
fruitful comparison between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty. By “fruitful comparison” I
again mean one that would show compatibility between them and open up grounds for
some degree of Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology.
The first of these objections concerns the possibility of comparing any phenomenologist
at a philosophical level with Aquinas. Objections two to four concern Merleau-Ponty
specifically in relation to Aquinas.
Objection #1. Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s Conceptions of Philosophical
Methodology are Opposed to One Another
For the first objection I draw on a Thomist from the latter half of the 20th Century,
Robert F. Harvanek, who was much concerned with waning interest in Aquinas’s
philosophy during the 1960’s. In an article entitled “The Crisis in Neo-Scholastic
Philosophy,” Harvanek provides evidence for this waning interest and juxtaposes it to the
heightened fascination with phenomenology, existentialism and linguistic analysis among
young thinkers of his day. The “crisis” of which he speaks is not only growing resistance
to Aquinas’s thought but how Thomism can incorporate genuine insights attained through
the new philosophical movements. Harvanek reports that “it has become something of the
accepted procedure for Thomists to adopt the word ‘phenomenology’ when describing
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their own philosophical process”78 and refers to Von Hildebrand’s argument that all truly
great philosophers employed phenomenology to develop their insights. Harvanek resists
both claims, although he does state at the end of the article that “a new Thomism has to
be uncovered, read from the viewpoint of phenomenology”79 but a phenomenology that
might very well be modified in light of traditional philosophy.80 Ultimately, he is not
opposed to a phenomenological enrichment of Thomism or to a potential alteration of
phenomenology through dialogue with scholastic and Thomistic thought but he does
believe that there are significant barriers to such integration and that fundamental
differences between Thomism and phenomenology need to be clearly and honestly stated.
Before getting to these barriers it is important to note that Harvanek applies them
to each of the major interpretations of Husserlian philosophy. He states that there is one
group of phenomenologists, led by Adolf Reinach, who proceed on the basis of the early
Husserl and who hold to a certain kind of Platonic realism. These thinkers include Max
Scheler, Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Caspar Nink, S.J.
among others. A second school, Harvanek says, follows the transcendental direction
taken by Husserl. Although this latter direction was considered by the Reinach school to
be a betrayal of the original and authentic meaning of phenomenology, Harvanek
believes that the basic methodology of both phenomenological directions is essentially
the same.81 Later historians of philosophy have identified two other schools of
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phenomenology: existential and hermeneutic. The hermeneutic interpretation (e.g.
Gadamer, Ricouer) was under development in the 1960’s and so Harvanek could not be
expected to distinguish it from the other branches of phenomenology. But the existential
interpretation, which includes Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre was certainly an
established part of the phenomenological tradition by the time Harvanek writes of the
“crisis” in Neo-Scholastic philosophy. Does Harvanek mean to exclude this mode of
phenomenology from his critique of the whole movement? No, it is more likely that he
simply includes them somewhere within the two different directions he believes
phenomenology has taken because he specifically mentions Heidegger and MerleauPonty as phenomenologists and it is clear that he intends his basic portrayal of the
phenomenological method and conception of philosophy to cover all thinkers employing
whatever derivation of Husserl’s philosophy.
Harvanek believes that “there is a basic difference in methodology” between
Aquinas and phenomenology (among other contemporary philosophical movements of
his day) and “ultimately a basic difference in the conception of philosophy.”82 I turn first
to methodological differences regarding the notion of experience. Harvanek believes that
phenomenology is restricted to a dependence upon immediate and subjective experience
because of its insistence on beginning without presuppositions: “this passion for the
immediate in Husserl is rooted in his search for a presuppositionless science.”83 He notes,
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for example, that Scheler approaches the question of God’s existence by exploring Divine
manifestations in personal experience and argues that Heidegger fails to adequately
establish his fundamental ontology precisely because of phenomenology’s exclusive
orientation to the sphere of the immediate. In contrast, Thomists and scholastic thinkers
depend upon “the experience of Western man, or of the human race, [or of] the developed
interpretation of that experience as found in the philosophy, theology, and literature, of
the West and the East.”84 This is a mediate notion of experience not in the sense that
one’s personal self-awareness is filtered through historical and cultural filters but in the
sense that it involves traditions and movements of thought outside of direct personal
experience; it is, therefore, a communal and historical notion of experience.85 The
philosopher who depends upon the experience of Western philosophical thinkers is
therefore not oriented around truths or ideas as they immediately appear to him or her but
in truth as it has been articulated and developed within the philosophical tradition.
Another methodological difference, flowing from these separate notions of
experience, is that phenomenology aims not for demonstrable propositions but for
rigorous explication and analysis of consciousness. The “proof” for the phenomenologist
is to describe adequately subjective experience so that it resounds with others and finds
confirmation in the spheres of their own interior lives. But for the scholastic or Thomistic
thinker this is not philosophical proof. Harvanek reports, for example, that a “scholastic
moralist reading one of von Hildebrand’s analyses of moral attitudes remarked: ‘There
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are many good insights, but he does not prove anything.’”86 For his part, von Hildebrand
was known to be strongly critical of “philosophers ‘who want to demonstrate
everything’” for “‘more truths are immediate than such philosophers recognize.’”87
However, according to scholastic and Thomistic thinkers properly identifying the causes
of things is at the heart of authentic philosophy:
In Aristotelian philosophy, an object is scientifically known when its
causes are known, or, in other terms, when it is demonstrated. The middle
term or the cause is the instinctive and natural quest of the Aristotelian
and the Scholastic. For every statement a “because” is looked for. Of
course, there is a doctrine of intellect and immediate knowledge in
Aristotle, but even truths of this class call for a dialectical and negative
demonstration.88
Perceptual consciousness may be relied upon to accurately bring individual objects in the
world to the intellect but perceptual consciousness provides just a first step in making a
philosophically valid proposition. For instance, I can grasp via perceptual consciousness
that the person standing before me is a human being. I know that all humans are mortal;
thus, I can philosophically conclude that the person before me is mortal. Even the
fundamental principles of philosophy grasped immediately by the intellect-- e.g. principle
of contradiction—need to be explained negatively or dialectically Harvanek believes.
Thus, the effective teacher of first-year philosophy students does not simply declare that
“a thing cannot both be and not be in the same respect at the same time.” He or she tests
it out dialectically, for example, by exploring the possibility that the principle might not
be true and then explaining the need to assume the principle in order to disprove it. For
the Thomist, philosophy demands demonstrable proof, according to Harvanek. Insofar as
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phenomenologists do not establish their claims through demonstration their work is not
philosophical in the sense that is acceptable to Thomists.
These methodological disparities indicate a radical difference between the
Thomistic and phenomenological conceptions of philosophy. For the Thomist, as we
have discussed, the experience that is drawn upon for philosophy is communal and
historical. This “mediate” experience refers not only to philosophical tradition but to
religious faith, as Harvanek explains:
The scholastic conception of philosophy presupposes the truth of the
Catholic faith and the reality of the Catholic experience. Philosophy
proceeds within this context making a clear distinction between theology
and itself but nevertheless recognizing the close relationship between the
two.89
Philosophy is characterized by its relationship to faith in God, to the supernatural. This
does not mean that scholastic thinkers depend upon theological premises to do their work.
Philosophy needs to be grounded in principles that can be established via human reason.
However, philosophy does deal with questions that are raised by faith and it contributes
to claims of faith by showing their compatibility with human reason. Furthermore, its
end, wisdom itself, is ultimately God himself which means that the final destination of
philosophy is exactly the same as the end of theology. But if religious experience for
scholastic thought serves as a basis for philosophical research, the very opposite is the
case in modern philosophical practice including phenomenology. Harvanek again:
In the postmedieval, and then the post-Enlightenment context, the notion
of “pure experience” or of “immediate experience” was developed in clear
consciousness of the distinction between the revelational and supernatural
on the one hand, and the natural on the other. A presuppositionless

89

Ibid., 540.
40

philosophy had to be a philosophy which is derived exclusively from
natural, as contrasted with supernatural, experience.90
If philosophy in a Thomistic vein is characterized by the transcendence of the intellect
reaching out not only toward supernatural principles and the Divine but also towards
truth established in the philosophical tradition, phenomenology (as every modern
philosophical movement) is characterized by immanance, the immanence of immediate
personal experience and natural principles that are considered to be drawn from within
the philosopher’s own self.
Because the method of phenomenology is descriptive analysis rather than
demonstration and because it rests upon an entirely different notion of experience and
because it conceives of philosophy as radically distinct from religious faith, Harvanek
sees “a kind of opposition between the contemporary philosophical trends and
Scholasticism or Thomism.”91 He has already noted that according to some Thomists
phenomenology fails to prove anything. This suggests a barrier to a fruitful comparison
because, from this perspective, there would be no valid conclusions to lay by the side of
Thomistic demonstrations. But Harvanek also notes that there is a corresponding reaction
from phenomenologists and other contemporary thinkers toward scholastic philosophy:
This scholastic concept of philosophy which implicates and includes the
notions of community and tradition and discipleship, as well as the notion
of a philosophy closely bound to theology and intertwined with Christian
experience, is alien to the Cartesian and Husserlian spirit of a completely
presuppositionless philosophy…In the modern view, scholastic
philosophy must break its links with theology and with religious
experience, at least supernatural religious experience, before it can be
accepted as a true philosophy.92
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Harvanek notes that some Thomists, albeit naively, claim that their method is
phenomenological. This obviously indicates a willingness to pursue some kind of fruitful
compatibility between phenomenology and Thomism. Harvanek is concerned with a false
rapprochement that does not recognize fundamental differences but he too would like to
see the opposition between phenomenology and Thomism surmounted. However, the
way to this compatibility might not be on the basis of their current methodologies and
conceptions of philosophy for he suggests that “it might very well be that the task before
the Thomist is the conversion or at least the modification of the contemporary
philosophical mentality.”93 In any case, there seems to be a greater openness on the part
of Thomists toward phenomenology (at least at the time of Harvanek’s writing) than on
the part of contemporary thinkers toward scholastic thought.
Merleau-Ponty himself corroborates the kind of rejection of the scholastic idea of
philosophy that Harvanek notes above. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France,
where Merleau-Ponty had been given a chair, he outlines his conception of philosophy
and the purpose of the philosopher. In one section he specifically addresses claims made
by religious thinkers that there is a final and complete destination for the human being
and that history is oriented toward a destiny in God. He states that:
The philosopher does not say that a final transcendence of human
contradictions may be possible, and that the complete man awaits us in the
future. Like everyone else, he knows nothing of this. He says—and this is
something altogether different—that the world is going on, that we do not
have to judge its future by what has happened in the past, that the idea of a
destiny in things is not an idea but a dizziness, that our relations with
nature are not fixed once and for all, that no one can know what freedom
may be able to do, nor imagine what our customs and human relations
would be in a civilization no longer haunted by competition and necessity.
He does not place his hope in any destiny, even a favorable one, but in
93
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something belonging to us which is precisely not a destiny—in the
contingency of our history. The denial of this is a fixed (nonphilosophical) position.94
Thus, the authentic philosopher rejects faith in the Absolute and instead embraces the
contingency and change which characterize ordinary life grounded in the here and now.
We see in this passage at least one of the essential features of the modern philosophical
project as articulated by Harvanek: the insistence that philosophy detach itself from
religious faith. It is arguable, as we shall see, whether or not Merleau-Ponty was
committed to Husserl’s presuppositionless philosophy of consciousness but in any case it
is clear that for him scholastic thought is not philosophy insofar as it is wedded to
religious faith.
We are confronted, therefore, with a situation in which representatives from both
Thomistic philosophy and phenomenology deny one another even the status of
philosophy and one of our representatives happens to be the very figure whose work I
propose to make compatible with Aquinas! If Harvanek is right there are significant
barriers to discovering compatibility between St. Thomas and Merleau-Ponty because
their very conceptions of philosophy and their methodologies are alien to one another. It
may be that fruitful comparison at a historical level could be attained, for example, to
shed light on differences between medieval and modern thought. But it does seem, on
the basis of Harvanek’s conclusions, that discovering philosophical compatibility that
would enable a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s thought will be difficult.
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Objection #2. Merleau-Ponty is Committed to a Purely Materialistic Anthropology
Incompatible with Aquinas’s Emphasis on the Priority of the Immaterial Soul
We have already encountered the suggestion that Merleau-Ponty is committed to
a purely materialistic anthropology when we addressed Ralph Ellis’s idea that
consciousness could not be conceived of as an immaterial part of the human being. But it
is also clear from Chapter One, Part I that Merleau-Ponty is not a reductive materialist.
Indeed, a significant part of his philosophical career was devoted to opposing empirical
realism which postulates that the human being, like any other object in the cosmos, can
be broken down to its physical and chemical make up and, in theory, exhaustively
known. From his first major work, The Structure of Behavior and onward, Merleau-Ponty
strenuously critiqued this empiricism in large part because scientific explanations are
always a second order expression of a more fundamental experience of the world, an
experience in which objects exist, in part, for consciousness which means that
consciousness itself can never be broken down into a scientifically analyzable object.
Merleau-Ponty denies reductive materialism but this does not mean that he accepts an
immaterial dimension to the human being.
Neither of the scholars whom I will draw on for this section claim that MerleauPonty is a reductive materialist, but each believes he holds to a kind of non-reductive
materialism. I will draw out two slightly different characterizations of this supposedly
materialistic dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical anthropology from two
different commentators on his thought: Steven Priest and Fred Evans.
I first turn to Stephan Priest, author of Merleau-Ponty. Here Priest introduces
readers to the broad range of Merleau-Ponty’s work while also critiquing it and arguing
that it provides a helpful way to introduce human subjectivity into the natural sciences.
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Early in the book Priest makes the following claim about the nature of subjectivity for
Merleau-Ponty:
He thinks subjectivity is physical, or, to put it another way: I am my body.
His phenomenological descriptions steer a careful course between mindbody dualism and materialism. Like the Cartesian dualist he accepts the
reality of consciousness and subjectivity. Like the materialist he accepts
that we are essentially physical beings. However, as in La Structure du
Comportement, he rejects the idea that we are physical objects. We are in
fact physical subjects.95
Merleau-Ponty does not accept any notion of mind as a separate substance in an exterior
relation with a body but he does hold with Descartes, Hegel and Kant that the human
being is a conscious subject who experiences the world. Further, this subject experiences
his or her body from within which means that there must be an essential distinction
between human bodies and other objects which cannot be experienced from within but
are given to consciousness as mere objects. We are subjects because we experience but at
the same time, according to Priest, Merleau-Ponty believes with the materialists that we
and our bodies are essentially physical.
Fred Evans, who has written extensively on Merleau-Ponty, also stresses that
Merleau-Ponty’s anthropology is materialistic but not reductively so and he sees this
anthropology as a very useful critique against mechanical theories of human behavior. In
his book, Psychology and Nihilism: A Critique of the Computational Model of Mind,
from which I take his account of Merleau-Ponty’s supposed materialism, Evans addresses
not so much how Merleau-Ponty’s anthropology is a hybrid of empirical and dualistic
notions of the human being but that the body itself is the source both of our ‘spiritual’
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transcendence and our grounding in the world. Evans writes that, according to MerleauPonty:
The body subject is not a mind and a body: mind is merely a capsule
phrase for indicating the body’s ability to break with its immediate
activities and initiate (for example, to ‘imagine’) others at the ‘periphery’
of the immediate horizon of its activities; and body is merely a capsule
term for our inability to ever break completely with our immediate
situation in the world.96
On the one hand, there is an immanent dimension to this body; because we are enfleshed
material beings we are grounded in specific temporal and spatial parts of the world.
Evans stresses that, for Merleau-Ponty, we cannot even think about the body-subject as
an isolated aspect of the world because we always find ourselves in a concrete situation.
We passively undergo the action of other beings upon us. However, there is also a
transcendent dimension to the body. Insofar as we are ‘mental’ or ‘spiritual’ beings we
can freely initiate action and thereby re-form or re-create the elements of our immediate
surroundings into something original. We can also express universal and abstract
concepts and thereby go beyond our grounding in specific situations. But this
transcendent power is an ability of the body itself: “Our ‘spirituality’ is..rooted in our
bodily existence despite the tradition that attempts to divorce spirit or mind from all
traces of ‘carnality.’”97 As evidence for this Evans points to how all our abstract ideas can
be traced back to our bodily grasp on the world: “for example, to the degree that our most
sophisticated geometrical ideas contain any hint of space, that is, refer to distance, size, or
shape, they refer back to our bodily relations to things.”98 Thus, there is no immaterial
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dimension of the human being for Evans’s Merleau-Ponty; the body is responsible both
for our being a part of the world and for our ability to break out of it.
What then is the distinction between the body as proposed by reductive
materialists and that proposed by Evans’ Merleau-Ponty? If both hold that we are
essentially corporal beings what is the difference between the Merleau-Pontian and
reductivistic conceptions of the human being? Evans addresses this point:
Unlike reductive materialism, which begins by considering the body as
decomposable into micro-parts, that is, into the basic units of physiology,
chemistry, and physics, we must understand the body characterized by
intentionality on the level of its interaction with the objects present to it,
on the level of the ‘subject-object dialogue.’ Explanation of human action,
therefore, must refer primarily to the intentionality of the person or groups
under consideration, and only secondarily to the ‘parts’ of this continual
upsurge toward the other inhabitants of the world.99
An inherent aspect of the reductivistic account of the human being as a compilation of
physical parts is that we are completely determined, just like any other being, by causal
and external forces outside our control. We dwell in passivity to sensory input and any of
our “actions” are ultimately explainable by particles received via sensation. This account
is blind to the intentional action that Merleau-Ponty believes is so fundamental to basic
human experience. As body-subjects we find that we exist in a “continual upsurge toward
the other inhabitants of the world,” that we ceaselessly exist in bodily intentionality
toward the objects of the world. Furthermore, the body itself, as an organic whole,
integrates its various parts so that it can achieve its intentional purposes. As Evans says,
quoting Merleau-Ponty, “each organ and process is what it is only insofar as it is already
unified by the common orientation for which it and the others provide the basis in any
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given situation.”100 A critical difference, then, between the reductivistic and MerleauPontian accounts of the human being is that the former begins with the parts of the body
and assumes they are externally organized while the latter begins with the human being
as a whole being who internally organizes its parts according its own intentional
directions. Evans’s Merleau-Ponty still has an essentially materialistic conception of the
human being but he also believes that the body-subject can initiate action rather than
simply exist in passivity to other objects in the environment.
If Priest and Evans are correct that Merleau-Ponty is committed to a purely
materialistic anthropology and believes that the “soul” of the human being expresses only
a bodily capacity for self-organization and self-initiation, then it may be difficult for us to
find the kind of compatibility that would enable Merleau-Ponty’s ideas to enrich
Aquinas’s. In Aquinas’s notion of the body/soul unity the soul is an immaterial principle
that forms for its purposes the human body. For Aquinas it would be utterly impossible
for the body to exercise the kind of initiative and self-organization that Merleau-Ponty
(according to Priest and Evans) attribute to it. How could anthropological ideas, grounded
in an essential materialism (though not reductivistic) positively contribute to a
philosophical system that rejects the first principles of these ideas?
Objection #3. Merleau-Ponty Has an Idealist Notion of Body/Soul Integration
Incompatible with Aquinas’s Philosophical Realism.
Some commentators on Merleau-Ponty’s work claim that, at least in his early
works, including The Structure of Behavior and The Phenomenology of Perception, he
remains stuck in philosophy of consciousness. Gary Brent Madison, for example, holds
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that breaking “out of the framework of a philosophy of consciousness [is]
something..which Merleau-Ponty had not yet succeeded in doing”101 by the time of the
Phenomenology of Perception. This next major objection to compatibility between
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty emerges from the claim that the latter’s philosophical
anthropology is based upon an idealist foundation. They may both hold that the human
being is an integral union of body and soul but if Merleau-Ponty believes that this union
is only achieved as a mental construction and may not be really so then we have here a
striking difference between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty which would likely preclude
compatibility between them.
In the previous objection I drew out claims from two scholars that Merleau-Ponty
has an essentially materialistic notion of the human being. But now I put forth
commentators who believe that his anthropology is grounded in a kind of idealism. How
is it possible that his work admits of two radically different interpretations? As we will
see in Chapter Three, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical career was largely devoted to
carving out a middle way between reductive scientific materialism and the idealism of a
pure philosophy of consciousness. He positively employed both of these basic positions.
For example, as we saw in Part Two, he drew strongly from the empirical studies of
contemporary science which were certainly grounded in materialistic presuppositions
about the nature of the human being. He also, as we shall see, believed that the
philosopher can only base his/her truth claims in what can be consciously experienced
and in this way shows his dependence upon philosophers of consciousness. Merleau-
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Ponty, therefore, was positively influenced by the two basic positions he so strongly
critiqued and it is not unreasonable that commentators would be able to situate the first
principles of his philosophical anthropology in both of these very different philosophical
positions.
I first turn to David Braine’s claim, grounded in his analysis of The Structure of
Behavior, that Merleau-Ponty’s anthropology is rooted in idealism, but an idealism that
also accepts the validity of certain scientific conceptions of the human being and that
“has an inbuilt anti-metaphysical bent.”102 It is clear that Merleau-Ponty does not accept
the view that the human being is simply a product of causal forces; this we have amply
covered already. But he looks with great favor, Braine shows, on scientific studies which
undercut positivistic causality: “Merleau-Ponty portrays causality as having lost ‘its
mythical meaning of productive causality’ with the result that ‘laws can no longer be
conceived as that which engenders the existence of the facts.’”103 For example, MerleauPonty makes much of research in particle physics which demonstrate that the presence of
an observer shapes the experimental outcome. If the presence of human intentionality can
literally redirect the physical flow of particles then there is space, Merleau-Ponty
believes, for the presence of human freedom among the laws of science. So, we cannot
conceive of the human being as a product of external forces. How then should we think
of the nature of the human being? Braine believes that Merleau-Ponty resists giving any
set, metaphysically grounded, concept of the human being and instead rests his
conceptions of nature upon the meaning-giving power of consciousness:
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[Merleau-Ponty] quotes with agreement the saying of Goldstein that what
we are looking for in the idea of life ‘is not the terminal stone of a
building, but the building itself in which the partial phenomena, at first
insignificant, appear as belonging to a unitary, ordered and relatively
constant formation of specific structure…; we are not looking for a real
foundation (Seinsgrund) which constitutes being, but for an idea, a reason
in knowledge (Erkenntnisgrund) in virtue of which all the particular facts
become intelligible.104
By “building,” Goldstein and Merleau-Ponty mean a general conception of life. They
both allow that there are apparent natural structures but that identifying these should not
be equated with establishing a philosophy of being. Instead, they are looking for ideas,
mental constructions, which make sense out of the various facts of life established by
science. If Braine is right, Merleau-Ponty does not hold that we can have a
metaphysically grounded concept of the human being as an integral union of body and
soul. Whatever unity we discover among human beings is a phenomenon of
consciousness, not something we can really attribute to them.
Another commentator on Merleau-Ponty’s work, Mary Rose Barral, comes to the
same conclusion as Braine does but mainly draws from The Phenomenology of
Perception and, in particular, the introduction to phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty
provides at the beginning of this work. I first quote in full a passage from MerleauPonty’s Phenomenology of Perception employed by Barral to justify her position that he
is an idealist. While describing the beginning point of philosophical reflection MerleauPonty declares:
I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my
antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead, it moves
out towards them and sustains them, for I alone bring into being for
myself (and therefore into being in the only sense that the word can have
for me) the tradition which I elect to carry on, or the horizon whose
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distance from me would be abolished—since that distance is not one of its
properties—if I were not there to scan it with my gaze.105
Barral places her own commentary on this passage in the context of a comparison with
Aquinas. She allows that both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty are interested in discovering
essences through an examination of things in their concrete particularity. However,
Aquinas wants to nail down the “ultimate explanatory principles and causes of the world
of our experience, causes and principles which phenomenology does not investigate.”106
Barral believes that, for Aquinas, the position of the philosopher is irrelevant to the
metaphysical causes of the universe in the sense that his knowing or lack of knowing
makes no difference to these causes because the whole universe is subject to them, is
formed according to them. But, Barral writes, according to Merleau-Ponty the presence
of the subject is essential for philosophical knowledge:
In a sense, it is as if he were saying: I am the cause of things and events,
but things and events do not cause me. He looks at the world from the
point of view of the subject, who can never be a pure spectator, as
Husserl’s epoché would require, or as could be said of Thomas’s
speculation. He is saying, in fact, that he is the one who gives meaning to
the world and to things in the world.107
If Barral’s Merleau-Ponty is right, the meaning of all things, including the human being,
is not something that can be established apart from the subject’s involvement with them.
While it may be true that there are definite structures, stable modes of being, typical
states of affairs, etc. in the world I only know of them because they appear in my
consciousness according to the meaning that I bestow upon them. We could say, then,
that the human being for Aquinas exists on a totally different plane of existence than it
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does for Merleau-Ponty. The integral unity that Aquinas sees between body and soul is a
real one, existing apart from the meaning-giving power of my consciousness.108 But the
plane of reality in which Merleau-Ponty sees the human being as an integral unity is only
within our conscious life.
If Braine and Barral are right and Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about the body/soul
relationship are not intended to describe the make-up of really existing human beings, but
only to identify how we bestow meaning on what we call human beings, then how can
these ideas be imported into Aquinas’s system which is undoubtedly directed toward
identifying the real essence of the human being? Merleau-Ponty may make similar
claims about the body/soul relationship but if their reference is not to the same kind of
being that Aquinas references (but only an ideal one), then a Merleau-Pontian enrichment
of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology may be difficult to achieve.
Conclusion to Chapter One
In this chapter I have attempted to lay the groundwork for a comparison between
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty which, I hope, will end in demonstrating that the two
thinkers are compatible enough for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights into the
integral union of body and soul to enrich Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. In Part I
I argued that the possibility of compatibility between Aquinas & Merleau-Ponty is
suggested by contemporary philosophy of mind theorists, Eric LaRock and Ralph Ellis,
who show that these two very different philosophers make strikingly similar claims about
the human being. First, both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty recognize that a living material
108
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being is self-organizing because of its form and that it is not a simple by-product of
causal forces outside it. Neither would deny that living material beings are subject to
influences from their respective environments; however, both hold that via its form an
organism acts into its environment to achieve certain objectives and orders all of its body
parts toward these ends. A second similarity is that (if LaRock and Ellis are correct) both
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty do not consider form and body separate substances but
inseparable parts of one integrated whole. A third similarity between Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty is suggested by how LaRock and Ellis draw upon them to argue against
physicalism and various problems associated with Cartesian dualism. For example, on
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the form/body unity, there is no need to
explain how soul could be a causal power outside of observed physical causality since
form is inseparable from its physiological correlates. As both LaRock and Ellis argue,
conscious states can be correlated with neurological activity without fallacy. Further, on
both accounts the intellect is partly dependent upon the brain or body for its activity and
so the problem of neural dependence between an unextended mental substance and its
extended body is avoided. These various points of similarity raise at least the interesting
possibility that there is enough compatibility in their respective philosophical
anthropologies for a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s thought.
However, in any kind of journey it is prudent to gain some foresight into potential
difficulties that might hinder it. In my hopeful quest to show that Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophical anthropology can enrich Aquinas’s, I recognize that there are possible
problems which may affect my conclusions; they will certainly affect the way in which I
make the comparison because they indicate probable points of tension between our two
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thinkers. In Part Two, we looked at three objections to the possibility of a fruitful
comparison between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty. On the basis of work by Robert
Harvanek, we first looked at how Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of
philosophy and philosophical methods might be opposed to one another. Because the
method of phenomenology is descriptive analysis rather than demonstration and because
it rests upon an entirely different notion of experience and because it conceives of
philosophy as radically distinct from religious faith, Harvanek sees “a kind of opposition
between the contemporary philosophical trends [including phenomenology] and
Scholasticism or Thomism.”109 In the second objection I drew out claims made by two
experts in Merleau-Ponty’s work--Stephen Priest and Fred Evans—that Merleau-Ponty is
committed to a purely materialistic anthropology and I argued that this would be
incompatible with Aquinas’s teaching that the soul, which forms the body of the human
being, is immaterial. The third objection to possible compatibility between Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty emerges from claims made by David Braine and Mary Rose Barral that
Merleau-Ponty only sees the human being as an integral unity within our conscious life
and does not intend, as Aquinas does, to make metaphysical claims about the really
existing human being.
These are serious objections to the possibility of a fruitful comparison between
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty and, specifically, to the possibility of the latter’s insights
enriching the former’s philosophical anthropology. But as I close out this chapter I want
to offer a final analogy that gives me hope to press forward. Let us imagine a goodhearted humanitarian atheist working for the United Nations. Her job is to understand the
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customs of various tribes in a war-torn region of Africa in order to best structure an
effective peace-keeping policy in the region. She knows little about a certain strife-torn
tribe tucked away in southern Kenya but she has access to detailed and accurate
descriptions of its people from a Christian missionary who has been living with them for
years. The secular humanist and the Christian have radically different ideas about the
nature of the world and of human beings and they would come to little agreement about
the best ways to shape U.N. policy should they find themselves collaborating on a
strategic planning committee. However, the humanitarian’s knowledge is greatly
enriched by the insights of the missionary and she is able to shape a very effective
peacekeeping policy as a result. If we now return to Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty and
assume that the objections arrayed against the possibility of a fruitful comparison are true
there may yet be opportunity for Aquinas to effectively draw upon Merleau-Ponty’s
insights into the nature of the body-soul relationship. If the descriptions of the missionary
are of the same people and places that the U.N. humanitarian is also addressing but they
seriously disagree about the nature of the world, etc. is it not possible for the latter to
simply disregard the difference while drawing upon the missionary’s insights? Similarly,
if Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty address themselves to the same world and both trust the
accuracy of basic descriptions of this world and our involvement in it, might Aquinas be
able to utilize Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions without embracing those philosophical
principles which conflict with his own? Perhaps, but if the third objection is true and
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy remains confined to ideas in consciousness it may be that
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty are not even addressing themselves to the same world.
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Chapter 2 – Aquinas’s Understanding of the Integral Human Being
In this chapter I turn away from a direct examination of the possibility of a
Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology and toward a
description of Aquinas’s teaching on the integral nature of the human being. Before
getting to the specifics of this teaching I want to put it into the broader context of his
Christian philosophy, basic metaphysical schema, and epistemology. A final point of
context I will address is the open-ended and, in the words of Josef Pieper, hope-structured
dimension of Aquinas’s philosophy.110 Although Aquinas was a systematic thinker and
articulated a whole interconnected vision of the universe he by no means offered a closed
system of thinking as some of his critics and proponents have supposed. His
philosophical anthropology is a significant dimension of a vision of the universe which
assumes that Being is both intelligible yet unable ever to be exhaustively grasped by the
human intellect.
Part I – Some Fundamental Dimensions of Aquinas’s Philosophy
A) Aquinas As A Christian Philosopher
I do not mean to imply by saying that Aquinas is a Christian philosopher that his
philosophy itself is grounded on principles of Christian theology. On the contrary,
Aquinas is very careful to distinguish philosophy from theology by marking out their
radically different starting principles: “As sacred doctrine is based on the light of faith, so
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is philosophy founded on the natural light of reason.”111 Aquinas affirms this basic
methodological difference in Chapter Four of the Summa Contra Gentiles II when he
argues that philosophers and Christian theologians think about creatures in opposite
ways. At this point one might argue that the very language of creatures (creaturis) is
already imbued with a theological slant because it implies that natural beings were made
by a personal God, but Aquinas holds that philosophy is able to affirm God as the first
efficient cause of the entire universe and so the theology implied in creaturis is not
necessarily Christian or based on revelation but is of a natural sort.112 In any case,
philosophers approach creatures in “bottom to top” fashion not assuming, at least
initially, that they are the revelation of God’s power but thinking first about their
immediately manifest nature—e.g. that fire moves upward, that certain objects have no
interior principle of animation but others do, that human beings are animals with
rationality. “In the teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and
leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures,
the last of God.”113 Philosophy does reach up to God but only through what it can gather
on the basis of natural observation. However, “in the teaching of faith, which considers
creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration of God comes first, that of
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creatures afterwards.”114 The theologian rooted in revelation has a sort of “top to bottom”
approach to the natural world; he/she first regards its objects—mountains, fire, leaping
stags—as representing the glory of God and only then thinks about natural beings in
themselves. Thus, the disciplines of philosophy and Christian theology proceed from
entirely different methodological foundations, although both are directed toward many of
same objects. Both can conclude, for example, that God is One and the First Cause of the
universe.
What then is meant by Aquinas’s ‘Christian philosophy’? This phrase does not
indicate that authentic philosophy necessarily confirms Christian teaching, for Aquinas
famously holds that one can believe, on the basis of human reason, in the eternity of the
world even though one cannot, on the basis of his or her Christian faith, accept that the
world is eternal. The phrase does indicate how Aquinas uses philosophy for the
exposition and defense of the Christian faith. The science of human wisdom or
philosophy is not inherently ordered toward this kind of apologetic but it can be
employed to advance the claims of faith. He states, for example, in his Exposition of
Boethius on the Trinity that theologians can draw on the work of philosophers in three
ways. First, “to demonstrate items that are preambles to faith.”115 Such preambles include
truths about God that we can rationally know—e.g. that God is simple and unchanging.116
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Aquinas insists that the same truths cannot be known in the same person both according
to faith and according to reason.117 For those who are uneducated in philosophy, truths
that can be rationally demonstrated might instead be accepted via revelation and, as such,
do not function as preambula ad articulos fidei. However, truths that can be determined
through the science of human wisdom Aquinas calls preambles of faith and he holds that
they can aid in the acceptance of the teachings of the ‘divine science’ because our
intellect is able to be led by “what is known through natural reason..to that which is
above reason.”118 Second, philosophy is able “to make known those items that belong to
the faith by means of certain similitudes.”119 For example, Augustine in his book On
Order shows that there are certain similarities between philosophical truths and the
reality of the Trinity. Third, philosophy is able “to oppose statements against the faith,
either by showing that they are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.”120
Christian theologians might, for example, undercut the position of a heretic not by
appealing to revelation but by showing how it contains logical contradictions. For
Aquinas, philosophy is not Christian in the sense that it is grounded in supernatural
principles but because it serves the advancement of the Christian faith. In fact all
sciences, including philosophy, serve as handmaidens (ancillae) to the divine science.121
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B) Aquinas’s Basic Metaphysical Schema And The Place of the Human Being
Within It
Within Aquinas’s grand metaphysical schema all created beings are sent out by
God (exitus) and exist in a movement of return to God (reditus). Aquinas grounds this
metaphysical structure on philosophical bases but also considers it from the perspective
of theology. For example, he teaches that final end of the human being is the beatific
vision, the ultimate reditus. Although the very existence of the end of contemplating God
and divine things can be ascertained through philosophy122 the possibility of seeing a
personal God face to face comes through the light of revelation. And, a fortiori, the
beatific vision itself is a gift from God because it exceeds the natural powers of the
human mind. Another central example of the theological dimension of Aquinas’s overall
metaphysical structure is that he recognizes that the entire created order, as a result of
Adam’s sin, exists in a wounded and disordered state. Christian revelation teaches that
Christ’s descent from the Triune Godhead, in which he becomes a human being, dies, and
rises from the grave, enables each person and the whole universe to overcome defects
caused by original sin and to achieve its preordained end in God.123 Still, the basic idea of
the universe as a journey in which creation starts out from God and exists in a movement
of return to God is an accomplishment of philosophy which means that, for Aquinas,
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philosophy is fundamentally theological. The science of human wisdom, according to the
internal capabilities of this science, determines that human beings are ordered to God.
If God is the source and summit of Aquinas’s metaphysical structure then proofs
of God’s existence would be obviously a central part of his approach. And indeed
Aquinas begins each of his two Summae with detailed arguments for the existence of
God. In the Summa Theologica his famous “five ways” take up Question 3, Article Two
of the First Part and in the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas demonstrates God’s
existence in Chapter 13 of Book One. Each of the various proofs begins with sense
perception. The first of Thomas’s five ways is grounded in our experience of motion. It is
clear that Aquinas puts special priority on this argument because it is the only one he
emphasizes in the Summa Contra Gentiles; there he provides a great deal more detail (13
pages) than the simple paragraph devoted to the first way in the Summa Theologica.
In order to help show the centrality of sense experience for Aquinas, I highlight
below the critical steps which he takes in the “first way” from motion. Aquinas says that
this proof is the “more manifest way” than the others not because it is the simplest but
because “it is certain, and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in
motion.”124 Aquinas here indicates the basic trust he has in sense experience. Unlike
Descartes, who distrusts the senses and who starts his proof of God’s existence in an
internal experience of doubting everything but his own doubt, Aquinas assumes the
existence of the world and has absolute certainty that there are beings in the world whose
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motion he can perceive. This trust is obviously critical to his whole philosophical project
because he rests his demonstrations of God’s existence and entire metaphysics upon it.125
What is motion, according to Aquinas? He states, borrowing Aristotle’s definition
from the Physics (Bk 3,Ch. 1), that it “is nothing else than the reduction of something
from potentiality to actuality.”126 Aquinas is not just speaking about local motion but of
any change whatsoever – alteration, growth, even diminution. After defining motion
Aquinas argues that “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by
something in a state of actuality.”127 A reality like fire—a typical example employed by
Aquinas that he uses here as well—is actually hot and it heats up wood which is
potentially hot but just prior to contact with the fire is actually cold. Here the argument
depends upon the principle of contradiction: wood cannot be at the same time potentially
hot and actually hot for then it would both be and not be the same thing in the same
respect, which is impossible. The wood cannot bring itself to a point of being actually hot
and therefore it needs something that is actually hot—fire—in order to undergo the
change from cold to hot. Aquinas then states “it is impossible that in the same respect and
in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move
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itself.”128 He goes on to make a major claim that “therefore whatever is in motion must be
put in motion by another.”129 Within the Summa Contra Gentiles I Aquinas takes pains to
show that ultimately no being can move itself but here he skips this possible objection.
However, the claim that whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another does
stack up well to basic common sense observation. Human beings are moved, for example,
by other people, by objects which attract their appetite, by the call of duty, and so on. The
second part of Aquinas’s first way is that it is impossible for there to be an infinite series
of movers who are themselves moved: “this cannot go on to infinity because then there
would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent
movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.”130 Thus,
without a first mover who is itself unmoved there would be no motion at all. Every being
that moves is dependent upon the being (or beings) who gave it motion. If there is no
unmoved mover then there is no explanation at all for why there is motion; indeed, there
would be no motion. But motion exists and thus there must be an unmoved mover whom,
according to Thomas, “everyone understands to be God.”131 This brief foray into one of
Aquinas’s demonstrations of God’s existence is important for showing that his
metaphysics is based not on God as described through revelation but upon the workings
of human reason trusting in sense perception.
After proving God’s existence and treating various aspects of God’s attributes
Aquinas goes on in each of his Summae to address creation. At this point we turn to the
exitus dimension of Aquinas’s metaphysics and how God, out of the abundance of his
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goodness, created the universe ex nihilo. Any claim that creation was necessary for God
would indicate that he was determined to act which would mean that God is not
completely free and thus not perfect. “The fact that creatures are brought into existence,
though it takes its origin from the rational character of God’s goodness (ex ratione
divinae bonitatis originem habeat), nevertheless depends solely on God’s will.”132
But why did God create such a diverse universe where there are some species of
beings that, from a human perspective, appear quite “low”—e.g. slugs and bugs—and
others quite “high”—e.g. angels? In the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas answers this
question in several ways. I will address two of his responses. Aquinas begins the first one
by stating that “since every agent intends to introduce its likeness (similitudinem) into its
effect, in the measure that its effect can receive it, the agent does this the more perfectly
as it is the more perfect itself.”133 Poor sculptors will do a poor job carving into stone the
forms they want to materialize, while excellent ones will do a correspondingly excellent
job of carving into stone those forms they want to materialize. As the most perfect agent
God’s likeness should be manifest in his creation in the best possible way. But precisely
because of God’s perfection, Aquinas argues that it would be impossible for any one
creature to allow the universe to bear an appropriate likeness to its Creator. God, as
cause, is simple and one but causes always transcend their effects; thus, there could not
be an effect from God that shared in his simplicity and unicity. Thus, “the presence of
multiplicity and variety among created things was..necessary that a perfect likeness
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(similitudo perfecta) to God be found in them according to their manner of being.”134 By
similitudo perfecta Aquinas does not mean that created being is a perfect copy of God as
if the latter were a kind of clone of the former. He means that the universe taken as a
whole is the most complete image of God that is possible “to a degree consonant with
created being.”135
It is perhaps easier to see how angels and human beings bear a likeness to God
than inanimate beings and creatures who lack the powers of rationality and will which
intellectual creatures have in common with God. How does this inequality in the universe
contribute to the whole creation being a similitudo perfecta of God? Aquinas argues that
a being is more like God if it resembles him in more than just one way. God is goodness
and poured out this goodness into other beings in the act of creating them. “Hence, the
creature approaches more perfectly to God’s likeness if it is not only good, but can also
act for the good of other things.”136 But acting for the good of other things requires both
plurality and inequality in the universe. One cannot pour out its goodness upon another
unless there is another to receive it; thus, we see the need for plurality. Further, the
presence of varying species allows creatures that are more like God to help those who are
less like him. Thus, the angels, purely intellectual substances, can act for the good of the
created order beneath them. The human race is able to act for the good of the various
species below it. The existence of diverse grades of being, the higher helping the lower,
was necessary in order for the created order to represent God as Goodness outpouring
goodness upon lesser beings.
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I have just touched briefly on some of the different grades of being present in the
universe, but in order to more accurately place human beings in the context of the
universe I now turn to a more complete treatment of the basic dimensions on the ladder of
being. I will first look at material creatures composed of matter and form. An important
principle for ranking these beings is the extent to which form transcends the matter it
informs: “the higher the form, the more it surpasses (superexcedit) matter in its being.”137
At the lowest level of form/matter composites we find the basic natural elements
of the universe, what is today indicated by the periodic table. Within these elements
forms “are altogether material and wholly embedded in matter,”138 because the forms
themselves have the dispositions of matter—e.g. moisture, density.
Above the lowest forms Aquinas describes the forms of mixed bodies. For the
most part the mixed bodies have the same operations as those of the natural elements but
their operations can sometimes produce the same effects as those of the natural elements
but through a “higher power which they receive from the heavenly bodies.”139 The case in
point Aquinas gives is the lodestone or magnet which exhibits density and gravity but
which can also attract iron to itself through, Aquinas believes, the action of the heavenly
bodies140 working within its form.
Above this level Aquinas describes the souls of plants that are “principles of
movement in living things, which move themselves.”141 The souls of plants are able to
surpass the power of the natural elements (e.g. earth, water) because they draw them into
137
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themselves, although the elements directly assist plant forms in their operations. For
example, through drawing up moisture and nutrients into itself the plant is enabled to
continue growing.
A step beyond plant forms is that of animal forms. Here we find forms
“resembling the higher substances, not only in moving, but even, somehow, in knowing
(in cognoscendo), so that they are capable of operations to which the aforesaid qualities
[of the natural elements] are of no assistance.”142 Many different species of animals can
act through some degree of knowledge achieved via the bodily powers of sensation and
imagination. For example, lions can sense the fresh smell of the gazelle that it is nearby
and, in some latent way, can imagine their prey as they track it. These cognitive powers
are not directly caused by the elemental properties of the animal’s bodily organs (e.g.
heating and cooling), Aquinas says, “although these [properties] are necessary for the due
disposition of the organ involved.”143
We now come to the human soul. This form is animal in that it has the powers of
sensation and imagination but it is also similar to substances higher than itself (i.e. God
and the angels) in that it can achieve intellectual knowledge. God and the angels, who are
purely immaterial substances, do not require any bodily organs in order to understand.
Likewise, the understanding of human beings does not directly depend upon matter.
Aquinas points out that “the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for
instance, it knows a stone absolutely as stone.”144 If this soul were material or depended
upon bodily organs knowledge of a thing’s universal nature would be impossible on the
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principle that an effect cannot have what is not in the cause. There is no power in a bodily
organ to access a universal reality that transcends its instantiation in a particular being.
Thus, our ability to know the absolute nature of something is not from any of our bodily
organs. On the other hand, human knowledge does require initial sense perception which
means that the intellectual soul of the human being is different than the intellects of God
and the angels because it is naturally suited to a body:
But since the human soul’s act of understanding needs powers—namely,
imagination and sense—which function through bodily organs, this itself
shows that the soul is naturally united to the body in order to complete the
human species.145
The human soul does not start its existence with an apriori grasp of universal principles
or with some untapped stock of knowledge but in a tabula rasa state. In order for us to
know the absolute nature of anything we must first have access to the world of concrete
particulars and our access to this world is achieved through imagination and sense. Thus,
the form of the human being is higher than the form of any other composite being. The
operation of the animal form directly depends upon bodily organs, but the human form in
its understanding “transcends the condition of corporeal matter” and thus “must not be
wholly encompassed by or imbedded in matter.”146
Between human beings and God exists the angelic order of creatures which are
not material and, therefore, not composite beings of form and matter. A particular angel’s
form is its substance and, because there is no matter within an angel, it is impossible, on
Aquinas’s metaphysics of individuation, that there be several individual angels of one
species; instead, every angel is its own species. The angelic form is higher than the form
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of human beings because it completely transcends matter. Its knowing does not require
the powers of sensing and imagination. Given our embodied groundedness in specific
times and places, human beings must slowly work their way to a knowledge of the
universe, but Aquinas holds that the angels do not come to knowledge discursively.
Instead “in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things
whatsoever that can be known in them.”147
If the angels are immaterial and separate intellectual substances capable of
knowing at once all natural things that they can know what makes them different from
the divine substance? How does their form differ from God’s form? Aquinas teaches that
God is the fullness of existence itself and that all being subsists in him; God is being.
Thus, God’s goodness, love, understanding and any other attribute that we rightly
attribute to God are all God himself; God is goodness or God is love, etc. Because of the
fragmented nature of our understanding we have distinct names for the different attributes
of God but in him there are no real distinctions. If God is being then he must be
absolutely simple for being encompasses everything and it would be impossible for there
to exist something that could be separate from being for if it were separate it would have
existence, but being already encompasses all existence. Thus, in God there is no
difference between being and what is or essence. Angelic creatures are not composed of
matter and form but nevertheless “a certain composition is found in them by the fact that
in them being is not the same as what is.”148 The what is of the angel refers to its
existence as an intellectual substance but this what is does not refer to the fullness of
existence because it does not encompass the divine being.
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I have so far addressed Aquinas’s central proof for God’s existence, his teaching
that the universe was created by God through the abundance of his goodness, and the
various levels of the ladder of being. I now turn to the reditus dimension of Aquinas’s
metaphysics, the return of the created order back to God.
In Chapter 46 of the Summa Contra Gentiles II Aquinas argues that all beings are
naturally inclined to return to God. He states that:
An effect is most perfect when it returns to its source (Tunc enim effectus
maxime perfectus est quando in suum redit principium); thus, the circle is
the most perfect of all figures, and circular motion the most perfect of all
motions, because in their case a return is made to its starting point. It is
therefore necessary that creatures return to their principle in order that the
universe of creatures may attain its ultimate perfection.149
God, as the perfect craftsman, would not create an imperfect universe and thus it was
necessary that every creature return back to him, the source of the universe.
In the same chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles II Aquinas indicates two
different ways that created beings return to their source. One way is achieved as a being
images the Creator simply by existing according to its own particular essence and apart
from any additional operation on its part. “Each and every creature,” Aquinas says,
“returns to its source so far as it bears a likeness to its source, according to its being and
nature.”150 Thus, the first way corresponds to the first act of creatures, their esse, which
Aquinas also calls a creature’s first perfection. The esse of composite things derives from
the form of these beings; thus, the matter of the composite thing is what it is because of
the act of the form. Now, all creatures, even sub-intellectual ones, return to God simply
by being. Even if the existence of the sub-atomic quark is miniscule it still has a likeness
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to God who is existence itself. But God’s nature is intellectual. And “since God’s intellect
is the principle of the production of creatures..the existence of some creatures endowed
with intelligence was necessary”151 in order for the universe as a whole to return to God.
The universe would not be complete in its return to God, according to first act, unless
some beings had an intellectual nature as God does.
The second way creatures return to their source is through their operations. This
second way corresponds to their second act, the operations or essence-structured actions
through which their esse is manifest. This second act also constitutes a thing’s second
perfection. Now, a creature’s operations tend naturally toward the good that is proper to
it. A plant’s stems and leaves reach out toward the sun and its roots seek out water so that
it might achieve optimal vegetative growth. An animal establishes itself in a particular
environment so that it can find the appropriate food and shelter and thus thrive according
to its nature. In moving toward the good appropriate to themselves creatures operate
according to their own natures and in doing so they return to God by imaging him whose
own operations perfectly correspond to the divine nature. However, the operations of
plants, animals and any other sub-human creatures are not rational. But God has no other
operation than those of intellect and will. Thus, in order for the universe to most perfectly
image God in its return to God, it was necessary that there be creatures who operate
according to intellect and will.
Now, a central dimension of God’s action is the outpouring of his goodness upon
the universe in creating it. God also conserves or sustains the universe and thereby
contributes to the good of the universe in an ongoing fashion. If a critical part of God’s
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operation is to contribute to the good of others, then for intellectual creatures to image
God adequately in their operations and thereby return to him they must also contribute to
the good of others. While discussing above God’s reasons for creating diversity in the
universe I addressed Aquinas’s argument that in order for the universe to image God
most perfectly it required the existence of intellectual creatures which contribute to the
good of others. But this contribution is the same way that intellectual creatures make their
journey back to God.
One very important aspect of this beneficent reditus intellectual creatures make is
that it implies that sub-intellectual creatures are not able, by themselves, adequately to
return to God and that intellectual creatures have a responsibility for helping them on
their journey. If sub-intellectual creatures could adequately return to God simply by being
and operating according to their natures then intellectual creatures could contribute
nothing to their perfection and thus nothing to their journey back to God.
But how do intellectual beings actually help sub-intellectual creatures reach their
proper perfection and thereby return to God? In his article, “How Knowing the World
Completes the World: A Note on Aquinas and Husserl,” John C. McCarthy helps provide
Aquinas’s answer. I turn first to a section of text quoted by McCarthy drawn from the
same chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles I have been addressing above:
In all things becomingly ordered, the relation of secondary terms to the
ultimate term imitates the relation of the first to all the others, both first
and last, though sometimes deficiently. Now, it has been shown that God
comprehends in Himself all creatures. And this is represented in corporeal
creatures, although in another way. For the superior body is always found
comprehending and containing the inferior, but according to quantitative
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extension, while God contains all creatures in a simple way, and not by
extension of quantity.152
McCarthy then gives a simple example from geometry to show what Aquinas means by
higher corporeal bodies comprising and containing lower ones according to quantity.
Within the structure of the cube the line contains the point, the plane contains the line
while the cube contains each of these quantitative dimensions beneath it. God contains
the cube and every other object in the universe but not in a material way. McCarthy goes
on quoting from the same passage:
In order that the imitation of God, in this way of containing not be lacking
to creatures, intellectual creatures were made which contain corporeal
creatures not by quantitative extension but simply by way of
understanding: for what is understood is in the one understanding and is
comprehended by his intellectual operation.153
McCarthy’s gloss on this is that “the way the whole universe is comprehended by the
divine intellect is imaged in the way the sub-intellectual world is understood by created
intelligence.”154 In a sense the whole sub-intellectual world is held in the mind of
intellectual creatures in the understanding which the latter have of them and this is an
imitation of how God comprehends and contains the whole created order.
It is perhaps easier to see how the containing and comprehending of the subintellectual creation by intellectual creatures is a perfection of the latter class of beings as
opposed to the former. Intellectual beings return to God by imitating him in their
operations of knowing the whole sub-intellectual order. But how does this knowing
perfect the sub-intellectual creatures? How does it contribute to their good? This question
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becomes especially weighty when we consider Aquinas’s position that knowing is a
perfection of the knower and not of the thing known. McCarthy illustrates Aquinas’s
position with the following passage from De veritate:
Knowledge depends upon the knowable, but the converse does not obtain;
whence the relation by which knowledge is referred to the knowable is
real, but the relation by which the knowable is referred to knowledge is of
reason merely…and thus is it in all things which stand to one another as
measure and measured, or that which perfects and that which is
perfected.155
So, if in knowing, human reason is measured and perfected by the object of intellection
but this object itself is not measured or perfected by the knower how can it be, as we
discussed earlier, that intellectual creatures contribute to the good of sub-intellectual
creatures by knowing them?
McCarthy takes us to De veritate 2.2 to address this difficult question. In this text
Aquinas marks out two different ways that created things are perfected. The first way is
the perfection of its first act, or esse. Aquinas does not here distinguish first act from
second act as he does in the Summa Contra Gentiles II, 46; the two kinds of perfection
Aquinas noted there are reduced to one in this section. After stating that “a thing is
perfect with respect to the perfection of its act of existence.”156 he goes on to say that any
created being remains imperfect. Why?
Since the specific esse of one thing is distinct from the specific esse of
another thing, therefore in any created thing of this kind the perfection in
each single thing falls short of perfection simply speaking to the degree
that perfection is found in other species (De Veritate, Q. 2, A. 2 as quoted
in McCarthy 1993, 78).
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A cat has its own perfection as a cat but insofar as it is not a mouse or a louse or a
member of any other species, its particular feline perfection is incomplete for it does not
possess the perfection of these other species. Aquinas further states that:
The perfection of any thing considered in itself is imperfect as being a part
of the perfection of the whole universe, which arises from the perfection
of single things gathered together (invicem congregatis).157
Any created thing by itself remains imperfect or incomplete because it is only a part of
the whole universe and therefore does not contain the perfection of the whole universe in
itself. It gains its perfection by being gathered up with other beings of the universe. How
does this integration occur? What is the remedy for the problem of singular created
beings lacking perfection and needing to be “gathered together” with other created
beings? Aquinas goes on:
In order that there be some remedy for this imperfection another mode of
perfection is found in created things according to which the perfection
which is proper to one thing is found in another thing: and this is the
perfection of the knower insofar as he is knowing, because something is
known by the knower according to this, namely, that the known thing
itself is in some way in the knower.158
With this passage we come full circle to the section from Summa Contra Gentiles II.46.4
where Aquinas argues that intellectual creatures are able to contribute to the good of subintellectual creatures. Even though these creatures have their own perfection (through
their existence and operations) they lack the perfection of other beings. They are able to
gain this perfection by being joined with them in the soul of a knowing being. When
intellectual creatures “contain corporeal creatures..by way of understanding them”159 they
perfect them as they unify them with other species which they also hold in their intellect.
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It is, as it were, that the various species of sub-intellectual creation find their proper place
within the knower. They are perfected by being intellectually recognized as an integral
part of the universe, a recognition that they obviously do not have on their own.
Now, every being whose existence is distinct from its essence has the kind of
imperfection noted above, that its specific esse is distinct from the specific esse of
another being. And thus intellectual creatures are in need of the same remedy that they
are able to provide for sub-intellectual creatures. They must be known by an intellectual
being who can unify them with all the other beings in the universe. This other being is, of
course, God himself who contains all created intellectual substances along with subintellectual beings in his own intellect and is therefore ultimately responsible for the
perfection of creation and its return to himself. Because God is the fullness of esse and
every creature takes its existence via participation in this esse, he does not suffer from the
imperfection of not containing perfection found in other species. Humans and angels are
designed to contribute to the perfection of the sub-intellectual creation by knowing them
for through this act God’s creation is an adequate image of him but these created
intellectual substances are, in turn, perfected by God as he contains them and the rest of
the whole universe in himself.
I have so far not distinguished the separate roles of angels and human beings in
the return of the universe to God. None of the texts I have been treating distinguish their
functions but it is certainly the case that their roles are not the same. Indeed, just as the
whole sub-intellectual creation depends upon human beings for their return to God,
insofar as they are known by them, so too does the human species depend upon the
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angels for their return to God.160 How so? Aquinas believes that “beings that participate
more fully in the power of the divine providence are executive agents of divine
providence (executiva divinae providentiae) in regard to those that participate less.”161
Thus, the angels, who participate more fully in God’s power than human beings, who are
closer to him in being, are responsible for exercising Divine providence over human
beings and helping them return to their source.162 This happens in at least two ways.
First, human beings are actually enlightened by the angels with regard to universal
truth.163 Second, human beings are assisted by the angels to do good.164
In this relatively lengthy, but necessary, excursus into Aquinas’s overall
metaphysical schema of the universe, the human being occupies a central linking place

160

Aquinas believes that Divine providence is accomplished in large part through the
work of the angels. The universe would be incomplete without the existence of the angels
and the return of human beings and the sub-intellectual creation to God would be
impossible without them. See, for example: Summa Contra Gentiles III, Chapter 77 That the Execution of Divine Providence is Accomplished by Means of Secondary
Causes, Chapter 78 - That Other Creatures are Ruled by God by Means of Intellectual
Creatures, and Chapter 79 – That Lower Intellectual Substances are Ruled by Higher
Ones.
161
SCG III.78.2.
162
See Oliva Blanchette’s discussion of the special function human beings have in the
perfection of the universe. Blanchette argues that although the Angels are closer to God
in terms of spiritual power and have a higher role than human beings in their exercise of
Divine Providence, human beings are still at the center of Aquinas’s theory of the
universe in part because sub-intellectual creatures and the separated substances are
ordered to serve them. See Chapter 7, “The Human Being’s Special Affinity with the
Total Perfection of the Universe,” and “The Human Being’s Own Promotion of the
Perfection of the Universe,” in The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas,
(University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 280-85.
163
See, for example, Summa Theologiae Ia.111.1: “The human intellect..cannot grasp the
universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
the phantasms…So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes
of sensible things.”
164
See, for example, Summa Theologiae Ia.113.2: “human knowledge and affection can
vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be
deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.”
78

between separate or intellectual substances—God and the angels—and corporeal
substances. Aquinas takes great delight in the marvelous connections between the various
beings of the universe and how “divine wisdom has united the ends of higher things with
the beginnings of the lower.”165 Human beings are the lowest of intellectual substances
because our intellectual souls, though immaterial, depend upon sense perception through
our bodies to gain knowledge. But we are also the highest of corporeal creatures because
our bodies are designed to be infused with the intellectual substance of our rational souls.
C) Aquinas’s Epistemology
Unlike modern philosophers, who often consider first philosophy to be
epistemology, and who often begin philosophical inquiry with questions about what can
be known and how it is known, Aquinas places his epistemology within the context of his
metaphysical theory and philosophical anthropology (which includes his psychology). He
begins, as we saw above, both of his Summae with proofs for the existence of God, and
then addresses the creation of the universe. In both Summae Aquinas then goes on to
address the nature of the angels before getting to the nature of the human being. Now, in
the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas does not specifically thematize questions of human
knowing. However, he does in the Summa Theologica’s Treatise on Man. Here Aquinas
first describes the essence of the soul (Ia.75), then the human soul’s union with the body
(Ia.76), then the various powers of the soul (Ia.77-83), and then how and what human
beings know (Ia84-89). Thus, after establishing his theory of the essence of the human
being Aquinas then addresses the way of knowing that is natural to us given our
composite nature.
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If Aquinas’s approach is to address philosophical anthropology prior to questions
of human knowing, why should I reverse the procedure here and address the later before
the former? Although Aquinas thematically treats questions of our knowing after his
metaphysics and his anthropology, he nevertheless utilizes epistemological principles to
prove the existence of God and establish his theory of human nature. Thus, in his natural
theology he makes certain assumptions about how we know—e.g. that our perception of
movement in concrete singulars is the first step to a philosophical grasp of God’s
existence—and then later he specifically addresses these assumptions (e.g. in Summa
Theologica Ia.84). Furthermore, his definition of truth actually occurs in both Summae in
the context of his treatment of God. In this present section I address some basic
dimensions of Aquinas’s epistemology because they are operative in his philosophical
anthropology. I will first address his theory of truth, second how our souls operate in
order to gain knowledge, and finally the primacy of sense perception for Aquinas’s
theory of human knowing.
For Aquinas, truth as well as goodness, is intimately related to being (ens).
Goodness is convertible (convertantur) with being in that it presents being under the
aspect of desirability. A thing is good as it is desirable, but a thing is only desirable
insofar as it is perfect and a thing is only perfect insofar as it is has actual existence.
Thus, insofar as there is being, there is goodness.166 Truth also is convertible with being
as Aquinas tersely presents in the following passage from Summa Theologica:
Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore
it is said in De Anima iii that the soul is in some manner all things,
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through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible
with being, so is the true.167
A particular person’s soul may not actually know all things, but it exists in potentia to
know all things and to the extent that it does gain knowledge of a thing, it somehow
contains that thing within itself. As I will discuss below the knower does not have the
matter of a thing within its soul, but the immaterial form of a thing. But because it is
precisely the form of a thing in a form/matter composite that gives existence to the whole
composite, by grasping the form, the knower gains understanding of the thing.
Essentially, truth is the knowability of being, just as goodness is the desirability of being.
However, being is not exactly the same as either goodness or truth, because if it
were exactly the same it would be both superfluous and confusing to call being by
different names. Goodness and truth each expresses a different relationship of creatures
to being. The creature who seeks goodness also seeks being insofar as it is desirable.
Here the term or end of the creature’s appetite is primarily being as an object. The
intellect of the creature who seeks to know goes out toward being, insofar as it is
knowable, but here the end of the act is primarily within the intellect itself. In very basic
terms, a creature’s primary relationship to being as goodness is a subject-toward-object
relationship in which being is desired and a creature’s primary relationship to being as
truth is an object-toward-subject relationship in which being is known—i.e. brought
within the mind of the knower.
So, truth expresses a certain kind of relationship that intellectual creatures have
with being, but what is truth? Aquinas follows Aristotle in defining it as the “adequation
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of thought and thing (veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus).”168 Truth means that a
thing is in the intellect as understood. Thus, Aquinas embraces Augustine’s definition of
truth, which is “that whereby what is, is manifested (veritas est, qua ostenditur id quod
est).”169 The being of a thing is clearly grasped by the knower but such understanding is
not in the thing known but in the knower.
Although truth as “adequation of thought and thing” primarily means, at least for
created beings, truth as the conformity of intellect to the thing known, there is a
secondary aspect of this fundamental definition—“the truth of things insofar as they are
related to the intellect”170--and this expresses the dependency of being on intellect. We
can see this with artificial things that come from humans. For example, an architect
designs a house. The very concept of the house emerges from the mind of the architect
and thus it depends upon him/her for its truth. When the house is built it is true insofar as
it conforms to the concept that the architect established for it. We can also see that being
depends upon intellect with regard to the whole universe, which was created in God’s
mind. Things in the universe are true, Aquinas says, “insofar as they express the likeness
of the species that are in the divine mind.”171 Human beings have the capacity, because of
their free will, either to properly express the likeness of the human species that is in
God’s mind—e.g. by living in charity—or to disfigure this likeness—e.g. by living in
hatred. When we live in charity we are true to ourselves as intended by God; when we

168

Summa Theologica 1a.16.1. Benzinger renders adequatio as ‘equation,’ but this
suggests a literal and thus unworkable sameness between the objective reality of a thing
and its presence in the intellect. Thus, I employ ‘adequation’ to allow for the ontological
difference between a thing’s objective reality and its presence in the intellect.
169
Ibid. My translation.
170
Ibid.
171
Ibid.
82

live in hatred we are not. Truth is in things and depends upon a divine intellect. However,
when we address the human knowing of the created order truth is primarily the equation
of our minds with the being of things and in this sense the truth is in our intellects.
I turn now to how human beings actually come to gain truth and I want first to
remark that for Aquinas the human being is most naturally ordered to know beings of a
composite nature because it is a being of a composite nature: “The power of knowledge is
proportioned to the thing known…[and thus] the proper object of the human intellect,
which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter.”172 But
because we are intellectual soul unified with a material body, we have access to two
kinds of knowledge—sensitive knowledge and intellectual knowledge. The first gives us
knowledge of material singulars (singularia) through the phantasms (phantasmata) or
interior mental representations of material things that are sensed. The Latin term from
which ‘phantasm’ comes, phantasma –atis, can also mean apparition or phantom and is at
the root of the English words ‘phantom’ and ‘fantasy.’ Thus, the word seems ordered to
something that we can visually grasp. Although ‘phantasm’ does include visual images or
representations of material things it also means representations of material things brought
by the other senses.173 A blind person, for example, can have a phantasm of a piece of

172

Summa Theologica Ia.84.7.
Unlike the intellect which is strictly immaterial the phantasms “are actual images of
certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality.” Summa Theologica Ia.79.Ad4. Thus,
the phantasms seem to have two modes of existence. On the one hand, they are actual
images. This part of Aquinas’s theory is clarified and confirmed by modern scientific
studies of physiognomy and neurology; that is, the sights, sounds, etc. to which we are
sensitively attuned make a literal impact upon us and correspond to very specific
neurological firings in our brains. I take these neurological groupings to be the “actual
images” of which Aquinas speaks. Their potentiality for immateriality is actualized by
the agent intellect as it abstracts their intelligible species from the particular conditions of
brain activity and transfers them to the possible intellect.
173

83

music from a Handel oratorio. Intellectual knowledge gives us the universal forms of
corporeal things as well as indirect understanding of separate intellectual substances: God
and the angels. I do not mean to imply by distinguishing between these two kinds of
knowledge that the one occurs strictly in the body while the second strictly in the soul.
Aquinas is clear that sensitive and intellectual knowledge involve the whole composite.
The sensitive powers of the soul orient the body to feel; thus one feels through his/her
whole being, not simply through his/her body.174 Although it is the case that intellectual
knowledge is not directly affected by any corporeal organ, because the intellect is an
immaterial power, this knowledge depends upon phantasms that are sensed by the body
or imagined. Without the phantasms the human mind could know nothing.
Aquinas frequently quotes Aristotle’s dictum that “the beginning of our
knowledge is in the senses (principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu).”175 He believes
that all the senses are helpful for gaining understanding, although there is a certain
hierarchy among the senses. Sight is highest because it is less bound by matter and
therefore able to have a wider scope of knowledge. We can see, for example, the whole
field with its birds and trees but we can only feel the grass beneath our feet and perhaps
the wind on our skin. But although the senses are all bound by matter and, for Aquinas,
much less noble than the intellectual power of the human being they are the inescapable
gateway to any kind of human knowing. Aquinas certainly recognizes that the senses can

174

See, for example, Summa Theologica Ia.84.6: “But [Aristotle] held that the sense has
not its proper operation without the co-operation of the body: so that to feel is not an act
of the soul alone, but of the composite. And he held the same in regard to all the
operations of the sensitive part.”
175
Summa Theologica Ia.84.6. My translation. Aquinas takes this passage from
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, i.1 and his Posterior Analytics, ii.15.
84

fail us and lead us to an initially wrong perception of reality but he also holds that the
only way to correct such misperceptions is to check them using our senses.
We sometimes have the luxury of turning to another source of truth when we
distrust a source that initially deceived us. We might, for example, rely upon the advice
of one friend, who has shown herself to truthfully tell the facts, after receiving false
information from another. But at the beginning point of our knowing Aquinas believes
we have no other alternative (naturally speaking) than to draw upon our senses. The
human intellect is a tabula rasa, a clean slate, and, according to Aquinas, does not have
any innate knowledge of the intelligible species, the forms of things and their common
matter—e.g. knowledge of the form of a horse and its orientation to a horse body.
Because it is embodied, the intellect can operate only through the limitations and
advantages of the body. It can know nothing by itself without access to material singulars
that are presented to it through phantasms formed by the imagination on the basis of
sense perception. According to Aquinas, the intellect cannot even know itself apart from
an act of understanding directed toward a material being and made possible through the
senses.176 This is so because we can only understand what is in act and the intellect starts
out in a state of pure potentiality. We therefore have knowledge of our own intellects
only after they have been actualized through understanding.177
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What actually happens within the soul in order for it to gain knowledge? One
approach to answering this question is chronological and based upon the mental
development of a human being from infancy, adolescence, and on to adulthood. In this
approach it is especially easy to see both that the human intellect is tabula rasa and that
our knowledge begins in the senses through phantasms formed from the senses by the
imagination. Infants exhibit no innate understanding. They have a few basic bodily habits
ordered toward their biological preservation—e.g. the reaction to suck when their mouth
is touched and the instinct to cry when in pain or hungry—but this is reactive bodily
knowledge and not of an intellectual nature. The infant’s entire world is initially one of
sensitive contact with outside objects and his/her intellectual understanding only develops
after exposure to this world. Aquinas’s approach, at least in the sections of the Summa
Theologica from which I am drawing his epistemology, is usually to discuss how the
already mature human soul, aware of its rationality, gains knowledge. Even this person,
who already possesses intelligible species from previous acts of understanding, needs
first to have phantasms in order to understand. Aquinas believes this is made evident
through direct personal experience:
anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand
something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples,
in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For
this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand
something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms
for the purpose of understanding.178
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If I want to understand, for instance, the various sample groups in some sociological
comparison of working conditions in America, I might visualize examples of these
groups-e.g. an immigrant farmer from Mexico, a white professional woman. The
phantasms are necessary for me to adequately grasp what is meant by the study. Or, if I
want to help a student understand how to make an effective argument on the basis of
generalizations I need to provide examples of such an argument that the student can form
phantasms of in order to understand what I mean.
To understand how precisely the intellect understands material objects via the
phantasms we need to turn to a distinction Aquinas makes, following Aristotle, within the
intellect. One dimension is called the possible intellect (intellectus possibilis) and the
other is called the agent intellect (intellectus agens). Why make this distinction? Because,
for Aquinas, it is demanded by experience. We recognize in ourselves both a hunger for
knowledge as well as a great lack of it; thus, there must be some aspect of our intellect
that remains in potential for understanding. This aspect of the intellect is the first
dimension mentioned above, the possible intellect. When Aquinas says that the “the soul
is in some manner all things” he is referring to this aspect of the intellect. And he means
by this phrase not that it actually knows all but that it potentially can.
Now, the intellect is immaterial. We know this because it is capable of having
knowledge of all material things and “whatever knows certain [material] things cannot
have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the
knowledge of anything else.”179 For example, if the soul were literally fire it would not be
able to know any other material thing with another essence; its own determinate make up
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would block out its ability to know other beings of different matter, like water or wood.
Another proof of the intellectual soul’s immateriality is that it is able to know the
universal natures or forms of things-e.g. a stone not as this piece of granite only but in a
universal sense, as a stone in the same way that a piece of quartz or basalt is also a stone.
But what is known, Aquinas regularly says, is known according to the mode of the
receiver.180 Thus, if the intellect were corporeal it would only be able to know things as
individual and would not even be able to grasp the existence of their immaterial forms.
Experience shows that the intellect must be immaterial for otherwise it would not
be able to know all things and their forms. Now, forms, as they exist in matter, are not
intelligible because, as I noted above, things are known according to the mode of the
receiver and the intellect is immaterial. “A thing is actually intelligible,” Aquinas says,
“from the very fact that it is immaterial.”181 If, as a thought experiment, we posit a thing
that is not a form/matter composite but only material such a thing could not be known by
the intellect. All things are, however, form/matter composites and thus within the range
of the intellect’s grasp. The form cannot be known as it exists in matter and thus the
intellect must have some power of abstracting the form from the composite, as Aquinas
explains below:
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But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart
from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it
follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things by which we
understand are not actually intelligible….we must..assign on the part of
the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible by abstraction
of the species from material conditions.182
The power, Aquinas refers to, is the agent intellect. Through the senses the human being
forms the phantasms of material things. The agent intellect then acts upon these
phantasms to abstract their forms from the conditions of individuating matter represented
in the phantasms and brings them to the possible intellect, which is the proper seat of
understanding in the human being.
If the form understood by the possible intellect is universal—e.g the species of
granite and its genus as stone—does not this fact suggest that the intellect as such cannot
access concrete singulars? But Aquinas states, as we saw above, that the human being is
naturally ordered to the knowledge of corporeal things, which only exist as concrete
singulars. Are we not faced with a contradiction in Aquinas’s epistemology? Although
the intellect as such does not have direct access to concrete singulars it does, via the
phantasms, have access to them as Aquinas explains:
Indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, [the intellect] can know
the singular, because, as we have said above (Q. 85, A. 7), even after
abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand,
needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species.183
Although the intellect’s knowledge of singular beings is indirect and although it has
direct access only to its universal form, we must not suppose that the intellect is able to
discard the phantasm of the singular and simply dwell in a world of universal forms.
Indeed, Aquinas affirms in this passage the intellect must turn to the phantasms (and thus
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to singular things) “even after abstracting the intelligible species” in order to understand
the species. Thus, our human knowing does not take place in some ethereal cognitive
tower divorced from concretely existing beings, but always depends upon our
engagement with them. Moreover, through our senses humans do have direct access to
material things and since we are composite beings we can say that the human qua human
does have direct knowledge of concrete singulars even if the intellect, as such, has only
indirect access to them.
Another aspect of the human being’s power to know that must be mentioned is
what Aristotle and Aquinas following him call the passive intellect or cogitative power.
This dimension of the human being’s power to know is intermixed with the body, unlike
the agent and possible intellects, and is shared with the higher animals. What is it? The
passive intellect is a power to make judgments about particular things for the sake of the
animal’s biological survival. It is called passive because it is related to the animal’s
sensitive power, which is purely receptive. On the basis of sensing particular things, as
well as imagining and remembering them, animals (including rational ones) are able to
distinguish one individual thing from another and decide to pursue one and avoid another.
Thus, the passive intellect is not part of the intellectual nature of the human being
properly speaking, not part of what distinguishes the human being as rational.184
In the necessarily brief treatment of certain key components of Aquinas’s
epistemology I have thus far highlighted the fundamental importance of sense perception.
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The act of ‘perceiving’ comes from the Latin verb ‘percipio, -cipere, -cepi, -ceptum’
which means, in part, to “to acquire possession of” or “to receive delivery of” or “to
perceive, apprehend, notice,” or “to take in or grasp with the mind.”185 Now, it is not
always the case that what we perceive with our senses we concomitantly perceive with
our intellects; thus, I can sense something white in the distance without really paying
attention to it and without grasping precisely what it is. Of the various meanings of
‘percipio’ sense perception seems especially covered by the first two--“to acquire
possession of” or “to receive delivery of”—and, to some extent by, “to perceive,
apprehend, notice,” at least to the extent that these actions refer exclusively to sensitive
knowledge. However, sense perception does not mean “to take in or grasp with the
mind.” This last meaning of ‘percipio’ refers specifically to intellectual perception.
Intellectual perception depends upon sense perception but the reverse is not the case. All
knowledge (both intellectual and sensitive) begins with the human being’s sensitive
engagement with material things. We cannot get beneath sense perception to justify it
because any cognitive act depends upon it. For Aquinas, the philosopher can only move
forward to explain and draw out the implications of our sense knowledge, but he/she
cannot justify it. As John Haldane says, “our knowledge of the external world is the
starting point for philosophical reflection, the task of which is not to justify this
knowledge but to explain it.”186
I want now to address one instance of intellectual perception that is especially
important in Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology because it concerns the human
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being’s self-knowledge. Sense perception is experience of material and usually external
things (excepting one’s own body); the kind of perception I now address is one’s
immediate and internal mental grasp of his/her own intellect. It remains the case, as I
discussed above, that any act of understanding ultimately depends upon sense perception
because the intellect begins in a tabula rasa state and is not actualized unless it first
engages concrete singulars. Once the intellect is in act it is able to know itself and this
happens, as Aquinas explains below, in two ways:
In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he
has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the
second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human
mind from knowledge of the intellectual act.187
The first way that the intellect knows itself is reflexive and takes place within the
subjective experience of the individual human person. I can perceive that I have an
intellectual soul in the very act of understanding something. While figuring out a
geometry problem and reaching a solution, I can recognize in myself my own intellect at
work. And although it is true that this reflexivity necessarily pulls me back from a
concentrated focus upon the problem at hand, it remains the case that I can perceive
myself in my own act of understanding. The second way that the intellect can understand
itself in its own act is a more abstract route. In this case I consider the human intellect in
its universal sense and work up towards knowledge of my own mind by first considering
basic cognitive experiences. To a limited way, we carried out this latter sort of inquiry
when we outlined Aquinas’s argument above that human beings depend upon phantasms
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to know and that experience indicates that we must have two distinct intellectual powers,
the agent and the possible.
I offer a final word on the intellectual perception of one’s own intellect because it
will be an important dimension of my comparison between the epistemological
methodologies of Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty as well as my examination of the claim
made by Harvanek that Aquinas’s notion of experience is broadly historical referring to
the collective activity of humanity while the phenomenological notion of experience only
takes place within the bounds of one’s own subjectivity. In the following passage
Aquinas notes a difference between the two different paths to intellectual self-knowledge
and stresses that the first way, attained through immediate subjective experience, is
superior to the second:
There is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it
consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first;
the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself,
and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the
second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice,
and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are
ignorant of the soul’s nature, and many have erred about it.188
The superiority of the first route to the intellect’s knowledge of itself is found in its
simplicity. I need only perceive my own action of understanding to know my intellect.
The errors to intellectual self-knowledge which can arise through the various steps of
“subtle inquiry” are precluded by the immediacy of “the mere presence of the mind” to
itself.
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D) Aquinas’s Open Philosophical System
In his essay, “The Timeliness of Thomism,” Josef Pieper remarks that both critics
and proponents of Aquinas’s work have claimed that he built a closed system of
philosophical thought in which the truth of the universe (including truth achieved by
human thinking and that truth revealed by God) is comprehensively displayed. Pieper
holds that there are a number of complex factors responsible for the development of this
opinion but specifically points to two.189 First, he blames Augustinian critics of Aquinas
during the Reformation who were distrustful of human reason and believed that Aquinas
had proudly presumed to build a comprehensive structure of philosophical and
theological thought. Second, Pieper points to a completely opposite reason: neoscholastics who wanted to defend their master against charges of agnosticism by stressing
that his system was complete and closed.
There is no doubt that Aquinas is a philosophical system-builder as I illustrated in
Section B of Part I above where I outlined Aquinas’s teaching that the universe contains
various kinds of creatures in a hierarchy of being and that each kind has its place in the
perfection of the universe. God is the source and summit of the universe and in him alone
existence and essence are one; every creature that comes from him is made up of two
irreducible co-principles: existence, through which the being shares in God’s existence,
and essence, which functions as a limit principle channeling that existence into a definite
nature. Of all created beings the angels are pure forms while every other creature’s
essence is a composition of the metaphysical co-principles of form and matter. Aquinas
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thus employs basic metaphysical terms in an effort to provide some degree of explanation
for every being; his metaphysical net leaves nothing out.
Furthermore, Aquinas believes that his metaphysical system is true, that he has
proven God’s existence and articulated metaphysical concepts that correspond with how
things really are in the universe. God, as the fullness of being, is the most certain and
most intelligible of all beings, and Aquinas believes that humans can make true
statements about God based upon his effects in the universe. Created beings are also
intelligible because of their nature as created beings. Pieper drives home this point from
Aquinas in the following passage:
things can be known by us because God creatively thought them; as
creatively thought by God, things have not only their own nature (“for
themselves alone”); but as creatively thought by God, things have also a
reality “for us.” Things have their intelligibility, their inner clarity and
lucidity, and the power to reveal themselves, because God has creatively
thought them. This is why they are essentially intelligible. Their brightness
and radiance is infused into things from the creative mind of God, together
with their essential being (or rather as the very essence of their being!). It
is this radiance, and this alone, that makes existing things perceptible to
human knowledge.190
The eternal types of things and the specific natures of singular beings are themselves
because they are creatively thought by God; without God’s creative thought a thing
would simply not be and would therefore not be accessible to human intellection. God
and his creative action can here be likened to the Sun and its illuminating rays. Without
the sun shining upon the objects of the universe they would not be available to be seen by
the human intellect; similarly without God’s creative energy that both designs and
sustains the beings of the universe they would not be intelligible to the human intellect.
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Although Aquinas believes that humans can gain truth about God and his
creatures, he did not presume that his system presented the whole truth about God and his
creatures. God is the most intelligible of all beings but remains out of intellectual reach
for any creature, angel or human, to grasp adequately because the vastness of his nature
far exceeds the capacities of its intellect.191 God’s creatures are also intelligible, albeit to a
lesser degree given their distance from the fullness of being, but even these cannot be
adequately grasped by the human mind. Aquinas says that “the essential grounds of
things are unknown to us, principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota.”192 Why?
Because of the same reason which allows for their accessibility to the intellect, namely,
their nature as created beings. Why is it that the created nature of things both allows for
humans to know them but at the same time makes them, in Pieper’s words,
unfathomable?193
Truth, as the “adequation of thought and thing,” primarily means for human
beings that we can conform out intellects to the being of those things which we know.
But, as I showed in the previous section on epistemology, Aquinas holds that there is a
secondary aspect of this fundamental definition and that is the truth of beings as they are
related to intellect. The essence of artifacts depends upon human minds—e.g. the house
design from the mind of the architect. But the very being and substantial essences of
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created things depend upon the Divine intellect, in whom dwell the eternal types of all
creatures. We can gain truth about creatures in the first sense because our intellects can
conform to their immaterial forms, but we can never gain access to things as they emerge
from the mind of God. Pieper illuminates this point while commenting on Aquinas’s
position that the essences of things are unknown to us:
This relation on which the truth of things is fundamentally based—the
relation between natural reality and the archetypal creative thought of
God—cannot, I insist, be known formally by us. We can of course know
things; we cannot formally know their truth. We know the copy, but not
the relation of the copy to the archetype, the correspondence between what
has been designed and its first design.194
The human being is in the right position, as it were, to know the essences of material
beings. We encounter them directly and, through abstracting their universal forms from
the phantasms that we form via our senses, we have a true grasp of them. However, we
can never take up a position, at least on the basis of our own powers, in the mind of God
as he creatively thinks and sustains any being.
Still there is what Pieper calls a “hope structure” in Aquinas’s philosophy which
is located in the tension between our capacity to have our intellects truly conform to the
forms of things because of the radiance they have from their being creatively thought by
God and our inability to see fully into the truth of things insofar as they correspond
directly to the thought of God. We experience in ourselves a restless drive to plumb fully
the depths of being, but find ourselves unable, at least on the basis of our own minds, to
do so. In Pieper’s words we are in “a condition [of hope] that by its very nature cannot be
fixed: it is neither comprehension and possession nor simply non-possession, but ‘not-
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yet-possession.’”195 The human being is a homo viator, a traveler or wayfarer, sent out by
God in an act of creative love and ordered to return to God. The human being partly does
this, as we saw in Section B, through knowing and thereby perfecting other material
beings in the universe. We begin our existence in total intellectual ignorance or “nonpossession” of knowledge and, through time, gradually grow in our knowledge of things
but never to the point of total comprehension. As individual persons we can experience
ourselves as homo viator and recognize in ourselves a gradual growth in the
comprehension of things.
But Aquinas also holds that philosophy in general is in a state of development
(which is not to deny that certain epochs can actually cover up through forgetfulness and
error insights attained by previous ages of thought). For example, Pieper points to
Chapter One of De Veritate where Aquinas provides his own theory of truth and then
shows how this theory is suggested in a variety of different interpretations of truth that
have come down through history. Pieper holds that Aquinas does not insist that his own
theory is fully adequate but leaves the door open for ongoing discovery:
Not one of the traditional formulae is rejected entirely or accepted as
exclusively valid. Though they are in no way fully concordant, he can
appreciate the particular validity of each. What actually is happening
here? It happens that St. Thomas is, in effect, placing himself within the
stream of traditional truth nourished by the past; without claiming to give
a final solution, he leaves the way open for future quest and discovery as
that stream flows onward toward the yet unknown.196
Aquinas is surely not a truth relativist. He believes that certain propositions are valid and
universally so. He presents various definitions of truth—e.g. from Augustine, Avicenna,
and Anselm—and accepts that each is valid. But the very fact that he draws on several
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different definitions without ever giving a final solution suggests an openness in Aquinas
to the truth being more deeply known and more fully articulated by future generations.
Part II – Aquinas’s Understanding of the Integral Human Being
In this section I will draw on two major books from Aquinas to present his
understanding of the human being as an integral union of body and intellectual soul. The
first book, which offers a more extensive treatment of the question at hand than the
second, is the Summa Contra Gentiles II. I will concentrate largely on explicating
Aquinas’s arguments from this text. The second book is the Summa Theologica,
specifically the “Treatise on Man.” There are certainly some overlapping arguments
between these two texts concerning the union of body and soul. The primary reason I
draw from the Summa Theologica is because it contains argumentation that appeals more
directly to the human being’s interior experience than the former text and therefore sheds
light on a certain closeness between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty that is not as evident in
the Summa Contra Gentiles II.
I have already provided in Part I the metaphysical and epistemological contexts
within which Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology is placed and so I will not devote
much space here to describing the overall context of Summa Contra Gentiles in which
Aquinas’s argument about the human being’s integral nature is placed. But it is critical to
contextualize this argument within Aquinas’s teaching about the nature of intellectual
substances because of the systematic nature of Aquinas’s style; in order to complete an
argument he often uses proofs that he previously established. The first major chapter of
Summa Contra Gentiles II in which Aquinas begins to articulate his theory of human
nature is 56, “In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body.” But we
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must not start here because prior to this question Aquinas examines fundamental
characteristics of created intellectual substances. It is first necessary to address this
teaching because it directly grounds the question about the human being’s integral nature.
In Part B of this chapter I addressed Aquinas’s teaching that the good is what all
things desire. Things which have no knowledge whatsoever are able to have a basic
natural appetite for the good; the rock, for example, desires the good proper to itself by
wanting to go downward. The desire of animals which have sense, but not rational
knowledge, is called animal appetite—e.g. the hungry lion which sees the gazelle is
moved to hunt, kill and eat it. And the desire of rational beings is called intellectual
appetite, another name Aquinas uses for will. Whereas natural things and animals are
moved toward their own proper good by forms external to themselves, intellectual beings
are able to move themselves to act because “the form understood, through which the
intellectual substance acts, proceeds from the intellect itself as a thing conceived and in a
way contrived by it.”197 One clear illustration of this can be found in the artist who
conceptualizes the form he/she wants to realize which then drives his/her creative
exercise. Now, it could be that the artist, having conceived a form to realize, moves off to
pursue some other good not artistically contrived in his/her mind—for example, the good
of a whiskey sour. But even if the artist turns from the canvas to the booze, it remains the
case that this other good must be conceived by him/her before he/she decides to pursue it.
The point is that rational beings are not moved to act by external forms. Through the will
intellectual substances have self-mastery, which means that they are free. Such autonomy
is not absolute, of course, and it should not be likened to freedom in any Kantian sense—
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i.e. the power to move oneself that prescinds from the influence of any external natural
good. Put in other words, intellectual substances are free to move themselves by
exercising judgment concerning the various goods to which they are naturally drawn and
can conceive of. Because the intellectual substance, as intellect, is ordered to understand
all things, its rational appetite or will is concomitantly ordered to a desire for all things.
Thus, “it is possible for the will to be inclined toward anything whatever that is presented
to it under the aspect of good, there being no natural determination to the contrary to
prevent it.”198
It is precisely because the intellect is ordered toward all things that Aquinas
concludes it cannot be a body. For a body is only able to contain things in a quantitative
fashion. A five-gallon bucket can contain only a certain amount of material. If it is filled
with 2.5 gallons of water then it has only 2.5 of capacity left and cannot hold Lake Tahoe.
The intellect, on the other hand, does not contain things quantitatively. Understanding
algebra does not inhibit it from understanding calculus. On the contrary, whereas objects
that hold material things have depleted capacity the more they hold, the intellect seems to
work in the opposite direction; one level of understanding often opens the door for a
greater and deeper understanding at another level. The intellect that learns to read is in
position to understand a great deal more without depleting its ‘capacity;’ once it grasps
concrete subject matter it is able to move on toward far more abstract subject matter. The
intellect can ‘hold’ both an understanding of water molecules and Lake Tahoe and the
entire universe without losing any capacity to understand other things. Furthermore, the
intellect does not contain things with only a part of itself as bodies do. The five-gallon
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bucket, for example, contains one gallon in only the lower 1/5th of itself; it does not hold
the gallon with its whole being. “By its whole self,” the intellect “ understands and
encompasses both whole and part, things great in quantity and things small. Therefore, no
intelligent substance is a body.”199
A follow-up conclusion that Aquinas makes after showing that the intellectual
substance is not a body is that it must be an immaterial self-subsisting form. If the
intellectual substance is not a body then it is not composed of matter and form, for only
bodies are made up of matter and form. If the intellectual substance is not composed of
matter and form then what is it? It must be an immaterial self-subsisting form. If the
intellect were material or a material form (e.g. a granite rock whose form of granite is
wholly imbedded in matter) it would only be able to know things as individual and would
not even be able to grasp the existence of their forms as such. But it does know things in
a universal fashion—e.g. the human qua human—and thus it must be immaterial and
must be able to subsist by itself. The intellect does know but clearly does not know in any
way that is directly dependent upon matter because it transcends matter in its knowing.
And yet the intellect does have existence. It must be, therefore, an immaterial selfsubsisting form.
Another characteristic of intellectual substances is that they are incorruptible. In
Chapter 55 of the Summa Contra Gentiles II Aquinas spends several paragraphs
demonstrating this characteristic of intellectual substances, but I will only briefly touch
upon the first few of these. His initial demonstration proceeds on the basis of the
definition of corruption. The term itself applies to composite things and means the
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dissolution of the form of the composite being from its matter. Why is it that the
separation of the form from its corresponding matter leads to the corruption of that thing?
Because “so long as the form remains, the thing must exist, since by the form the
substance is made the proper recipient of the act of being.”200 In composite substances the
act of being of the whole composite comes from its form so that when the form is
removed that thing suffers corruption. If a substance is not composed of matter and form,
then it cannot suffer corruption. But an intellectual substance, as we saw above, is a
subsisting form, rather than being composed of matter and form. Thus, the intellectual
substance is incorruptible.
The next chapter I will address is the beginning point of Aquinas’s direct
discussion on the human being as an integral union of body and intellectual soul. In this
chapter, 56, he addresses “In What Way an Intellectual Substance Can be United to the
Body?” In Chapters 45-46 of Summa Contra Gentiles II, as I addressed above in Part B
of this chapter, Aquinas argues that the universe requires the existence of a variety of
different types of beings so that it can be as perfect a likeness to God as possible and so
that it can make a complete return to God. Briefly, intellectual creatures are necessary
because God is intelligent, but sub-intellectual creatures are necessary so that the
intellectual ones can contribute to their good and thereby express the goodness of the
Creator. Now, all of the sub-intellectual substances of the universe are material beings
and subject to corruption. As we have just discussed there are intellectual substances in
the universe which are immaterial and incorrupt. Aquinas now addresses the possibility
of a metaphysical oddity in the universe, a creature that on the one hand is intellectual
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(and therefore immaterial and incorrupt) but at the same time corporeal and thus, in some
sense, subject to material constraints and corruption. How could there be a creature which
combines in itself seemingly contradictory characteristics—immateriality and materiality,
incorruptible intellectual form, and corruptible matter? How could these two basic
dimensions possibly come together and if such union is possible how could it be called
‘one being?’ How could intellect and matter actually be integrated?
In Chapter 56 Aquinas begins to answer these questions. He does not prove by the
end of the chapter that the human being is an integration of body and intellectual soul but
he does establish the platform for this claim by showing that it is possible for an
intellectual substance to be united to a body by being its form.
He first argues that it would be impossible for an intellectual substance to be
united to a body by being mixed with that body. When things are mixed together they are
necessarily altered—e.g. blue and yellow paint mixed to make green. Such alteration
depends upon the substances having a common material denominator—e.g. paint in the
example just used. If the blue was paint but the yellow a beam of light the two could not
mix to achieve green paint. Now, an intellectual substance is immaterial while the body is
obviously physical. There is not a common material denominator between them and so
the two could not possibly be united by way of mixture.
Nor could an intellectual substance be united to the body “by way of contact
properly so called.”201 Contact between bodies only occurs at their outside surfaces.
When one clasps the hand of another he/she has made contact; the surfaces of their
bodies have touched. But the one does not have direct contact with the tendons and blood
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beneath the skin of the other’s hand and vice versa. An intellectual substance is not a
body and therefore cannot be united with the body by way of contact, at least properly
speaking.
But there may be, Aquinas ventures, a way that an intellectual substance can be
united to the body through “a certain kind of contact.”202 When bodies come into contact
with one another they are both altered, at least to some extent, as the form of the one is
impressed upon the other and vice versa. People who clasp their hands together are both
active and passive; a man squeezes the hand of his lover so that she receives the form of
his hand and yet he must also conform his hand to receive her grasp. She passively
receives his hand while at the same time with her own squeeze makes his hand conform
to her own. However, “if attention is given to activity and passivity, it will be found that
certain things touch others and are not themselves touched.”203 The moon, for example,
touches the ocean waters of the earth and succeeds in moving them, but these waters do
not in turn touch the moon. Here we see a one-sided kind of touching because the
celestial body acts upon terrestrial elements without being acted upon by them. It is
possible, therefore, for things not in contact via their extremities to still touch other things
insofar as they act upon them. Aquinas offers the example of how a person in sorrow
touches us not in a physical sense but we passively receive her action of sorrow and
therefore experience a certain kind of contact with her. “Hence, it is possible for an
intellectual substance to be united to a body by contact,”204 that is by acting upon the
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body which passively receives the touch of the intellectual substance without the
reciprocal action of touching that substance.
The kind of contact just described between an intellectual substance and the body
is not quantitative but a contact of power and the latter kind of contact differs from the
former kind in at least three fundamental ways, according to Aquinas. First, in contact of
power “the indivisible can touch the divisible.”205 Now, there is a kind of quantitative
indivisible reality, the point, which is able to touch the indivisible, namely its own logical
place at the end of some quantitative body (e.g the end of the road is a point).206 However,
an intellectual substance is indivisible in a different way than the point is indivisible
because the former is “outside the genus of quantity, and that is why no quantitative
indivisible entity with which it can make contact is assigned to it.”207 The point, by
definition, is unable to touch divisible entities but an intellectual substance can touch
them by acting upon them. A second difference between quantitative contact and contact
of power is that the former is carried out only at the outermost boundaries or extremities
of a body while “the latter regards the whole thing touched.”208 I might physically touch
another person as he goes about his daily affairs without that other even being aware of
my touch. In this case the contact is merely superficial. However, if a boxer hits his
opponent so that he tumbles to the ground and is knocked unconscious the first boxer, in
one sense, has touched the whole person. But this is only an indirect touch of the whole
person mediated through the outside contact of the boxer’s blow upon his opponent’s
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chin. The initial contact still only involves the extremities of their bodies. However, in
contact of power a thing is acted upon and moved so that the contact of the one directly
touches the whole of the other. A third difference, which arises from the second, is that
the bodies which come into quantitative contact with one another are necessarily extrinsic
to one another because such contact only involves the extremities of these bodies. But
contact of power “extends to the innermost [of the thing touched and] makes the touching
substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance.”209
According to Aquinas, there is no reason why intellectual substances, which are
immaterial and have a greater level of actuality than bodies, could not enter the innermost
parts of bodies and be united to them via contact of power.
At this point in the argument it appears as if Aquinas’s position will be that the
human being is a unity between an intellectual substance and a body established via
contact of power but, in reality, he is simply exploring at depth the possibility that such a
union could take place. There is no theoretical hindrance to an intellectual substance
being united to the body through contact of power. However, such a being would not be
unqualifiedly (simpliciter) one, Aquinas argues: “It would be one with respect to acting
and being acted upon, but this is not to be unqualifiedly one.”210 When the space shuttle is
fitted with a massive rocket and launched into the sky we see one thing surging upward,
but this thing is not unqualifiedly one because the rocket is a separate piece of equipment
acting upon the space shuttle. It is not part of the form (which in this case is an accidental
form) of the space shuttle established by its makers. The space shuttle plus launch rocket
may appear to be one thing but it is not unqualifiedly one. Similarly, a being established
209
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by an intellectual substance uniting to a body by contact of power is not unqualifiedly
one, but only one with regard to acting and being acted upon.
Is it possible then that the human being is not unqualifiedly one, but one only in
the sense that an intellectual substance acts upon the body? Aquinas next explores three
meanings of one in its unqualified sense in an attempt to identify whether the human
being, as a union of body and intellectual substance, could be unqualifiedly one. He says
that one refers to the indivisible, the continuous, and the one in reason. The human being
cannot be one in the first sense because as a union of body and intellectual substance
he/she is a composite and any composite is at least potentially divisible. Nor could
humans be continuously one because this kind of unity is only quantitative and therefore
does not apply to the intellectual substance, which is immaterial and not subject to simply
quantitative description. The only remaining possibility is that the human being is
unqualifiedly one as a thing one in reason.
I now turn to the passage in which Aquinas argues that the human could be a
thing one in reason if he/she is a composite of substantial form and matter:
Now, from two permanent entities a thing one in reason does not result
unless one of them has the character of substantial form and the other of
matter…So, it must be asked whether an intellectual substance can be the
substantial form of the body.211
This passage raises some interesting questions. Aquinas is asking whether or not there
can be a concretely existing thing, composed of an intellectual substance and a body, that
is unqualifiedly one, but how can this unity be achieved “in reason?” Is not the concrete
human being unqualifiedly one as a singular being? Is Aquinas saying here that a human
is not one being unless somehow recognized as such by an intellect?
211
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These questions can be answered by a closer look at what Aquinas means by one
in reason (ratione unum). Asking whether a thing is one in reason is the same as asking
whether it has an essence. Essence has both a universal and a particular meaning. A
horse, for example, is called such because it belongs to the species of Equus caballus
which describes the horse’s essence in a universal sense. The particular essence of each
individual horse refers to how the universal essence is found to exist (esse) according to
the concrete conditions of that horse. If a particular thing has an essence (in both
meanings of the word), according to Aquinas’s metaphysics, it must be a unity between a
substantial form and its corresponding matter; it cannot be an artificial thing made of an
accidental form and matter. Further, essence in the universal sense refers to species and
an individual refers to a member of a species. So, asking whether a thing is one in reason
is also the same as asking whether or not it participates in a species.
I turn to a passage in Aquinas’s early work, De Ente et Essentia, in which
Aquinas explains how human nature, considered as a species, can only exist in the
intellect. This passage should help us better understand what Aquinas means when he
says that a thing that is one in reason is the unity between a substantial form and its
corresponding matter. He says that:
Human nature, then, can have the character of a species only as it exists in
the intellect. Human nature itself exists in the intellect in abstraction from
all individual conditions, and it thus has a uniform relation to all
individual men outside the intellect, being equally the likeness of all and
leading to a knowledge of all in so far as they are men. And from the fact
that the nature has such a relation to all individual men, the intellect forms
the notions of species and attributes it to the nature. That is why the
Commentator asserts, on the first book of the De Anima, that it is the
intellect which causes universality in things…And although the nature
existing in the intellect has the character of a universal from its relation to
things outside the intellect, since it is one likeness of them all,
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nevertheless, as it exists in this or that intellect, it is a certain particular
species apprehended by the intellect.212
Thus, Aquinas is not saying in the aforementioned passage from Summa Contra Gentiles
II that the concretely existing human is not unqualifiedly one unless somehow recognized
as such by an intellect. To be unqualifiedly “one in reason” is to participate in a species.
A species in an abstract sense can exist only in the intellect where it is divorced from the
particular conditions of existing of this man or that woman. But the species is only
identified in the abstract because the intellect apprehends it in its particular instances
within individual human beings. Thus, concretely existing humans, if they are a unity of
intellectual substance as form and the body as its corresponding matter, will be “one in
reason” and thus unqualifiedly (simpliciter) one. The question now becomes whether or
not the human actually is a unity achieved by intellectual substance as substantial form of
the body.
Reasonable people, Aquinas allows, contend that the intellectual substance cannot
be the form of the body. Why not? One reason is that a thing is distinguished from
another by its act. Aquinas has already shown (as we covered above) that the intellectual
substance is an incorruptible and self-subsisting form. Obviously the body is corruptible
and therefore cannot have an act that is the same as that of the intellectual substance. If
the body and the intellectual substance have two different acts then they cannot be one
being via the intellectual substance functioning as form of the body. Another argument
against their substantial union is that “it is impossible for a thing that has its being in a
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body to be separate from the body.”213 If the intellectual substance is form of the body
then its being is woven together with the body but Aquinas has already shown (as
covered above) that intellectual acts do not depend upon the body; thus, it cannot be the
form of the body.
For these and other reasons Plato argued that the intellectual substance and the
body could not be unqualifiedly one in a form/matter composite. Rather, it could only be
united as “mover to movable, for Plato said that the soul is in the body ‘as a sailor in a
ship.’”214 Now, in Chapter 56 of Summa Contra Gentiles II Aquinas has already said that
it is at least theoretically possible for the intellectual substance to be united to the body as
mover to movable. In Chapter 57, “The Position of Plato Concerning the Union of the
Intellectual Soul with the Body,” Aquinas looks more closely at this position and
concludes that it does not square with our perception of the human being.
Plato acknowledged that the human being appears to be one but asserted that
he/she is not unqualifiedly one. Instead, he claimed that “the soul itself using the body is
man; just as Peter is not a thing composed of man and clothes, but a man using
clothes.”215
Aquinas’s fundamental response to Plato’s claim, a response that indicates his
trust in the basic perception of the human and which guides many of the more detailed
arguments he makes against Plato is that “animal and man are sensible and natural
realities.”216 When I encounter a human being I see a unified living thing. I can feel its
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warm flesh. I can listen to it speak. I grasp through my senses that this man or that
woman is a particular natural thing that also encounters me through his/her senses. I can
say when my wife walks into the kitchen every morning as I rise to greet her that “there
is my wife.” Thus, our basic experience of encountering human beings is that they come
to us as embodied and Aquinas trusts this experience while, as we shall see, also
philosophically justifying it.
Now, if the soul is the entire essence of the human being, as Plato claims, and
simply uses the body as a man uses his clothes then we could not say that we sensibly
encounter a human being “for the soul is neither a sensible nor a material thing.”217 But
this is impossible, Aquinas declares. It completely contradicts our basic experience of
another human being as one that we actually encounter in flesh and blood. It does not
square with our experience of the human being as a natural and sensible reality.
Furthermore, Aquinas argues, “it is impossible that things diverse in being should
have one operation.”218 This one operation does not refer to a thing in which action has its
end, but rather to a subject who initiates the operation. The members of a rowing team
working together to speed their boat through the water work together to affect the one
operation of the boat’s movement. But the kind of operation Aquinas refers to is that
which comes forth from the human being and we experience that he/she has some
operations in which body and soul are unified. Aquinas says that the body does not
directly share in the operation of understanding because understanding involves a
grasping of immaterial and universal forms, which is impossible for the body to
accomplish. However, there are many operations that the soul and body have in common
217
218

Ibid.
Summa Contra Gentiles II.57.6.
112

such as anger, joy, or fear. These emotional actions “occur through some transmutation in
a determinate part of the body and, therefore, are obviously operations of soul and body
together.”219 In moments of great joy, for example, the whole of our consciousness is
filled with exuberance and we might shout or shed tears. But in whatever parts of the
body the emotion is especially expressed, it is clear that the emotion involves both soul
and body, according to Aquinas. And because it is not possible for different beings to
enact the same operation it must be the case that the human is one thing composed of
both body and soul.
At this point, however, Aquinas anticipates a Platonic objection. It may be that the
one operation we have just described in acts of emotion that clearly involve both soul and
body could be explained according to the soul (a distinct being) as mover and the body (a
different being) as moved. 220
But it cannot be that the soul is simply the mover of the body, Aquinas argues. He
presents several reasons for his opposition to Plato’s position mostly on the basis of
Aristotle’s De Anima. First, the “sensitive soul has not the function of mover and moved
in sensing, but of that whereby the patient is passive.”221 For example, when walking to
school the other day I encountered two massive Rottweiler dogs which, upon seeing me,
began to growl menacingly and approach with teeth bared. I became fearful, started
sweating, felt adrenaline pulse through my veins and, a moment later, felt relief as the
master of the dogs successfully called them back. My sensitive soul responded in
passivity to the outward stimuli of the menacing animals. It is the nature of the sensitive
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soul to be moved by objects that it senses, not to function as mover to the body that is
moved. A second argument Aquinas raises against Plato’s position is that if the soul is
united to the body as a movable thing then “the body and its parts do not owe to the soul
that which they specifically are” which would mean that at death, when the soul passes,
the “body and its parts will remain of the same species.” 222 However, this is clearly false
for at the departure of the soul, body parts lose their proper function. Third, if the soul is
merely a mover and the body merely a moved object then the body owes its movement to
the soul but not its life. And yet the body lives – how then to explain its life? There is no
other probable explanation for its life than its soul. A fourth argument is that movable
things are not corrupted by their separation from the mover. Thus, if the body were
simply a movable thing and the soul simply its mover it should not be corrupted at death.
But this is clearly false. A fifth argument is that if the soul is united to the body simply as
its mover then “it will be in the soul’s power to be separated from the body at will and to
be reunited to it at will”223 but this is obviously not true. Thus, it cannot be that the soul is
separate in being from the body and merely functions as a mover to a movable body.
After providing many reasons for why the soul cannot be simply the mover of a
movable body Aquinas positively argues in the final part of Chapter 57 that the soul is
united to the body as its form. This argument, taken from Aristotle’s De Anima II and
also repeated in the Summa Theologica, is as follows:
That by which something becomes a being in act from a being in potency
is its form and act. But it is through the soul that the body becomes a being
in act from being potentially existent, for living is the being of the living
thing. Now, the seed before animation is living only in potency, and,
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through the soul, becomes living in act. Therefore, the soul is the form of
the animated body.224
I now turn to an explication of this brief argument, which is highly significant for
understanding Aquinas’s integral anthropology. In any natural thing the form has
fundamental priority over the matter because it is through the form that the whole
composite has the kind of act or esse that it does. In other words, without the form in any
form/matter composite there is no actual thing to speak of.
A potentially confusing aspect of Aquinas’s passage is the language of
“something..being in potency” and “the seed before animation.” Does Aquinas mean that
a thing can concretely exist that does not have form, that the seed can exist as ‘seed’
before animation? Aquinas does not mean this. A concretely existing thing in potency to
form already has its own form/matter composition. For example, the apple that I recently
consumed was made up of the form ‘apple’ giving its act to various water molecules and
other physical elements but, as it came into my self, I broke up the apple and separated its
form from its matter so that now the matter is subsumed under my own form. When
Aquinas says that “something becomes a being in act from a being in potency” by its
form, he means that the something only takes on concrete existence because of the act of
the form. And he is not referring to an actually existing seed that is present, then infused
with soul, which then becomes animated. Any seed to have actual concrete existence
must already be a concrete form/matter composite.
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Now, all natural things are form/matter composites. Inanimate objects such as
stones do not have forms that are souls. Rather, as we covered in Part I, Section B of this
chapter, they have material forms which means that the forms themselves have the
dispositions of matter—e.g. moisture, density. The form of an animate object, however, is
the soul (anima –ae) which Aquinas, following Aristotle, defines as follows: “soul is
defined as the first principle of life in those things which live: for we call living things
animate, and those things which have no life, inanimate.”225 There are, of course,
different orders of animate things starting with beings whose life is simply nutritive—i.e.
vegetative life that grows by taking in nutrients from the sun and soil. The souls of
animals, in addition to being nutritive, are also sensitive. Their bodies live not only by
absorbing vitamins and minerals but also by engaging the environments appropriate to
their species via their sense organs.
An interesting characteristic of inanimate objects is that if their forms are
eliminated it is clear to our senses that the objects themselves are eliminated. Sand that is
subjected to high temperatures and becomes glass loses its form and is obviously not
present in the glass. However, when the form of a living thing, its soul (anima -ae)
departs the thing that remains often looks much like it did before the form left. When I
pluck the lettuce from my garden it remains stiff and green so that I call it by the same
name I did before I plucked it. The Romaine lettuce growing in the dirt is now the
Romaine lettuce in my salad bowl. But for Aquinas the natural thing ceases to be itself
when its form/soul is separated from it which means that the gardener Thomist should
speak of “former” Romaine lettuce in her salad bowl, rather than Romaine lettuce strictly
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speaking, because the leaves have undergone a fundamental ontological change;
previously they were parts of a living plant but now are bereft of life.
The soul of a living thing is the very being of that living thing and without that
form the thing becomes another object altogether. When the seed sprouts up and
manifests itself as an oak all of its matter is incorporated into the life of the tree. The
thing is wholly an oak tree because of the act of this form, or soul, which gives living
“oak ness” to its every twig, bough, and leaf. The same is true with animals; living is
their very being and there is no aspect of their nature that is not expressive of the kind of
life that they are. For example, every part of the rabbit expresses the soul of rabbit.
For human beings also our bodies and each of its parts are alive with our
particular human souls. Without the form of our souls our body and its parts would no
longer be our own, would no longer be human. “It is through the soul that the body
becomes a being in act from being potentially existent” and there is no middle ground
between potentially existent and actually existent. We live as nutritive and sensitive
beings because of our souls and without them we have no life. “Therefore,” Aquinas
says, “the soul is the form of the animated body.”
At this point in Summa Contra Gentiles II Aquinas believes he has shown that the
human being is an integral unity of soul and body. He believes he has shown the human
being is unqualifiedly one because the human is “one in reason,” in other words, that it
has a nature or essence due to the soul being the substantial form of the body. Although
Aquinas finishes his argument in Chapter 57 that the soul is the form of the body he has
not yet demonstrated that it is the intellectual soul that is its form and this task takes up
the next several chapters. In certain descriptions of the human being as composite (e.g. in
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St. Paul and some of the Fathers of the Church226) the human being is considered a tripartite composite of body, soul, and spirit. But Aquinas, following Aristotle’s
hylomorphism, has the soul do “double duty” as it were. He argues that the spiritual or
intellectual principle of the human being is at the same time its soul, its substantial form.
Thus, in the next chapter he argues that there are not several souls in the human being,
but only one and that this soul is intellectual in nature.
Aquinas begins Chapter 58 by allowing that his previous argument that the soul is
the form of the body does not adequately demonstrate that the human being is an integral
union of body and soul because of a potential objection from Plato that there are three
souls in the human being, the intellective, the sensitive, and the nutritive. Thus, “even if
the sensitive soul were the form of the body, it would not be necessary to conclude that
some intellectual substance can be the form of a body.”227 In response to Plato, Aquinas
offers eight separate arguments. I will present the first of these. Aquinas argues that
characteristics attributed to one thing “according to diverse forms are predicated of one
another by accident.”228 Thus, one might say of Socrates (whom Aquinas, along with
other philosophers, often gives the honor of standing as a logical dummy) that he is a
white and a musical thing but neither whiteness or musicality are predicated of Socrates
as substantial forms; rather, they are attributed to him by accident because Socrates
would still be himself if he took on a deep tan or lost his musical ability. Now, if the
intellective, sensitive and nutritive souls are diverse forms and only the sensitive soul the
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substantial form of the body, then the characteristics associated with the other forms
would be predicated of the human accidentally. Accordingly, we would be said to be
human because of our intellective soul, animal because of our sensitive soul, and living
because of our nutritive soul. This would then mean that the predication “[a human] is an
animal or an animal is a living thing, [would] be by accident.”229 But this is impossible,
Aquinas argues as he turns to the common language we use to define one another, a
common language that emerges from our basic experience that the human I encounter is
one being. It is impossible because this predication is not by accident, but through itself,
meaning that the predication is already a part of the subject. If any of these fundamental
characteristics is predicated of the human being accidentally then we would be able to
assume that they are not essential dimensions of the human being, which is absurd.
Finally, if the human being does not have three souls but only the one intellectual soul,
then we cannot refer to the sensitive and nutritive aspects of human existence as souls,
but rather as powers.
If there is only one soul, which serves as the substantial form of the human being,
why should we hold it to be the intellectual soul? Because there is an order of priority
among the three parts of the human being under discussion such that “the sensitive is
subordinate to the intellective and the nutritive to the sensitive, as potency is subordinate
to act.”230 The intellectual soul subsumes the other powers of the human being which
stand in potency to its acts and which exist for the rational operation of the human being.
It is perhaps easiest to see this when we consider a deliberate intention to learn about
some facet of the world. I might, for example, want to learn about the family of cardinals
229
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nesting in my backyard and my sensitive and nutritive powers fall into place with this
intention. I look for the birds in order to learn about them and my observation demands
that the nutritive powers of my body continue to function appropriately. But even when I
am not deliberately employing my sensitive and nutritive powers—while I sleep my
organs work to keep me alive—it remains the case that these powers are subordinate to
my intellectual soul because they exist for the purposes of a being that is ordered toward
knowledge.
After showing that there is only one soul in the human being, the intellectual soul,
Aquinas proceeds to address various arguments for how this soul could be unified with
the body. Essentially his argumentative strategy, as in many other places in his writings,
is to eliminate all competing explanations of a given reality except for one that remains as
the only possible option. He has already shown that the intellectual soul cannot be united
to the body simply as its mover. I now turn to Aquinas’s treatment of Averroes’s claim
that the intellectual soul is united to the body by means of the phantasms and is not the
substantial form of the body. In the Summa Contra Gentiles II, Chapters 59-61, Aquinas
specifically addresses Averroes’s claim. Aquinas offers a much more succinct retort to
Averroes in his Summa Theologica I.76.1 and it is to this latter argument I will now turn.
The passage below contains Aquinas’s brief presentation of Averroes’s claim followed
by his initial response:
The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species,
as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms
which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the
possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. But
this link does not sufficiently explain the fact that the act of the intellect is
the act of Socrates.231
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According to Averroes, or “The Commentator,” the possible intellect is not the
substantial form of the body but exists as a separate substance.232 It is linked to the body
by the medium of the intelligible species (e.g. the universal form of granite inhering in all
granite stones). The intelligible species are also in the phantasms which are themselves
found within the corporeal organs of the human body; thus there is a link of the possible
intellect to the body through the intelligible species. Now, Averroes claims that his
position was an authentic interpretation of Aristotle. Aquinas disagrees and therefore
opposes Averroes’s position by appeal to Aristotle. Aquinas, following Aristotle, shows
that the act of the intellect is at the same time the act of a concretely existing human
being by comparing the relationship of phantasms to the intellect with the relationship of
colors to sight. The red of the wall I look upon is in my sight; similarly, the species of
phantasms are in the possible intellect. “Now it is clear,” Aquinas urges, “that because
the colors, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not
attributed to the wall.”233 On the contrary, the wall is seen but it does not see. Likewise, it
is absurd to predicate that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands as if this
embodied person is somehow distinct from Socrates’s possible intellect. Rather, the
phantasms are understood and they are understood by Socrates himself. Aquinas here
appeals to a basic conscious experience that my act of understanding is, in fact, my act of
232
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understanding not a separate substance doing its understanding in me. Further, when I
encounter another who is figuring out a problem and coming to conclusions I readily and
rightly attribute that person’s cogitation to him/her not to some other being doing its
cogitation in him or her. Averroes is wrong; the union between one’s intellect and his/her
body is not through a mediating linkage of the intelligible species but must be more
direct.
Before going further it is worth pausing again at the distinction between the
possible and agent intellects. Aquinas will argue, again following Aristotle, that the
former dimension of the intellect is the substantial form of the body. For example, in
Chapter 60 of the Summa Contra Gentiles II, “That Man Derives His Specific Nature,
Not from the Passive, But From the Possible Intellect,” he shows that it is specifically the
possible intellect that “must be part of man as his act and form.”234 In Question 76,
Article One of the Summa Theologica I, devoted to explaining how the intellectual
principle of the human being is united to the body as its form, Aquinas does not highlight
the technical distinction between the agent and possible intellects with regard to
form/matter question. Instead he just argues that the intellect is form of the body. But
why elsewhere does he claim that it is the possible intellect that is the substantial form of
the body? In short, because the understanding of the human being takes place in the
possible intellect. The agent intellect, as we already discussed, brings the intelligible
species to the possible intellect. If the human being is ordered toward understanding and
it is specifically in the possible intellect that we do understand then this dimension of our
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being is our nature and puts into motion all the other dimensions of our being for its
purposes; it must, therefore, be the substantial form of the body.
But now to another proposal for explaining the union of intellect and body that
Aquinas opposes. This one is offered by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander argues that
our intellectual power is not grounded in a subsistent intellectual substance but emerges
from the elements of the human body. He holds that the possible intellect is not exactly a
blending of physical particles in the human body, but rather the relation between these
particles which becomes a “preparedness in human nature to receive the influx of the
agent intellect.”235 Aquinas, again following Aristotle, argues that the possible intellect
must be free from an admixture of bodily elements because it is in potential to know all
things and it would be unable to know all things if it had the nature not only of any
physical thing or combination of several physical things but also the relations between
these physical things. Furthermore, even if preparedness could be thought of as
transcending an admixture of bodily elements preparedness “does not mean to receive,
but to be prepared to receive.”236 Because the possible intellect directly receives the
intelligible species it cannot be a mere preparedness in human nature.
There are other similar arguments that Aquinas takes up which attempt to explain
the intellectual soul as somehow emerging from the body. Galen, for example, held that
the soul is a temperament:
He was moved to say this because of our observation that diverse
passions, ascribed to the soul, result from various temperaments in us:
those possessed of a choleric temperament are easily angered;
melancholics easily grow sad.237
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Galen had, we could say, a bottom to top view of the soul; because of certain bodily
ingredients the human is determined to act in certain ways. Very close to this perspective
on the relation between soul and body is that espoused by Empedocles and others who
claim that the soul is a harmony of various physical parts—e.g. as between the sinews
and bones. A basic Thomistic retort to both theories is that the intellectual soul cannot be
greater than its cause. Now, we know that the intellectual soul is capable of grasping
immaterial realities, of seeing the universal forms in things. If the soul were merely
bodily temperaments or a harmony between physical parts than it would not be capable of
the kind of understanding that it clearly has. Thus, the intellectual soul cannot emerge
from physical parts. Furthermore, if the soul were only a temperament or a harmony it
would not be capable of resisting, for example, a melancholy mood. But we see that the
soul “rules the body and resists the passions, which follow the temperament.”238 If the
soul resists the body, then it cannot be a result of the body.
Other philosophers diminish the intellectual nature of the human being by arguing
that there really is no difference between the intellect and the sense. In this way they
stress the common links that human beings have with the animals. While it is true that
humans are animals and act in large part according to their senses, Aquinas points to
some fundamental differences between sensible acts and acts of the intellect in opposition
to the views of these philosophers. Our senses are aware only of singulars, but the
intellect is aware of the universal forms of things; our senses are only capable of grasping
corporeal things, but the intellect is capable of receiving incorporeal realities like
wisdom, truth and beauty; our senses are not aware of themselves during acts of sensing,
238
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but the intellect has a reflexive power both to understand and to grasp that it is
understanding. Each of these differences marks the intellect as fundamentally different
from the senses.
Others hold that the possible intellect is the imagination itself but this cannot be
because “imagination has to do with bodily and singular things only [but] the
intellect..grasps objects universal and incorporeal.”239 Thus, the possible intellect cannot
be the imagination.
Finally, in Chapter 68 of Summa Contra Gentiles II Aquinas gives his final proof
that the intellectual soul must be the form of the body. He had shown, contra Plato, that
the soul must be the form of the body in Chapter 57 but he had not shown that it was the
intellectual soul that was this form. Now, after surveying and disproving various theories
about the intellect’s relation to the body, which do not support the intellectual soul as
form of the body, Aquinas argues that Aristotelian hylomorphism is the only available
option:
For, if an intellectual substance is not united to the body merely as its
mover, as Plato held that it is, nor is it in contact with it merely by
phantasms, as Averroes said, but as its form; and if the intellect whereby
man understands is not a preparedness in human nature, as Alexander
supposed it to be, nor the temperament, according to Galen, nor a
harmony, as Empedocles imagined, nor a body, nor the senses or the
imagination, as the early philosophers maintained, then it remains that the
human soul is an intellectual substance united to the body as its form.240
Aquinas then makes this conclusion evident by examining two requirements that
must be met for one thing to be another’s substantial form. First, “the form must be the
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principle of the substantial being of the thing whose form it is.”241 There are other forms
present in a being which are accidental – e.g. whiteness. Obviously, the intellectual
principle cannot be the substantial form of the body if it is merely an accidental form that
can pass from the human being without eliminating the reality of the human being. If the
intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, then its absence from the body would
mean that the human being itself were no more. And we know that the intellectual soul is
the formal principle of the human being because when the soul departs, the body
immediately becomes a different thing altogether; it ceases to be human.
The second requirement, is that “the form and the matter be joined together in the
unity of one act of being” so that it is “this single act of being..in which the composite
substance subsists: a thing one in being and made up of matter and form.”242 In order to
satisfy the first requirement Aquinas reminds the reader of what he has argued in Chapter
51 that “the fact that an intellectual substance is subsistent does not stand in the way of its
being the formal principle of the being of the matter.”243 There are not two acts of being
Aquinas stresses; there is not the being of the subsistent intellectual substance and then
the being of the composite. Rather, because the intellectual substance is the substantial
form of the body, the body only exists as body because of the soul that forms it. Thus, the
act of being of the intellectual soul is the same act of being of the composite.
However, Aquinas presses an objection to his own position. He supposes that
some may argue that the intellectual substance could not communicate its being to the
body so that one act of being results because “diverse genera have diverse modes of
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being” and also because “to the nobler substance belongs a loftier being.”244 Aquinas
satisfies this objection by arguing that this single act of being belongs in a different way
to the matter, the body, than it does to the intellectual substance or form. It belongs to the
former as “its recipient and subject” and belongs to the latter “as its principle.”245 Thus,
although there is a single act of being of the composite it is not the case that this single
act of being occurs in the same way with the matter as it does with the form of the matter.
The intellectual soul retains its position as a loftier mode of being than the matter; indeed,
without the existence of the intellectual soul informing the matter become human body
there would be no body properly speaking at all. Aquinas thus concludes his argument
that the intellectual soul is the form of the body by explaining that the requirements for
the intellectual soul acting as the substantial form of the body have been met.
A potential objection to Aquinas’s position is that if we admit that the intellectual
soul can subsist by itself and at the same time admit that it functions as the substantial
form of the body then are we not allowing that the intellectual soul can be two essentially
different kinds of beings? Can the same thing, on the one hand, be an immaterial
substance capable of a purely spiritual existence apart from the body and, on the other
hand, be the fundamental principle of a physical thing limited by the space/time
continuum and subject to the physical laws of the universe? How could the same being
that is not limited by matter form for itself a body that is subject to material limitations?
Either we have here two essentially different beings or, as the objection might go, we
have a strange metaphysical case of a spiritual thing seeking to diminish its own kind of
existence.
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A basic response to this potential objection is that Aquinas is clear that the
intellectual soul separated from its body by the physical death of that body exists in an
unnatural state. As Aquinas argues in the following passage, the separated human soul is
outside of is proper place in a purely spiritual existence and longs to return to the body:
To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it
belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light
body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining
meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place; so the
human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body,
having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be returned to the body.246
Helium gas has a natural desire to go up. It can be trapped and held, as in a child’s
balloon, but when that balloon gets popped the Helium returns to its proper place. In
similar fashion, the soul has a desire to be with its body. It is not an essentially different
kind of being when separated from the body, just outside of its proper place.
Because the soul is not in its natural state when separated from the body its ability
to know is compromised. The Platonist might blissfully long to be separated from the
supposed prison house of the body in order to directly apprehend pure essences, but
Aquinas is clear that knowledge gained by the separated soul is “imperfect, and of a
general and confused nature.”247 Why? Because although the intellectual souls of human
beings are immaterial they do not (as angels do) have the natural capacity to know things
directly through universal species; rather “they were so made that their nature required
them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of
sensible things from the sensible things themselves.”248 Aquinas does allow that the
human soul in a separated soul is able to know by turning to intelligible universal species
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(e.g. mathematical principles, human nature, principles of beauty) but that it generally
cannot understand singular sensible things by means of the universal species. Aquinas
believes that the separated human soul can have some knowledge of concrete singulars
through the habit of knowing them attained while embodied, or through affection, or
natural inclination or divine dispensation but that it remains fundamentally impaired in its
capacity to know.249
Thus, there is not an essential difference between the intellectual soul in its
separated state and when it functions as substantial form of the body. Indeed, Aquinas is
clear that the separated human soul is in an unnatural state and unable to function
properly without its body.
I now turn to two additional dimensions of Aquinas’s teaching on the union of
body and intellectual soul. These are logical implications of Aquinas’s hylomorphism but
drawn out in separate chapters following Aquinas’s final proof that the intellectual soul is
the form of the body in Chapter 68 of Summa Contra Gentiles II.
I turn first to Chapter 71 of Summa Contra Gentiles II, “That the Soul is United to
the Body Without Intermediation.” Aquinas argues that the conclusion of this chapter can
be inferred from the very nature of the relationship between form and its corresponding
matter because the form makes the matter to be what it actually is; the form permeates
matter so that it becomes the very expression of the form. When we encounter an active
human body we immediately encounter an active human soul. It is the soul, as form,
which reduces the matter of the body from potentiality to act. Thus, the soul does not
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function through an intermediary in its relation to the body; rather the body is what it is
because of its total passivity to the activating power of the human soul.
A further conclusion Aquinas makes, as a logical inference from the fact of the
soul functioning as substantial form of the body, is “That the Whole Soul is in the Whole
Body and in Each of its Parts:”
Now, the soul is the act of an organic body, not of one organ only. It is,
therefore, in the whole body, and not merely in one part, according to its
essence whereby it is the body’s form.250
The body functions as an organic whole, each of its parts having a function and existing
in interdependence with one another. The soul, as act of the body, forms the body for
itself and is directly responsible for all the various parts of the body functioning together
in one integral whole. It could not at the same time be act of the whole and not be in each
of its parts. “This explains,” Aquinas argues, “why it is that, when the soul departs,
neither the whole body nor its parts remain of the same species as before; the eye or flesh
of a dead thing are only called so in an equivocal sense.”251 Each part of the body only
functioned as it did because of the soul’s presence within it. Each part’s failure to retain
its proper act at the soul’s departure shows, according to Aquinas, that the soul must have
been present in that part. Finally, because the soul is immaterial and has no parts in any
physical sense it is present as its whole self in each part of the body.
Conclusion to Chapter Two
The foregoing arguments from Part II that Aquinas gives for why the intellectual
soul must be the substantial form of the body are not phenomenological in any sense of
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the word. Aquinas does not directly appeal to the human being’s experience of his/her
own consciousness of embodiment either to demonstrate that the human being is by
nature an integral composite of body and intellectual soul or to lay an experiential basis
for this demonstration. However, we have seen in Part I of this chapter that Aquinas is
not adverse to appealing to interior experience. In Section C, I showed that Aquinas
presents us with two ways that the intellect can come to know itself:
In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he
has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the
second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human
mind from knowledge of the intellectual act.252
The first way that the intellect knows itself is reflexive and takes place within the
subjective experience of the individual human person. I can perceive that I have an
intellectual soul in the very act of understanding something. While figuring out a
geometry problem and reaching a solution I can recognize in myself my own intellect at
work. Further, Aquinas notes a difference between the two different paths to intellectual
self-knowledge and stresses that the first way, attained through immediate subjective
experience, is superior to the second because of its greater simplicity. This argument is a
sort of touch down to the phenomenological ground so heavily traversed by modern
philosophers. Aquinas recognizes that the best way for me to understand my own intellect
is to dwell in the interior experience of my own thinking.
Although Aquinas does not appeal to the human being’s experience of his/her
own consciousness in the positions covered in Part II of this chapter he does turn to
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interior experience in Question 76 of the Summa Theologica I where he addresses
whether or not the intellectual soul is the form of the body. The initial part of his
affirmative response to this question is taken from Aristotle’s demonstration in De Anima
ii, 2. Aquinas also draws from this demonstration in Chapter 57 of Summa Contra
Gentiles II to show that the soul is the form of the body, but in this chapter he only posits
that the soul, as such, is form of the body; he does not demonstrate that it is precisely the
intellectual soul that is the form of the body. In the Aristotelian demonstration from the
first part of Aquinas’s response in the Summa Theologica, he does argue that the
intellectual soul is form of the body but wants to supplement this argument by appealing
to the direct consciousness every human has of being an embodied intellectual creature.
This appeal, which is not found in the Summa Contra Gentiles II arguments we have
covered, is as follows:
If anyone however wishes to say the intellectual soul is not the form of the
body he must explain how it is that this action which is understanding may
be the action of this man for every one knows by experience (experitur)
that it is himself who understands.253
Thus, Aquinas depends upon a basic interior experience every human has of being an
embodied thinking creature as an initial common sense indication that the intellect is at
least a part of the human being. This is not a stand-alone demonstration that the
intellectual soul is form of the body, but it does serve as an experiential touchstone for
the rest of his argument—i.e. it is a fundamental human experience that any theory about
the body/soul relationship must adequately account for. After showing problems with
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various faulty explanations for the relationship between the intellect and the body,
Aquinas then concludes that “this [particular] man understands because the intellectual
principle is his form.”254
I close, then, with what I will later argue is a point of strong common ground
between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty, a point of intersection between their respective
philosophical anthropologies that will hopefully show the possibility of a MerleauPontian enrichment of Aquinas’s own thought. What is this common ground? It is that for
both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty our interior experience of being an integral union of
body and spiritual soul is a fundamental starting point for philosophizing about the nature
of the human being.
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Chapter Three – Merleau-Ponty’s Understanding of the Integral Human Being
It is critical for the purpose of showing how Merleau-Ponty might enrich
Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology that we recognize the latter thinker’s appeal to
subjective experience. However, this aspect of his thinking about the human being should
not be overemphasized because it is such a limited part of his overall philosophical
anthropology. In contrast to a subjective approach to studying the human being we could
say that Aquinas’s approach is largely cosmological.255 Why cosmological? First, because
he repeatedly compares the human being to other kinds of creatures in the cosmos so as
to define and characterize the human being. We are like the angels insofar as we are
rational or spiritual beings. We are like the animals insofar as we have bodies. We
occupy a middle place on the scale of being. A second reason for characterizing
Aquinas’s approach as cosmological is that he emphasizes the human being’s purpose in
the perfection of the whole universe. According to Aquinas, the existence of diverse
grades of being is necessary in order for the created order to represent God as goodness.
Through the presence of “higher” beings, i.e. rational ones, outpouring goodness upon
“lesser” beings, i.e. inanimate and animate creatures, the universe is able to reflect God’s
goodness.
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Lublin, no 4., ed. Andrew N. Woznicki, (Peter Lang: New York, 1993). In this article
Wojtyla argues that the subjective dimension of the human being is an objective part of
being human and that exploring it through the resources of phenomenology by no means
introduces a strain of subjectivism into philosophy but rather can enrich Thomistic
anthropology with its tendency to explore the human being by comparing him/her to
other beings in the cosmos and not through a close examination of subjective experience.
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For Aquinas the meaning of the human person as an integral union of body and
intellectual soul is asked and answered within a systematic metaphysical framework,
which is why I needed to devote a large part of Chapter Two to outlining his
metaphysics. Merleau-Ponty’s approach to understanding the integral union of the human
being is in stark contrast to Aquinas’s. While it is true that Merleau-Ponty does address
the nature of the human being, he also holds that there is no such thing as an unchanging
essence and he does not believe that there is an ultimate purpose to either the human
being or the universe, at least no purpose that a philosopher could know. Furthermore,
Merleau-Ponty does not directly thematize the following question: what is the human
being? Rather, according to Merleau-Ponty, we come to see indirectly that the human
being is an integral union of consciousness, soul and body while phenomenologically
exploring perception. In short, we could say that while Aquinas’s philosophical
anthropology is carried out in an explicit and systematic metaphysical context, MerleauPonty’s is carried out in a phenomenological context, although one which opens into
ontological claims about the nature of the human being.
Another point of contrast between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical
anthropologies is that while Aquinas does begin (at least in Summa Theologica 76.1) with
our experience of being an integral unity of body and intellectual soul he concentrates
more on arguing that the human being is an integral unity of body and intellectual soul.
But Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the human being and thus the phenomenologist who
attends to basic human perception always and already experiences him/herself as a unity
of consciousness, soul and body. The unity of the human being, according to MerleauPonty, is a given, a non-negotiable point, a touchstone that serves to break apart monistic
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or dualistic theories of human nature, rather than a position that the philosopher comes to
through argumentation. For Merleau-Ponty, any philosophical anthropology that would
deny the integral unity of the human being is not sufficiently attentive to the basic
perception that is foundational to any philosophy because this perception can only occur
if the human being already is an integral unity of body, soul and consciousness.
Although the primordial unity of the human being as revealed by perception is a
given for Merleau-Ponty, this does not mean that it cannot be fruitfully explored and
further understood. My purpose in this chapter is to present Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding of the human being as an integral union of body, soul, and consciousness
as it appears in the major period of his philosophical work and, in particular, in his
phenomenology of perception.
At this point I must make a brief aside to note that Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty
have different terms to describe the integral human being. For Aquinas the human being
is a composite of intellectual soul and body, while Merleau-Ponty refers to an integration
of body, soul, and consciousness. Even if it turns out that Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty
have compatible notions of soul and body so that the latter thinker can enrich the
former’s philosophical anthropology, what are we to do with the additional concept of
consciousness? Does Aquinas have a comparable notion in his teaching about the integral
human being? Does his notion of soul include consciousness? I raise this issue now
simply to alert the reader before delving into Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the
integral human being that the basic dimensions of the human being under discussion in
Chapter Three will differ from the “parts” of the human being that we discussed in
Chapter Two. I do hope to show that these differences do not preclude a Merleau-Pontian
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enrichment of Aquinas’s thought, but at this point I must beg the reader’s forbearance to
wait until later in the chapter for my argument that the terminological differences
between them are not insurmountable.
What then will this chapter look like and how will I get at Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding of the integral human being? I devote Part I to the main themes and
philosophical orientation of Merleau-Ponty’s work. I outline his basic position as a
modern philosopher of consciousness while at the same time explaining how his
understanding of consciousness differs from an intellectualist and an empiricist portrayal
of consciousness. I describe Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of phenomenology noting
some critical differences between himself and Husserl. Next, I turn to the foundational
importance of perception for Merleau-Ponty’s work; perception is the abiding leitmotif of
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and all problems are solved, if in fact they can be solved, by
appeal to the insights it reveals. I then examine Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the subjectobject dialogue, which is a fundamental dialectic between the embodied human, his/her
world, and other people that perception reveals. Finally, I look at Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of truth.
Part II is devoted to Merleau-Ponty’s teaching on the integral human being in his
first major work, The Structure of Behavior. While this book is not strictly
phenomenological, we will see that Merleau-Ponty does introduce the phenomenological
method in the text, especially in its latter sections on body-soul unity. The text is
essentially about the relationship between nature and consciousness. In developing this
relation Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of ‘form.’ We will see that he believes all
objects of the world exist according to their own laws of behavior that consciousness
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calls ‘forms,’ but that these forms cannot be strictly “in” the objects. In The Structure of
Behavior, Merleau-Ponty first describes the human being as an integral union of body
and soul, which he takes to be a form of the human being. He also argues that
consciousness can be a form of the human being. He holds that whereas the forms of
external objects exist in a kind of interplay between consciousness and nature (i.e. the
subject-object dialogue that I explain in Part I)—objects having natural structures that
bespeak ‘forms’ but needing a consciousness to identify these structures as ‘forms’—the
form of the human being can be consciousness itself as it orients the body to achieve its
ends. When we are conscious we are able to form the body around our intentions. But
when we are unconscious our bodies still function as formed by virtue of our souls. Thus,
there must be, for Merleau-Ponty, a distinction between consciousness as form and soul
as form. I will further address this difference later in the chapter.
Part III of this chapter is devoted to The Phenomenology of Perception. In this
text Merleau-Ponty does not directly thematize the question of the relationship between
body, soul, and consciousness as he does in The Structure of Behavior, but through his
analyses of perception he does provide many insights into how “the soul spreads over”256
the parts of the body and how “the consciousness of the body invades the body.”257 I will
explore three different phenomenological findings which, for Merleau-Ponty, reveal the
integral unity of the human being. First, I will look at his treatment of the relationship
between the human being and external stimuli. An examination of experiences of
exploring the objects of our surroundings and receiving the various sense impressions
that they offer reveals that human beings are able to anticipate and select certain stimuli
256
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while ignoring or downplaying other stimuli. Second, I will explore how the lived body,
as subject of expression, indicates the integral union between consciousness and its body.
Third, I will explore Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of human expression and how the body is
not just a tool for consciousness to communicate words or gestures but that expression
occurs in the very bodily acts of speaking, of writing, of gesturing, etc. All these
explorations of experiences will serve to show that consciousness functions as a form of
the body ordering and enveloping all of its parts according to its intentions. They will
also serve to show that consciousness is ordered toward the body that it envelops and that
the body can be adequately explained only according to consciousness which lives in and
informs it.
One final introductory word is that I will not be addressing Merleau-Ponty’s later
philosophy in this chapter or in the following ones, even though some have argued that
this stage of his philosophical career moves him closer to the scholastics and Aquinas
than his phenomenology did.258 The main reason for not addressing his later works is
simply that doing so would take me away from the specific question that this dissertation
is intended to answer: whether Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to
understanding the human being can enrich Aquinas’s own philosophical anthropology.
Furthermore, I follow Gary Brent Madison’s argument that there is not a sharp break
between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological period and his later metaphysical works
(e.g. his unfinished monograph, The Visible and the Invisible, and his last published
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article, “Eye and Mind”).259 Rather, his later ontological claims—e.g. that being is an
intertwining between its visible aspects which can be objectified and its invisible aspects
which cannot--is, in Madison’s words, an “unthought thought” in the earlier
philosophical texts, a “meaning which is nowhere fully expressed, but which winds
through Merleau-Ponty’s various writings binding them together.”260 I will have occasion
later in this chapter to illustrate Madison’s claim somewhat, but I do not intend to fully
address the extent to which Merleau-Ponty’s earlier works lead to his explicitly
metaphysical writings. On the other hand, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology is never strictly the description of phenomena, but that he uses it to argue
that the human being is an embodied consciousness. Thus, his phenomenology opens out
into ontological claims.
Part I – Main Themes and Philosophical Orientation of Merleau-Ponty’s Work
A) Merleau-Ponty as a Modern Philosopher & His Understanding of Consciousness
Those who specialize in medieval or ancient philosophy will likely be surprised
by Merleau-Ponty’s frequent references to “classical philosophy” or “traditional
analyses” or “classical psychology” because he applies these terms to early modern as
opposed to pre-Christian or pre-modern thought.261 Although Merleau-Ponty occasionally
references Greek or scholastic thinking, it is clear that his philosophical home is what the
contemporary academic community calls “modern philosophy.” He seems to believe that
philosophy in its proper sense really began with Descartes and he contrasts “traditional”
or Cartesian thought with what he called “modern” thought, which includes post259
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Newtonian physics, contemporary Gestalt psychology and, most certainly,
phenomenology.
However, Merleau-Ponty is also strongly critical of several key thinkers and
schools of thought that are representative of modern philosophy (as understood by the
contemporary academy). For example, Merleau-Ponty considers Descartes a leading
representative of intellectualism and he sees this mode of thinking, along with
empiricism, to be full of error in its claims about the nature of the human being and the
nature of human knowing. In what sense then can we say that Merleau-Ponty is a modern
philosopher? Much of Merleau-Ponty’s work is devoted to a polemic against what he
sees are the major schools of post-Cartesian philosophy: intellectualism or critical
thought, and scientific empiricism. I will have plenty of occasions in the pages which
follow to expose this polemic because it is impossible to do any examination of MerleauPonty’s work without addressing it. But even though Merleau-Ponty is critical of postCartesian or modern philosophy (even though this is “classical” philosophy for him) we
can still call him a distinctly modern philosopher. Why? Because he squarely addresses
himself to problems that arise from modern thought and he seeks to answer them through
a distinctly modern conceptual framework. For example, at the beginning of his Structure
of Behavior Merleau-Ponty writes that his main purpose is to “to understand the relations
between consciousness and nature.”262 He understands nature, in the sense given by
scientific empiricism, as “a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound
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together by relations of causality.”263 Certainly, the medievals understood that there are
causal relations in nature, but they also believed that nature was sustained by God’s
presence and that living forms are immaterial. Merleau-Ponty accepts a basically
materialistic concept of nature, one which is quite foreign to the medieval mind, although
there were certainly ancient Greek thinkers who shared this belief (e.g. Democritus). And
although Merleau-Ponty is highly critical of Descartes, he is also highly indebted to
Descartes in that he is, in many respects, a philosopher of consciousness. On the one
hand, he accepts an empirical view of the natural world but on the other hand he believes
that the beginning stage for any philosophical activity is the examination of
consciousness and its relation to the world.
But what does Merleau-Ponty mean by consciousness? Is it an active power of
directing the human being or simply a basic self-awareness? Does it encompass our
intellection, volition and affectivity or need to be understood as reflexively
accompanying those powers? Does Merleau-Ponty believe consciousness functions as a
form, as Ralph Ellis has claimed?
One helpful way to begin clarifying Merleau-Ponty’s notion of consciousness is
briefly to compare it with Descartes’s cogito. In one sense Merleau-Ponty is indebted,
like Husserl, to Descartes. Husserl opens up the riches of phenomenology by dwelling on
what happens within the cogito, within conscious experience. Merleau-Ponty himself
concentrates his philosophical work on taking inventory of interior experience. But one
of the first things he notices about interior experience is that it is inevitably ordered
toward the physical milieu within which a person finds him/herself. And here is the
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critical difference between his and Descartes’s notion of consciousness. Descartes
believes that the mind is an unextended substance that is not essentially a part of the body
and that consciousness is not inherently involved with the body. If I can doubt everything
except my own doubt then I can only be truly sure that I am a pure thinking substance; I
can doubt whether or not my body is actually an integral part of me. But Merleau-Ponty
believes that Descartes simply fails to take into full consideration the meaning of the very
doubt he uses to justify the cogito. Merleau-Ponty insists that the only way I could doubt
at all is if my consciousness was in the first place embodied. I have doubts about
existence precisely because consciousness does not dwell in a purely for-itself (pour soi)
realm of spiritual interiority but is woven into a body with its physical limitations making
consciousness perpetually thrust into ambiguities and perspectival thinking.
One way that Merleau-Ponty establishes that consciousness is inherently ordered
toward the world is through an examination of child psychology. He argues that the:
influence of the milieu in the formation of the mind is sufficiently evident;
it is clear that a child who had never seen an article of clothing would not
know how to act with clothing; nor would he be able to speak or to
envisage other persons if he had always been absolutely alone.264
Thus, the very ability to have a thinking mind is dependent upon external factors. For
Merleau-Ponty consciousness begins with the child thrust outside of him/herself into a
living and active world. The cogito is thus essentially dependent upon the world and
therefore upon a body which allows us to dwell within the world. And it is merely a
forgetfulness of his own beginnings that permits Descartes to assume (when he wrote as
an adult philosopher) that his now developed consciousness is most secure of itself by
doubting the world that helped enable his consciousness to develop in the first place.
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But even when consciousness has developed so that the person has a strong sense
of subjectivity and inwardness, consciousness is never simply a sphere of interiority but
always depends at some level on the bodily comportment of the human being that
engages him/her in the world. Consciousness would not even be, Merleau-Ponty wants to
say, unless it existed in a dialectical relation with the world to which it has access via its
body. “Hence one cannot say that man sees because he is Mind,” according to MerleauPonty, “nor indeed that he is Mind because he sees: to see as a man sees and to be Mind
are synonymous.”265 This is so because our perceptions are always grounded in some
concrete and particular bodily engagement with the world.
Although Merleau-Ponty holds that a fundamental part of “consciousness..[is] my
actual presence to myself”266 he will not allow that consciousness is adequately defined as
self-presence. I have briefly touched on why this is so with perceptual consciousness
because consciousness depends upon the external objects of the physical milieu in which
it is placed through its body. Thus, Merleau-Ponty says that:
the universe of consciousness revealed by the cogito and in the unity of
which even perception itself seemed to be necessarily enclosed was only a
universe of thought in the restricted sense: it accounts for the thought of
seeing, but the fact of vision and the ensemble of existential knowledge
remains outside it.”267
The fact of vision reveals that we are thrust outside of ourselves to an ensemble of things
on which we depend for our vision.
Although consciousness depends upon the external milieu within which the
human being is placed for its emergence and ongoing operation, Merleau-Ponty does not
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believe that consciousness exists merely in a state of receptive dependence upon outside
objects. Rather, he holds that consciousness becomes dialectical. Yes, the little baby must
first be introduced to the ball in order to actually see it and pick it out from the array of
objects before his gaze, but once he does see the ball this vision leaves what MerleauPonty calls “sedimentation”268 in his mind and this “sedimentation” is a sort of
springboard which enables him to declare that other round objects like tires and balloons
and the little spherical heads drawn by his sister are also “balls.” When consciousness
awakens to itself it finds itself thrust open to the world which is already laying down
“sedimention,” already providing a means for consciousness to act into the world. As
consciousness receives (vision, hearing, tasting etc.) from the outside at the same time it
approaches the world on the basis of what it has perceived.
Thus far I have only focused on consciousness as the seat of perception. For
Merleau-Ponty it is also the seat of action and this aspect of conscious life is also
dialectical. Merleau-Ponty offers as an example a football (i.e. soccer) player operating
on the field of play to illustrate what he means:
For the player in action the football field is…pervaded with lines of force
(the ‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the ‘penalty area’) and articulated
in sectors (for example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries) which call
for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action as if
the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but
present as the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player
becomes one with it and feels the direction of the ‘goal,’ for example, just
as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body.
It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu. At
this moment consciousness is nothing other than the dialectic of milieu
and action (my emphasis). Each maneuver undertaken by the player
modifies the character of the field and establishes in it new lines of force
268
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in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the
phenomenal field.269
The player is thrust outside of himself to such an extent that his consciousness is
absorbed by the field of play. The ball, the opposing players, and the possible courses of
action he could take to score seize his attention and set the parameters for his action. He
moves right because of that big opponent on his left; he moves toward the net because
scoring is the very purpose of the game. But however limited the range of possible
actions might be, the player is not completely constrained by the forces and objects
arrayed before him. He takes one course of action—e.g. dribbling the ball—but could
have taken others—e.g. passing it--and in his action he alters the whole field of play; the
big defender on the player’s right lunges forward because he decides to dribble straight
for the net. The dynamism of give and take between players on the football field is
immanent to consciousness; the field is so flooded into the player’s consciousness that all
else is set aside but this very field which is, in part, a result of his actions upon it.
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of consciousness, which the example above
illustrates well, is that consciousness is not simply a sphere of self-awareness but also the
seat of the human being’s thinking and willing and bodily comportment. Consciousness
does not simply accompany action (either mental or physical) but is the source of it.
Merleau-Ponty speaks about the power of consciousness for personal acting as Aquinas
speaks about the intellect as a source for the acting of human beings.
However, this does not mean that Merleau-Ponty considers the body to be a sort
of tool or instrument. For the player on the field (as for all of us even in the most
mundane of activities) the body is instead so infused with conscious intentions that we
269
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can experience a seamlessness between them. Merleau-Ponty says that “consciousness is
in the first place not a matter of ‘I think’ but of ‘I can.’”270 This means that the body is
involved in intentionality from the beginning of our conscious acts. There is not first
deliberation and then consciousness moving the body as an instrument, but from the
beginning of any movement we make the body itself and its possibilities are an inherent
part of a basic pre-reflective consciousness of ourselves and the objects which surround
us and which call out certain bodily responses to them.
Another fundamental aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of consciousness, which I
will further address below in the section on perception, is that it is never in full
possession of itself. For Merleau-Ponty, borrowing from Gestalt psychologists, every
perception is a figure on a background so that while the figure might be clear and fully
grasped by the mind, the background is in a half-light and contains latent shapes and
therefore latent meanings that the mind only grasps by turning away from the first figure
and directly towards the contents of its background. In the passage below Merleau-Ponty
explains that the possibility of hallucinations (taken in a broad sense as an ostensible
sensory experience of something that really does not exist) depends upon consciousness
not being in full possession of itself:
To ask oneself whether the world is real is to fail to understand what one
is asking, since the world is not a sum of things which might always be
called into question, but the inexhaustible reservoir from which things are
drawn. The percept taken in its entirety, with the world horizon which
announces both its possible disjunction and its possible replacement by
another perception, certainly does not mislead us. There could not
possibly be error where there is not yet truth, but reality, and not yet
necessity, but facticity. Correspondingly, we must refuse to attribute to
perceptual consciousness the full possession of itself, and that immanence
which would rule out any possible illusion. If hallucinations are to be
270
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possible, it is necessary that consciousness should, at some moment, cease
to know what it is doing, otherwise it would be conscious of constituting
an illusion, and would not stand by it, so there would no longer be any
illusion at all.271
The statement that consciousness can “cease to know what it is doing” indicates a
significant part of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. A sphere of ambiguity attends
consciousness. Because consciousness is inherently perceptual, inherently ordered toward
the world in which the person is interwoven through his/her body and because
perceptions never gives us a full grasp of the intended object but instead announce the
possibility of further exploration, consciousness cannot be in full possession of itself.
B) Merleau-Ponty’s Understanding of Phenomenology272
One of the best explanations of phenomenology in general, let alone MerleauPonty’s specific understanding of this philosophical method, can be found in the Preface
of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. In the first place, Merleau-Ponty says,
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“it is a matter of describing, not of explaining or analyzing.”273 What is described? Our
perceptions of the world, other selves and objects within it, and our relationship with
these others are described. By perception Merleau-Ponty does not simply mean our visual
access to the world, rather it includes every mode of this access. He means by it the basic
and unreflective awareness we have of being connected to others and to ourselves as
embodied creatures. “Perception,” Merleau-Ponty says, “is not a science of the world, it
is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which all
acts stand out, and is presupposed by them.”274 For Merleau-Ponty, any scientific
explanation is a “second order expression,” grounded in a more fundamental experience
of the world. For him the main task of phenomenology will be to reveal this unreflective
perception. “We must rediscover,” he says, “the structure of the perceived world through
a process similar to that of an archaeologist. For the structure of the perceived world is
buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge.”275 Our own cultural habits of
scientific thinking might, for example, lead us to think mainly about material objects
according to their strictly defined elemental properties. But when we explore our
fundamental perception we find that objects are always interrelated with other objects
and, because of the perspectival nature of our perception, remain theoretically impossible
to comprehend exhaustively.
Unlike Husserl, who mainly uses the phenomenological method to describe the
structures of consciousness (for example, the manifold layers of time consciousness),
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Merleau-Ponty generally utilizes phenomenology to shed light on our unreflective
connection to the world and to the objects of the world; thus, the phenomena shed light
on reality, they provide access to ourselves and those objects to which we are related
which means that they are ordered toward ontological claims. Merleau-Ponty does see
value in the epoché or the bracketing of existence from his descriptions. Why? Not
because he wants to retreat to consciousness, not because he believes that a
transcendental ego literally constitutes the world making the merit of philosophy to
consist in clarifying the means of this constitution, but because we are so “compounded
of relationships with the world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to
suspend the resultant activity…to put it ‘out of play.’”276 We loosen the cords of
intentionality that tie us to the world so as to better appreciate it and bring it to reflective
understanding. Merleau-Ponty does not, then, put existence out of play in any radical
way. And perhaps a better way of explaining his version of the époche is that he
momentarily steps back from his existential immersion in the world so as to better
understand the world.
Because of the distance created by the epoché between the phenomenologist and
the world into which he/she is thrust, the phenomenologist is able to study the essences of
realities (which include individual things and their relationships with other objects as well
as the world itself). Essences are ideal, according to Merleau-Ponty. They do not exist in
any Platonic sense but are concepts that the thinker draws out from a multitude of
concrete experiences in order to explain a common denominator of those experiences.
The concept of ‘perception’ is itself an essence; indeed it is the primary essence that
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Merleau-Ponty investigates throughout his philosophical career. We are able to detach
perception from the myriad instances we have of experiencing it and examine the basic
similarities of these experiences—e.g. that perception is always from an embodied
perspective.
Merleau-Ponty believes that studying essences is central to phenomenology; he
even defines this philosophical method as “the study of essences.”277 However, he insists
that this study is a means to an end, not an end in itself:
But it is clear that the essence is here not the end, but the means, that our
effective involvement in the world is precisely what has to be understood
and made amenable to conceptualization, for it is what polarizes all our
conceptual particularizations. The need to proceed by way of essences
does not mean that philosophy takes them as its object, but, on the
contrary, that our existence is too tightly held in the world to be able to
know itself as such at the moment of its involvement, and that it requires
the field of ideality in order to be acquainted with and to prevail over [the
world’s] facticity.278
Merleau-Ponty does not intend philosophy to be about essences; rather, he wants
essences to provide a way for the philosopher to better understand the world and his/her
engagement with it. Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of essences as means to understand the
world (and our engagement with it) is one more indication that Merleau-Ponty is not
strictly a philosopher of consciousness and certainly not one who believes that the field of
ideality is the starting point for philosophy. The starting point is the existential situation
within which the philosopher finds him/herself, a situation that is prior to thinking and
which shapes and informs all of the philosopher’s conceptualizations. For Merleau-Ponty,
the world is the beginning point of philosophy because it is the world which first imposes
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itself upon consciousness, but it is also the end point because philosophy is ordered
toward an understanding of this world.
Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty addresses how the human being is in the world
and we can therefore say that his phenomenology is existential, like Heidegger’s; both
philosophers explore our being in the world. But though Heidegger never adequately
thematizes emodiment, the body is central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
investigations. While it remains true that he is in many respects a philosopher of
consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on how consciousness is embodied and, as a
result, is a part of the world means that we cannot adequately describe him as a
philosopher of consciousness. His philosophy is rightly called existential because of his
exploration of how the body (i.e. the phenomenal or experienced body, as opposed to the
objective body) makes us inhere in a concrete situation and weaves us into the being of
the world.
Another important dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is that he
consistently uses it to critique two other modes of philosophy and their respective
interpretations about the nature of the human being. On the one hand, he argues against
reductive scientific empiricism (e.g. Hume, Freud) and on the other hand, intellectualist
idealism (e.g. Kant, Hegel). For empiricism, the human is an exterior being without an
interior, an object in-itself (en soi) that can be lined up alongside any another physical
object and, in theory, fully explored. For intellectualism the human is a consciousness
that is purely for-itself (pour soi) and an interior without an exterior because the whole
world is constituted from within. But neither of these theories takes seriously our basic
experience of embodied consciousness and of therefore being an integration of the en-soi
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and the pour-soi, that is, objects because of our bodies but infused with consciousness by
which we are able to set things at a cognitive distance from ourselves.
Now, Merleau-Ponty’s method is largely descriptive and he does not write in
explicitly logical propositions. Nonetheless, it is quite easy to draw deductively valid
propositions from his phenomenological illustrations. For example, a typical argument
against intellectualism can be put in the form of modus tollens: If the human being
constitutes the world (p) then we would find in experience no ambiguities, no
uncertainties (q). But our experience is fraught with ambiguities. We have no experience
of deliberately constituting uncertainties but of encountering them – that object, for
example, in the half light that appears like a crouching dog but which, on latter
investigation, I realize is a tree stump. So, not q, and therefore not p: we are not pure
constituting consciousnesses. It is true that Merleau-Ponty himself does not write in
explicitly syllogistic form but he does use his phenomenological findings to make
deductively valid arguments. His statement that phenomenology is “a matter of
describing, not of explaining or analyzing”279 is too limited or modest a claim because he
does use it to analyze and disprove the ideas of intellectualist and empiricist thinkers
regarding the nature of the human being.
C.) The Foundational Importance of Perception
I have already addressed the significance of perception for Merleau-Ponty when
introducing his understanding of consciousness and phenomenology, but more needs to
be said about this theme. Merleau-Ponty makes the centrality of perception to his thought
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abundantly clear in a resume of his work provided to a committee of professors
overseeing his candidacy to the Collège de France:
My first two works [The Structure of Behavior and The Phenomenology of
Perception] sought to restore the world of perception…The perceiving
mind is an incarnated mind. I have tried, first of all, to re-establish the
roots of the mind in its body and in its world, going against doctrines
which treat perception as a simple result of the action of external things on
our body as well as against those which insist on the autonomy of
consciousness. These philosophies commonly forget—in favor of a pure
exteriority or of a pure interiority—the insertion of the mind in
corporeality, the ambiguous relation which we entertain with our body,
and correlatively, with perceived things.280
By “world of perception” he does not mean so much the world that is perceived, but the
vastness and richness of perception itself through which the human being is opened up to
the world. Perception reveals about itself that the human mind is incarnated in a body
and, therefore, that the human being is an integral union of body and consciousness
(which for Merleau-Ponty encompasses the mind). In one sense this integral union cannot
be proven because it is at the root of any experience which could be drawn upon to
“make the case” that the human being is an integral union of consciousness and body.
However, the basic fact that our thinking is inherently grounded in a body has been
forgotten by many philosophers and thus needs to be recovered. Perception has been, as
Merleau-Ponty says, “buried over by the sedimentations of later knowledge”281 and his
hope is to uncover it as a sort of phenomenological archeologist. My intention with this
section is to illustrate some of the foundational insights Merleau-Ponty offers regarding
perception. These will help us better understand Merleau-Ponty’s more specific claims
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about the integral union of the human being which I introduce in Parts II and III of this
chapter.
One clarifying word before we get to what Merleau-Ponty uncovers through his
phenomenological investigations is that perception includes “the common act of all our
motor and affective functions, no less than the sensory.”282 We often associate perception
with a visual grasp of things but, for Merleau-Ponty, perception refers to awareness
achieved through all the senses. It also includes our emotional grasp of the world and the
values of things which can be accessed via affectivity—e.g. aesthetic or cultural values.
Perception also gives, Merleau-Ponty says, “at every moment a global, practical, and
implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, of our hold on them.”283
Thus, perception also includes a basic sense (more general than the sense of ‘touch’) not
only of things themselves, but of our relationships with them.
A fundamental epistemological fact that is revealed by examining perception
phenomenologically is that all knowledge begins with it. “All knowledge takes its place
within the horizons opened up by perception.”284 The first premise of any argument about
the nature of anything, of any statement about the world, of any declaration of truth is
first of all grounded in perception. Any abstraction whatsoever involves stripping a thing
of its facticity. We can only gain an understanding of essences on the seedbed of living
concrete experience.

282

Ibid, 5.
Ibid, 5.
284
Phenomenology of Perception, 241.
283

155

Second, by exploring perception we make contact with ourselves since we are the
subjects of perception. What do we discover about ourselves? That we are our bodies, as
Merleau-Ponty describes below:
We have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the
objective and detached knowledge of the body that other knowledge which
we have of it in virtue of its always being with us and of the fact that we
are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken our experience
of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world through our
body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. But by thus
remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also
rediscover ourself, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a
natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception.285
Immersed as we are in scientific ways of thinking about ourselves—e.g. that the human
body has a certain genetic make-up and that our thinking depends upon correct
neurological functioning—it is perhaps easy to have a detached and objectivistic notion
of our own bodies. Ironically, this objectivistic approach might also arise because we live
with our bodies so closely that we forget to reflect upon the experience of actually living
in them. In any case, by exploring the act of perception itself Merleau-Ponty concentrates
our attention on the fact that we are our bodies. He does not mean by this that we can be
reduced to what science says of our bodies; this is no declaration of materialism. He
means by this that we are what he elsewhere calls our “lived bodies.” Our consciousness
infuses our bodies; we are an integral union of body and consciousness.
Third, when we examine perception in its primary form—e.g. I awake to the
experience of being sensibly aware of the world—we discover that it happens in us.
Perception in its raw state is really an occurrence in us, not a personal act, as MerleauPonty explains below:
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I cannot say that I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say that I
understand a book..My perception, even when seen from the inside,
expresses a given situation: I can see blue because I am sensitive to
colours, whereas personal acts create a situation: I am a mathematician
because I have decided to be one. So, if I wanted to render precisely the
perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that
I perceive.286
The “one” who perceives in me is nothing other than the world as it is given to me in my
particular situation and prior to my judgments or conceptualizations about the world. This
means that I cannot be a self-enclosed sphere of consciousness and that because of
perception the very make up of my mind is due, in part, to an imposition (not meant in
any violent sense) of the world upon me. I find that I am what I am in part because I am
naturally opened up to colors, sights, sounds, and so on.
If we find that our consciousness is fundamentally open to things which, in
sensory fashion, impose themselves upon us, then perception provides, as Merleau-Ponty
says, a “knowledge of existing things.”287 The experience of perception is a phenomena
immediately tied to the real existences of things. For Merleau-Ponty, we can have no
doubt that the world we perceive is “out there” in concrete form. In fact the only way to
understand the phenomenon of hallucination is against the backdrop of our faith in
perception’s ability to actually grasp things. If perception did not have this faith, then the
very question—“what is a hallucination or not?—would not even arise.
But, one might counter, in an effort to charge Merleau-Ponty with subjectivism,
that the real world to which Merleau-Ponty refers is only the world as perceived, only the
world as it appears in consciousness. He never gets, so the objection might go, to the
world as it is. Rather, he simply addresses himself to interior phenomena and remains
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locked in his own mind. But, for Merleau-Ponty, the only way I have access to the world
is through my embodied consciousness of it. Yes, it is true that he addresses the
phenomena of the world but this does not mean that he denies its objective reality. His
wonderment as a philosopher is not in the phenomena for themselves but in the world
revealed (in however limited a form) by the phenomena. The only way I have access to
the world, Merleau-Ponty would say, is through my limited, body-bound perceptual
access. This is not subjectivism, at least not of a radical kind, but an honest look at the
means at our disposal for understanding the world.
To embrace the perspectival nature of our knowing, far from leading us toward
subjectivism, actually moves us closer to the truth. First, it is a truth about who the
human being actually is. When we counter modernistic claims that the human being can
occupy a sort of “view from nowhere” and theoretically can have a complete grasp of the
world with the fact that we are always involved in the world because of our corporeal
imbeddedness in it and cannot remove ourselves from perspectival knowing, we are
closer to the objective truth about the human being. A second reason Merleau-Ponty’s
emphasis on the perspectival nature of our knowing leads away from subjectivism is that
it shows forth the inexhaustible richness of the world and its objects. He amplifies this
point below in a passage from The Structure of Behavior:
Perspective (la perspective) does not appear to me to be a subjective
deformation of things, but, on the contrary, to be one of their properties,
perhaps their essential property. It is precisely because of it that the
perceived possesses in itself a hidden and inexhaustible richness, that it is
a ‘thing.’...Far from introducing a coefficient of subjectivity into
perception, it provides it on the contrary with the assurance of
communicating with a world which is richer than what we know of it, that
is, of communicating with a real world. The profiles of my desk are not
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given to direct knowledge as appearances without value, but as
‘manifestations’ of the desk.288
The objects and situations to which we address ourselves only provide a limited
manifestation of their reality at any given time and place. I cannot fully grasp them and
the fact of this limitation coupled with my own drive to fully know propels me to further
and deeper explorations. The perspectivism to which I am bound in my knowing assures
me that I am communicating with a world that is boundlessly rich and not a fiction of my
own making.
D.) The Subject – Object Dialogue
The previous section is important for helping us to see that Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology is not subjectivistic in any radical idealistic sense; he does not hold, as
with Hegel, that the world is entirely constituted through the resources of consciousness.
On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty believes that we do approach the world on the basis of
our concrete historical and social situation so that in one sense we receive from the world
and project unto the world according to subjective filters. According to Merleau-Ponty,
our knowing emerges from a subject-object dialogue with the world. I turn now to an
important passage from Merleau-Ponty where he stresses the priority of the world in our
human knowing (also emphasized in the last section) but also begins to introduce us to
the subject-object dialogue which is so critical for understanding his philosophy:
It is a question of recognizing consciousness itself as a project of the
world, meant for a world which it never embraces nor possesses but
towards which it is perpetually directed--and the world as this preobjective individual whose imperious unity decrees what knowledge shall
take as its goal. This is why Husserl distinguishes between intentionality
of act, which is that of our judgements and of those occasions when we
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voluntarily take up a position..and operative intentionality (fungierende
Intentionalität), or that which produces the natural and antepredicative
unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in our desires, our
evaluations and in the landscape we see, more clearly than in objective
knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to translate
into precise language.289
Although the term subject-object dialogue is not used here we can begin to get at this
central theme through Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of two dimensions of intentionality:
intentionality of act and operative intentionality. The previous treatment of primary
perception above was essentially a treatment of operative intentionality. Our basic stance
upon waking up is one of operative intentionality, or operative perception. We receive the
world laid out in front of us before we even make any judgments about it. Operative
intentionality is passive in that through it we are fundamentally receptive of the world. In
a sense, Merleau-Ponty will say, the world speaks itself into us. When we open our
senses we do not dictate what we will perceive; rather, we take in what is available. The
world gives itself to us. Operative intentionality is a necessary precursor to intentionality
of act—i.e. I must have some context within which to reflectively act. I stand before a
horizon and I receive what is presented to me (operative intentionality) but then I “take
up a position” and then deliberately look to one particular place. I pay attention to the
play of light on the trees and marvel at the colors—e.g. intentionality of act.
It would be a mistake to think of operative intentionality and intentionality of act
as discrete acts of consciousness that can be separated from one another. We can
distinguish them in theory so as to better understand the working of consciousness, but in
practice operative intentionality and intentionality of act cannot be clearly marked off
from one another. This is because operative intentionality naturally unfolds into
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intentionality of act. “We found,” Merleau-Ponty says, “beneath the intentionality of act,
or thetic intentionality, another kind which is the condition of the former’s possibility:
namely an operative intentionality already at work before any positing or any
judgement.”290 It is already at work in that it orients consciousness to a particular place in
the world and then calls for consciousness to take up a position or make a judgment. And
as I do so—e.g. as I figure out what the pleasant smell is that has captured my interest—I
am able to realize that it has been given to me through my more generalized bodily hold
on the world: operative intentionality.
How does this dual intentionality introduce us to the theme of the subject-object
dialogue? The world that I take in according to operative intentionality is one that I am
already attuned to in some sense. That is, I see it according to my pre-existing desires,
according to natural and/or habitual patterns of evaluation. There is what Merleau-Ponty
calls ‘sedimentation’ in consciousness which helps to orient intentionalities of act. For
example, a young boy might have some nascent musical ability and interest in the tempo
and rhythm of his older brother’s piano playing. Because of this he directs himself to the
playing and listens attentively to the sound of the older boy going over and over his
beginner Suzuki piece. This intentionality of act—attentive listening--adds another layer
of “sediment” to consciousness—i.e. memories of the music—and this sediment enters
into the younger boy’s operative intentionality. He has a new layer of experience upon
which to approach the world although he will not likely be directly conscious of this
experience.

290

Ibid., 498.
161

I turn now to another example of the subject-object dialogue but this time in the
context of a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about motivation. I present these ideas
while also introducing an example of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological treatment of
pathology. Merleau-Ponty is famous for discussing the experiences of patients with
various neurological disorders and showing how certain phenomenological findings (e.g.
that consciousness is ordered toward the perception of wholes) enable us to adequately
explain the disorders. Merleau-Ponty often draws upon the experiences of Mr. Schneider,
a man who had suffered a brain injury during fighting in World War I and whose
pathology had been carefully studied and documented by the psychologist Kurt
Goldstein. In what follows I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of Schneider’s pathology
according to his phenomenological finding that there is a subject-object dialogue in
consciousness between motivated phenomena and motivating phenomena. I show further
how his teaching provides a better explanation of Schneider’s illness than the mechanistic
explanations offered by scientific empiricism.
There are a wide variety of symptoms that emerge from Schneider’s pathology.
The following are just some of the many that Merleau-Ponty addresses. For example,
Schneider cannot grasp the essence of a story and thus, when telling it back, “finds
nothing to emphasize” and can only reconstitute it “part by part.”291 In conversation he is
unable readily to grasp the meaning of language spoken to him; instead, “the words of
others are for him signs that have to be severally deciphered.”292 Although Schneider
would like to have specific opinions about, for example, the way the government levies
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taxes or conducts its foreign policies, he is unable to formulate them and “’must be
content with large-scale beliefs, without the power to express them.’”293
What then is Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motivation and how can we employ this
idea to provide a non-mechanistic account of Schneider’s illness? In the first place it is
important to note that motivation should not be understood in intellectualist terms as a
purely internal phenomenon whereby a person is moved as a result of her own ideas
alone or, in an empiricist sense, as the result of sense impressions entering into the person
from the “outside” world. It would be simplistic to call Merleau-Ponty’s concept a
combination of these two perspectives because neither of them explicitly address the idea
of motivation. However, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of motivation involves both
consciousness as a constructive power as well as objects from the “outside” acting upon
consciousness and in this way he draws upon both intellectualist and empirical traditions
in philosophy. Motivation is, as we see in the following passage, a fluid concept which
can be understood only as a dialogue or as a give and take movement between the
conscious subject and the world which surrounds him/her:
To the degree that the motivated phenomena comes into being, an internal
relation to the motivating phenomenon appears; hence, instead of the one
merely succeeding the other, the motivated phenomenon makes the
motivating phenomenon explicit and comprehensible, and thus seems to
have preexisted its own motive.294
A simple example from my former commute to Duquesne serves nicely to illustrate this
concept. The first time I approached the University while driving on Forbes Avenue the
front right tire of my car dipped into an unusually deep pothole. The tire thudded down
and the car shook while I tightly gripped the steering wheel and experienced the irritation
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that often accompanies such encounters. Immediately prior to driving into the pothole it
was either entirely outside my field of perception or, at the most, experienced as a slight
indention within the pavement, a vague object within the more explicit object of the road
itself. After my car dropped down and I experienced ensuing irritation the pothole
became for me explicit and comprehensible. The motivating phenomenon—my bumpy
experience of the hole set alongside its physical surroundings which included my own
body--was not present by itself in my consciousness; it appeared in relation to the
motivated phenomenon—my tight gripped irritation. However, the latter phenomenon
clarified the existence of the object which gave rise to the motivating phenomenon and
drew it out of an implicit place on my field of perception into a very distinct object on
that field.
Another important dimension of motivation is that we constantly form habits of
consciousness which impact and develop our experience of motivation. It is here that we
see Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the subject-object dialogue further developed. Prior to
my first commute to Duquesne the pothole was not a mental factor for me, but after
dropping my car into it, the sediment of my consciousness now holds the experience of
that first encounter. Thus, when I currently drive down Forbes Avenue the pothole leads
to motivating phenomenon of “pothole is present!” but now I project meaning into it; it
has become an explicit and potentially dangerous object in my perceptive field that
motivates me to swerve around it. The pothole is now internally related to my experience
of satisfaction, the motivated phenomenon, when I have successfully avoided it.
For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness functions according to motivation, which
means that any experience I have of being in the world can be explained by appeal to an
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internal relationship between motivating and motivated phenomena. For example, when I
now drive by a stately grove of sugar maples in late summer I am prompted (but not
determined!) to look forward to those same trees when their leaves turn crimson in a few
weeks time because my consciousness holds the memory of those trees in their autumn
glory. The grove of maples in summer serve as motivating phenomena in relationship to
certain motivated phenomena--i.e. the expectation of fall color.
How then can we draw upon motivation to explain Schneider’s illness? For
Merleau-Ponty the normal human being experiences motivation in the context of “an
‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting,
our physical, ideological and moral situation or rather which results in our being situated
in all these respects.”295 I experience motivation while being “situated” in a world rich
with meaning that I both project into and receive meaning from. As the normal bodysubject acts into the world the whole horizon of his/her consciousness is filled with
interconnected motivating phenomenon. However, for Schneider the intentional arc of his
consciousness is flaccid and his motivation is anemic; he is not able to easily hold onto
the various features that have informed his “human setting” and use them both to project
meaning into and understand the various objects of his world. He is able to walk from
point ‘A’ to ‘B’ and to experience the motivating phenomenon of objects interposed
between his destination and his current position which bespeak “distance” (the motivated
phenomenon). However, a rich variety of motivating phenomena, which are available to
most people, do not even appear to Schneider. Unless an object is directly related to an
explicit course of action that the patient has taken—e.g. walk to the grocery store to
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purchase a loaf of bread—it will not function as a motivating object. He will not, for
example, even notice the home of his doctor while en route to the market because it does
not figure into his plans for the bread he wants to buy. “In his case, the possible situation
at every moment is so narrow that two sectors of the environment not having anything in
common for him cannot simultaneously form a situation.”296
Schneider’s extremely thin experience of motivation can, therefore, explain the
symptoms of his pathology noted above. He cannot grasp the essence of a story because
the sedimentation of “story” in his consciousness is either thin or non-existent. Further,
he has hardly any concept of a whole narrative that he could use to grasp the nature of a
new story. He is unable readily to grasp the meaning of language spoken to him because
unlike others, who have a developed internal lexicon that they use to immediately
understand another, Schneider must, in a sense, define anew each word in a sequence.
The patient cannot formulate or express political opinions because they are outside the
range of his very practical and sequential existence; political meaning is not in the
sediment of his consciousness. For Cesar Chavez the back breaking and underpaid labors
of the farmhand is a motivating phenomenon related to the motivated phenomenon of
protest precisely because he sees political meaning (among other meanings—e.g. racial)
in those labors. But Schneider is unable to project political significance into or out from
the practical details of his existence. His whole experience of motivation is profoundly
weak or, in other words, the subject-object dialogue that he has with the world about him
is profoundly limited like a discussion made up of basic words that remains on a trivial
level.
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Schneider’s situation casts into relief that normal human functioning depends
upon consciousness having certain kinds of sedimentation or habits. When listening to
another tell a story we must have a previous understanding of narrative and its beginning,
middle, and end structure to fully grasp its meaning. At a more basic level we have to
already understand the words another speaks in order to properly receive what he/she has
to say. There are what we can call universal kinds of sedimentation that allow for normal
social intercourse, but the subject-object dialogue is also unique to each person in that my
particular consciousness has layers of sedimentation that emerge from my own life
course, my family of origin, my innate inclinations and temperament, etc. Each one of us
is uniquely oriented such that what is motivating phenomena for one might not even
register for another and even if it did, the motivated phenomena might be very different
between them depending upon the different “groundwork” of their different
consciousnesses.
Now, up to this point I have been considering the subject-object dialogue within
the context of our lived body experience of it and have been concentrating upon how
human capacity for understanding objects in the world is affected by the sedimentation of
our consciousness. But I would be remiss not to add that for Merleau-Ponty the subject –
object also has an effect upon the objects which we direct ourselves toward, which means
that the truth-hungry philosopher is not oriented toward unchanging essences, but rather
toward a world which exists, like the human being, in developmental flux. For example,
let us consider the first Native Americans or Colonial settlers who first saw an “old man”
in the rocky face of New Hampshire’s “Man on the Mountain” and then shared their
experience with others. From a geological perspective the rocky face was not changed by
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humans seeing it as a “man” but nonetheless the rocky object became imbued with
meaning from the subjects who gazed upon it. The object became a symbol and in one
sense was made more rich by Native Americans or Colonial settlers imbuing the rock
with the meaning of “old man.” Further, each generation of viewers develops the symbol
so that it now means more than simply “old man in the rock” but also “historical
landmark,” emblem of “New Hampshire,” and so on. In Merleau-Ponty’s vision of the
world human subjects and the objects to which they relate exist in a state of mutual
developmental flux. Human consciousness continues to be altered by engagement with
the world and the meaning of objects in the world continues to change due to our
engagement with it.
E.) Merleau-Ponty’s Concept of Truth
Let us consider Merleau-Ponty’s teaching that all things, including physical
objects and material situations that we access through our senses as well as abstract
concepts/ideas that we think about, are never completely revealed to us, but presented
according to aspects or perspectives. It is perhaps easiest to understand this teaching by
considering how we see physical objects; as we walk around them we gain, from each
new angle, new dimensions. But we also necessarily approach ideas, problems, social
situations and other more abstract realities from various angles. We try to wrap our minds
around the contemporary global financial crisis by considering mortgage backed
securities, predatory lenders, reckless Wall Street money managers, irresponsible buyers,
false assumptions about the rise of home values, and so on. Clearly the objects which we
seek to know can never be fully grasped from each perspective all at once by the human
mind.
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And even if we could accomplish this for one moment, we find ourselves and the
objects we seek to know immersed in time and under constant change as a result not only
of engagement with physical forces but also with meaning-giving human subjects so that
completely defining “what they are” becomes even more difficult. If this is true and it is
also true that what we can know depends upon the development of our minds, how is it
possible to have truth? If what we know is what it is because I imbue it with meaning
then how can I have access to an essence beyond my limited scope? How can one know
anything at all in an absolute or permanent sense? Does Merleau-Ponty even have a
concept of truth?
I want to approach an answer to these questions by considering truth in the
context of the human being. There are many places where Merleau-Ponty speaks about
the human being ambiguously, claiming on the one hand that there is some necessary and
universal aspect of our being, some dimension of our existence that we can consider a
given “nature,” while on the other claiming that human beings have no universal essence.
For example, in a section where Merleau-Ponty explains his notion of freedom he writes
the following:
Everything in man is a necessity. For example, it is no mere coincidence
that the rational being is also the one who holds himself upright or has a
thumb which can be brought opposite to the fingers; the same manner of
existing is evident in both aspects. On the other hand everything in man is
contingency in the sense that this human manner of existence is not
guaranteed to every human child through some essence acquired at birth,
and in the sense that it must be constantly reforged in him through the
hazards encountered by the objective body. Man is a historical idea and
not a natural species.297
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For Merleau-Ponty there are certainly defining features of human beings. Our bodies
indicate our rationality as we walk upright, enabling us to better examine the world
around us rather than be huddled face-first to an environment satisfying our biological
needs, and as we use our hands for making tools out of objects. Indeed, the majority of
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical career was spent defending and promoting what he saw as
an essential aspect of humanity—embodied rational consciousness--which he believed
was valid across times and cultures. Still, Merleau-Ponty clearly does not believe in
unchanging essence. He does not hold, as Aquinas does, that the nature of the human
being is derived from an immortal and immaterial soul. There is no “human nature finally
and immutably given.”298 There are stable features of human existence that we can
articulate as we examine normal human experience but these must be developed and
established and then re-established in our individual lives, according to Merleau-Ponty.
So, if Merleau-Ponty does not believe that there are permanent essences to things
is he able to have any firm notion of philosophical truth? To provide an answer let us first
look, as Merleau-Ponty does, to our experience of the possession of truth. It is important
to note while doing so that Merleau-Ponty writes against the backdrop of skepticism,
which decries any notion of truth, and strong rationalism, which assumes that the world
can be fully explained according to rational categories and the assertions of
consciousness. He writes:
We know that there are errors only because we possess truth, in the name
of which we correct errors and recognize them as errors. In the same way
the express recognition of a truth is much more than the mere existence
within us of an unchallengeable idea, an immediate faith in what is
presented: it presupposes questioning, doubt, a break with the immediate,
and is the correction of any possible error. Any rationalism admits of at
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least one absurdity, that of having to be formulated as a thesis. Any
philosophy of the absurd recognizes some meaning at least in the
affirmation of absurdity.299
By their very declaration of skepticism philosophers of the absurd take for granted that
there must be some kind of truth (even if they can only hold do a semantic theory of truth
and deny the possibility of knowing the world as such), else the declaration itself would
be meaningless and just another exercise in sophistry. On the other hand, rationalism
must be formulated on the basis of a claim which cannot be clearly proven. MerleauPonty believes in truth and uncovers how even the skeptic takes for granted that it exists.
But he is unwilling to walk with rationalists, either of an empirical scientific or
intellectualist sort, who believe that our minds can fully possess it.
But how does Merleau-Ponty define truth and what does it mean in the context of
the integral human being? I know of no passage in Merleau-Ponty’s work where he
succinctly defines truth but, on the basis of several different passages where he broadly
describes what he means by it, I believe we can succinctly summarize his definition as
follows: the truth is an optimal correspondence between my consciousness and the thing.
He explains that when we are viewing an object that “there is an optimum distance from
which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed from which it vouchsafes most of itself:
at a shorter or greater distance we have merely a perception blurred through excess or
deficiency.”300 If we stand too far away from the tree on the horizon then it can only be
faintly grasped, but if we stand at two inches from it the tree is a blurry mess and
impossible to focus upon. When I am in a place where my eyes and therefore my
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consciousness can best see the tree, when it is in optimum focus, then I have a true grasp
of it.
But there are two corollaries to the truth as an optimum correspondence between
consciousness and the thing. The first is that the truth is not absolute because I participate
in it. I come to objects with a sedimentation of consciousness (that I can be more or less
aware of) that both limits and provides access to the objects I wish to know but which
disallows me from having an absolute or all encompassing access to anything. Knowing,
for Merleau-Ponty, does not take place through a purely receptive consciousness
somehow receiving an unchanging universal essence of a thing; rather we participate in
what we know.
Second, an optimum grasp of a thing can give us a definition that we can count
upon but there is a teleology of consciousness toward more and more perfect
formulations of a thing’s truth, as Merleau-Ponty further explicates below:
Habemus idem verum, we possess a truth, but this experience of truth
would be absolute knowledge only if we could thematize every motive,
that is, if we ceased to be in a situation. The actual possession of the true
idea does not, therefore, entitle us to predicate an intelligible abode of
adequate thought and absolute productivity, it establishes merely a
‘teleology’ of consciousness which, from this first instrument will forge
more perfect ones, and these in turn more perfect ones still, and so on
endlessly.301
There is an optimal angle from which I can stand before and describe a thing but I cannot
have a complete grasp of it from this optimum angle because one step to my left (to speak
of knowledge purely from a visual perspective) gives me another angle that I did not have
at the optimum place and so on ad infinitum. Thus, the initial truth or true picture that I
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can have is incomplete and I can always go beyond the existing truth I have to more
precise formulations.
After addressing the main themes and philosophical orientation of MerleauPonty’s work, I now turn to his treatment of the human being as an integral union of
body, soul, and consciousness. In Part II I will address the philosophical anthropology of
The Structure of Behavior. In Part III, I will address it by examining The Phenomenology
of Perception.
Part II – Merleau-Ponty’s Teaching on the Integral Human Being in the Structure of
Behavior302
In The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty attempts “to trace out, on the basis of
modern psychology and physiology, the relationships which obtain between the
perceiving organism and its milieu.”303 He wants to show on a foundation of scientific
studies that objects in the world act according to their own structures or forms such that
the whole of the object is greater than the sum of its parts and thus cannot be understood
in any atomistic sense.
Merleau-Ponty’s examinations of contemporary scientific research to better
understand the relationship between the perceiving organism and its milieu are not
phenomenological in a methodological sense, however they do show his sympathies with
philosophers of consciousness. He shows, for example, that any scientific experiment
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necessarily takes place within the fundamental context of the scientist’s perceptual
consciousness. However, he does hold that an object’s form is, in part, constituted by
consciousness and he argues for this position partly through phenomenological analysis.
Later in The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty is explicitly phenomenological and
almost every theme Merleau-Ponty raises in this text is taken up again in The
Phenomenology of Perception.304 Thus, we can count The Structure of Behavior as partly
a work of phenomenology although it does not start off explicitly so.
As Merleau-Ponty says in his introduction, the basic purpose of this book is “to
understand the relations between consciousness and nature.” What is nature? “By nature
we understand here a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound together by
relations of causality.”305 Nature includes the whole cosmos: the entire physical world,
other human beings, and oneself. The central question he raises is what is the relationship
between one’s consciousness and the rest of the cosmos. Merleau-Ponty is not primarily
interested in ontology here. He is not asking what is nature and what is the order that
exists between things in the cosmos. By relations between consciousness and nature he
primarily means how consciousness properly understands nature. Now, as we will see,
Merleau-Ponty is clear that nature does speak of itself to consciousness, that meaning
emerges from things for consciousness. Merleau-Ponty is no idealist in any radical sense,
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although he does believe that we know the world according to subjective filters. He does
not believe that the understanding of nature can be reduced to consciousness constituting
nature by projecting meaning on to it. However, he is clearly a modern philosopher in
that he assumes that one’s basic relationship with the world is through consciousness, that
one stands in relation to the world from his/her consciousness.
Now, a significant part of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical career is dialogue with
empiricist and intellectualist thought. In The Structure of Behavior, his first book-length
work, this dialogue is central. In fact, Merleau-Ponty frames the whole thrust of the work
around the problem of the competing explanations given by empiricist and intellectualist
thinkers regarding the relationship between consciousness and nature. The explanation
given by empiricism (what Merleau-Ponty also calls realism or causal thinking) for the
relationship between nature and consciousness rests on the assertion that the “’mental’
(is) a particular sector of the real world.”306 Merleau-Ponty allows that empirically
minded thinkers recognize the need to distinguish physical organisms from
consciousness, but they treat consciousness as if it were a physical thing governed by
tangible cause and effect relationships. For example, “the doctrine of Freud applies
metaphors of energy to consciousness and accounts for conduct by the interaction of
forces or tendencies.”307
Alternatively, critical thought, or intellectualism, holds that “there is nothing in
the world (i.e. nature) which is foreign to the mind…[that] the world is the ensemble of
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objective relations borne by consciousness.”308 Here nature is swallowed up by
consciousness and the relations between things are posited by the mind.
Merleau-Ponty’s study emerges from his desire to find some solution to these
competing explanations, as he describes in the following passage:
Thus..there exist side by side a philosophy, on the one hand, which makes
of every nature an objective unity constituted vis-à-vis consciousness and,
on the other, sciences which treat the organism and consciousness as two
orders of reality and, in their reciprocal relation, as ‘effects’ and as
‘causes.’ Is the solution to be found in a pure and simple return to critical
thought? And once the criticism of realistic analysis and causal thinking
has been made, is there nothing justified in the naturalism of science—
nothing which ‘understood’ and transposed, ought to find a place in a
transcendental philosophy? We will come to these questions by starting
‘from below’ and by an analysis of the notion of behavior. This notion
seems important to us because, taken in itself it is neutral with respect to
the classical distinctions between the ‘mental’ and the ‘physiological’ and
thus can give us the opportunity of defining them anew.309
Whom does Merleau-Ponty refer to by philosophers who make nature an objective unity
constituted by consciousness? These are philosophers who trace their origin from
Descartes, in particular Kant and the post-Kantian critical tradition. Within the critical
tradition there is not, generally speaking, a denial of the reality of the physical world, but
rather a basic belief that the human being can only know what his/her mind projects on to
raw sense data supplied by the senses. Empiricist thinkers, on the other hand, reduce
consciousness to a dimension of the physical world. And while they recognize that
consciousness does not appear to have the characteristics of material extension and
therefore appears to be second order of reality, the initial physical order is foundational
for consciousness. Consciousness is an epiphenomenal reality for many empiricist

308
309

Ibid., 3.
Ibid.
176

thinkers, a by-product of physiological forces which falsely appear to itself to act upon
the body.
How does Merleau-Ponty address these competing explanations? He examines
behavior, as explored by the contemporary scientists of his day and as we experience it in
basic perception. Raw behavior makes no distinctions of itself between physiological and
mental realities. Thus, it is a sort of neutral field in which to study competing
explanations of the relationship between consciousness and nature. Merleau-Ponty ends
up drawing on the traditions of both critical and empirical thought as he examines
behavior and our experience of it. He holds with the former group that we are unable to
access anything apart from the involvement of consciousness, that experience necessarily
occurs in consciousness. On the other hand, he pays close attention to scientific studies of
behavior and, in particular, to the notion that there is meaning within the objects of nature
that can be fruitfully studied and named, a meaning which is not put into the objects of
nature, but which emerge from nature for consciousness.
The problem we have been addressing between competing explanations of the
relationship between nature and consciousness is one that Merleau-Ponty tackles
fundamentally on the grounds of epistemology, not ontology. This does not mean that
Merleau-Ponty altogether avoids ontological claims. On the contrary, his notion of
immanent signification—that the objects we perceive declare their own meaning to us--is
an ontological claim. His belief, which I will address below, that the universe is a single
totality and that we are unable to comprehensively define specific forms, because
changes in the whole universe lead to changes in these forms, is also an ontological
claim. Further, it appears that Merleau-Ponty has a fundamentally materialist view of the
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cosmos and this is an ontological presupposition, but one that he cannot ultimately prove
because of his commitment to perceptual consciousness as the beginning point of
philosophizing.
In the first chapter of The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty critically
examines classic reflex theory and unfolds a foundational idea which will occupy us for
the rest of Part II of this chapter: the concept of form (la forme) or structure (la
structure), terms which Merleau-Ponty uses interchangeably. Classic reflex theory
assumed the existence of a one-to-one correlation between external stimuli and discreet
nerve conductors. It assumed that organisms were basically organic machines and that
external stimuli could act upon distinct parts of the organism and cause a reaction without
the whole involvement of the organism. Merleau-Ponty challenges this idea by drawing
upon, for example, the research of Sherrington.310 The latter thinker, while still committed
to classic reflex theory, had revealed several truths about the behavior of organisms
which seemed to belie this theory. For example:
Sherrington has pointed out that the limits of the reflexogenic field for the
scratch reaction varies with days and circumstances. It can be added, with
the intensity and frequency of the excitants. The receptive field is strictly
defined only under the artificial conditions of the laboratory experiments
or again in pathological conditions.311
If an organism’s reflexes are separable from one another and operate like light switches
that can be turned on by external stimuli, then the scratch reaction (i.e. an organism’s
propensity to touch or scratch that part of its body which is prodded by an external
stimulus) should not vary with days and circumstances. Nor should it vary depending
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upon the intensity or frequency of the excitants, but it does. Merleau-Ponty shows that the
findings by Sherrington and many others reveal that “the fate of an excitation is
determined by its relation to the whole of the organic state [of the organism].”312
Certainly, factors in an organism’s external environment cause that organism to act in
fairly predictable ways but Merleau-Ponty shows that the organism’s whole system is
involved in reacting to stimuli. For example:
In general, when a reaction is produced, all those which other stimuli
could provoke at the same moment turn out to be inhibited; and when two
antagonistic reflexes enter into competition in this way there is no
compromise; only one of the two is achieved. Everything happens as if the
nervous system could not do two things at once.313
It turns out that the nervous system functions as an interrelated whole so that if it is
undergoing one reaction, other reflexes are inhibited. Merleau-Ponty also shows that
organisms (especially the more complex ones) are able to select or ignore certain stimuli
depending upon their own motivated inclinations or avoidances. Here he draws on an
example from higher primates and humans:
As soon as it is a question of fine movements of the hand, or even of
grasping movements, a simultaneous innervation of the antagonistic
reflexes is observed, the distribution of which depends on the goal to be
obtained and on the type of movement to be executed.314
When the organism is directing itself toward some objective it is able to redirect reflex
routes according to its purposes. Thus, classic reflex theory, which assumed the existence
of a one-to-one correlation between external stimuli and discreet nerve conductors, is
incorrect. The nervous system self regulates in holistic fashion when faced with stimuli.
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Further, it exists not merely in passivity to external activity but partly determines which
stimuli to receive and which to ignore.
Now, the holistic nature of an organism that enables it to deny or receive certain
excitations, is its form. How does Merleau-Ponty define form? His basic explanation,
which covers not only living beings but non-living ones as well, is taken from Gestalt
psychology:
The ‘forms’..are defined as total processes whose properties are not the
sum of those which the isolated parts would possess…We will say that
there is form whenever the properties of a system are modified by every
change brought about in a single one of its parts and, on the contrary, are
conserved when they all change while maintaining the same relationship
among themselves.315
This definition, also given in our Chapter One discussion of Ralph Ellis’s work in
neuropsychology, clearly covers the reflex behavior we have just examined above; each
reflex circuit is intimately related not just to other reflex circuits but to the whole
behavior of an organism depending upon its objectives. The various aspects of a form are
unexplainable apart from the larger wholes of which they are part. They would not
explain the behavior of the whole if their various properties could be added up and
summarized. Rather, they only make sense in light of the behavior of the whole being
which arranges and orders its parts.
At this point it is tempting to outline and differentiate Merleau-Ponty’s treatment
of various kinds of forms—physical, vital (including amovable and syncretic) and human
(or symbolic)--because of its cosmological nature and the interesting comparisons
between it and Aquinas’s own use of form to explain life in the cosmos. However, the
necessary limits of the dissertation prevent this exploration and I must be content to
315

Ibid., 47.
180

summarize certain essential aspects of forms which will help me respond to questions
raised in Chapter One regarding the feasibility of a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of
Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology.
A first characteristic of form, according to Merleau-Ponty, is that it is not exactly
a real characteristic of anything, but an object of perception. In the next chapter I will
show that Merleau-Ponty backs off some from this position. Nonetheless, his most
consistent claim is that “form” is not an object in the world, but an object of perception.
By not “exactly real” I indicate that Merleau-Ponty is a bit vague on where the form
actually lies, as we shall see. By real he means physical. For Aquinas, form is not
necessarily physical and therefore not necessarily real in the sense employed by MerleauPonty but the former thinker clearly holds that forms can be immaterial and therefore
inform actual things. Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is nothing immaterial
to any being, but at the same time he does not want to reduce consciousness to physical
processes and ideas to physical things. In any case, at one point Merleau-Ponty denies
that the form is actually in the object that is said to be informed:
Thus, form is not a physical reality, but an object of perception..in the
final analysis form cannot be defined in terms of reality but in terms of
knowledge, not as a thing of the physical world, but as a perceived
whole.316
Merleau-Ponty does not believe that forms are in objects, but this does not mean he
believes they are simply constituted by consciousness. He declares in another place that
“behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea.”317 In the passage above he says that we
need to define form in terms of knowledge (la connaissance), but this is knowledge not in
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an abstract sense but in the raw received sense that occurs in perception. I see the tree and
know it is there and know it has a given shape, size, color, and so on. Thus, the form is
not, strictly speaking, in the thing, but nevertheless it is grasped by, rather than imposed
by, the mind. Thus, there is an intrinsic orderedness about the thing which bespeaks a
certain “form.” If we dissected an object we would not find its form so it is not real in the
sense employed by empiricists, but nonetheless it must be present to some extent in the
thing, otherwise the object would not be able to declare to consciousness that it is formed.
One commentator on Merleau-Ponty, Gary Brent Madison, argues that we must
understand this question about the place of form in light of perception and the subjectobject dialogue, addressed in Part One of this chapter, which are so important to MerleauPonty’s overall philosophical project. He writes that:
Form belongs at one and the same time to the world (it is a structure) and
to consciousness (it is a meaning); and thus its proper locus is neither initself nature nor pure internal self-consciousness, but rather perception
which is the life of a subject engaged outside of himself in the world and
who is at once active and passive.318
We can think of form as existing in a dialectical relationship between the human being
and the world. In one sense form is in my consciousness because it is here that I come up
with concepts and language to describe what I perceive. But we definitely find ordered
behavior within objects which bespeak a certain form. This form does not express the
total structure of the thing because this total structure is itself never complete. It arises
from the object’s own dialectical relationship with the objects of its milieu. And as a
perceiver, my ability to grasp the meaning of objects develops through my own
dialectical relationship with the world. Thus, we have here two meanings of dialectical
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relationship. Human beings gain various kinds of sedimentation in consciousness as we
engage the world and we also impact objects of the world through our engagement with
them. But non-conscious objects of the world—e.g. rocks and trees—also have a kind of
dialectical relationship with other objects in the world. For example, the tree which grows
upon the rock is obviously affected by it and vice versa.
Even though Merleau-Ponty is fundamentally interested in the relationship
between consciousness and nature and even though he claims, at certain places in The
Structure of Behavior, that forms are only perceived wholes these statements do not
preclude the possibility that things might actually be ordered by some kind of formal
reality. If things function a certain way such that we perceive them as having definite
structures of behavior does this not suggest that something like ‘forms’ inhere in them? If
we cannot say that forms inhere in objects, we must at least say that their behavior is
holistically ordered, that there is a real orientation in an organism of preferred behavior
so that it has the meaning of structure or form which is held out to perceptual
consciousness. Towards the end of the book Merleau-Ponty will even say the following:
It is not only the matter of perception which comes off the thing as it were
and becomes a content of my individual consciousness. In a certain
manner, the form also makes up a part of the psychological individual, or
rather is related to it; and this reference is included in its very meaning,
since it is the form of this or that thing which presents itself to me here and
now and since this encounter, which is revealed to me by perception, does
not in the least concern the proper nature of the thing and is, on the
contrary, an episode of my life [emphasis mine].319
How are we to understand this passage? On the one hand Merleau-Ponty here says that
the form of something presents itself to me, which obviously implies that it is a reality of
that object. He will not go so far as to say that this form permanently defines an object,
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however; this form does not “concern the proper nature of the thing.” I interpret this latter
phrase as meaning that we can never completely have a thing’s full meaning in our
consciousness. Rather in episodes of my life—i.e. from the perspective I now have from
this time and place—I gain real access to at least part of the ordered meaning of a thing—
its “form”--but this meaning can change.
Merleau-Ponty is resistant to say that the forms of objects are, strictly speaking, in
those things in part because he is thinking of “in-itself” nature in empirical terms and he
does not think that we could adequately identify a thing’s form through scientific
techniques. Furthermore, he resists saying that structure or form is in a thing because he
does not want to cut off a thing’s behavior and the form that we use to describe that
behavior from the larger whole of which they are part. This leads me to a second
characteristic of forms, that each should be considered as part of more comprehensive
forms which can alter their specific behavior:
One cannot even say that structure is the ratio essendi of the law which
would be its ratio cognoscendi, since the existence of such a structure in
the world is only the intersection of a multitude of relations—which, it is
true, refer to other structural conditions.320
For Merleau-Ponty--and here is where we have a strong sense of the underlying
ontological current in his thought--the entire universe is one ordered whole, one ultimate
structure or form which exists in an ongoing state of evolutionary development. When it
changes there is change distributed to all parts of the universe such that we can never say
that there is a permanent form in any of its parts. A particular form really makes sense
only in the context of the universe which remains in a state of flux and which, moreover,
can never be adequately comprehended by the human mind.
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Merleau-Ponty offers a helpful example to explain further what he means by the
impermanency of particular forms and the need to understand them in light of larger
wholes:
Doubtless it is by means of laws that we are able to reconstruct the
architecture of a civilization which has disappeared: each step of progress
in Egyptology modifies the history of Egypt. But the reconstituted
structures function to complete a ‘time’ of the universe, the idea of which
they presuppose. They are not themselves real forces which would direct
the course of history or add a ‘causality of idea’ to the causality which
links together the partitive events. But Egypt, as an economic, political
and social structure, remains an object of thought distinct from the
multiple facts which have constituted it and brought it into existence. It is
an idea, a signification common to an ensemble of molecular facts, which
is expressed by all the facts and which is not contained completely in any
one of them. In the same manner, the actions and reactions of which a
physical form is the seat are conceived by the physicist as the components
of a physical system, lacking which his science would be without object.321
So, Egypt is a form, a whole that is found in its social, historical artifacts, etc. but it is not
in any of these artifacts although the artifacts unquestionably indicate the cultural unity of
Egypt. They declare their belonging to Egypt and each in its own way expresses
something of this form. However, the form changes as new discoveries are made, which
necessitates renewed interpretation of each part of the form “Egypt.” Similarly, when I
see the structure of a physical object and name it, that form is not in any of the parts. The
form itself, as a description of an immanent order, will change as my knowledge of the
physical object changes.
At the beginning of Part II, I indicated that the central question of The Structure of
Behavior is how best to explain the relationship between nature and consciousness.
Examining the form or structure of behavior is Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical strategy
for answering the question. He believes that our experience of perceiving forms “saves us
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from the alternatives of a philosophy which juxtaposes externally associated terms and of
another philosophy which discovers relations which are intrinsic to thought in all
phenomena.”322 In one sense Merleau-Ponty embraces the picture of the world painted by
scientific empiricism: the world is made up of physical objects which relate to one
another in causal fashion and which can be identified and named by the thinker. He does
not want to isolate consciousness in a purely for itself sphere that would be basically
immune to the causal forces of nature acting upon it. Thus, when we perceive a thing it
has some degree of causal impact upon us in that a distinct meaning emerges for us,
declares itself to us. But Merleau-Ponty also holds that consciousness meets the objects
of the world half-way. Consciousness is not a physical process that can be reduced to
other objects in the world or, it if were, there would be no way to prove it (!) because
consciousness is always present and prior to any experiment that would demonstrate the
physicality of consciousness. Consciousness approaches the objects of the world with its
own sediments of understanding by which it understands the world and draws out the
meanings which are immanent to the world. Consciousness exists in a dialectical relation
with nature such that it articulates forms or structures to explain the behavior of things.
Merleau-Ponty does not want to say, therefore, that forms/structures are “in” things. On
the other hand, he is very clear that the behavior of objects are so ordered that
consciousness, which is true to perception, will see them as ordered wholes. MerleauPonty’s final words of The Structure of Behavior sum up this dialectical relationship
between consciousness and nature:
The natural ‘thing,’ the organism, the behavior of others and my own
behavior exist only by their meaning; but this meaning which springs forth
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in them is not yet a Kantian object; the intentional life which constitutes
them is not yet a representation [as in scientific empiricism]; and the
‘comprehension’ which gives access to them is not yet an intellection [as
in Cartesian intellectualism].323
The preceding discussion about form has been preliminary to Merleau-Ponty’s
ideas regarding the relationship between a human being’s own consciousness and his/her
body. Merleau-Ponty has a whole section on this theme and its critical aspects will be
outlined below. The basic questions raised here are as follows: What is the form of
human life? We have discussed in general the relationship between consciousness and
what we could call external nature, those objects I encounter outside of me. But what is
the relationship between the consciousness of a human being and his/her own self?
I begin a response to this question with Merleau-Ponty’s frequently quoted but
difficult definition of the soul and body and their relationship to consciousness. What we
will find is that he sees the human soul as an animating form, but with a dynamism that is
hard to understand. I offer the definition in full:
But it is not a duality of substances; or, in other words, the notions of soul
and body must be relativized: there is the body as mass of chemical
components in interaction, the body as dialectic of living being and its
biological milieu, and the body as dialectic of social subject and his group;
even all our habits are an impalpable body for the ego of each moment.
Each of these degrees is soul with respect to the preceding one, body with
respect to the following one. The body in general is an ensemble of paths
already traced, of powers already constituted; the body is the acquired
dialectical soil upon which a higher “formation” is accomplished, and the
soul is the meaning which is then established. The relations of the soul and
the body can indeed be compared to those of concept and word, but on the
condition of perceiving, beneath the separated products, the constituting
operation which joins them and of rediscovering, beneath the empirical
language—the external accompaniment or contingent clothing of
thought—the living word which is its unique actualization, in which the
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meaning is formulated for the first time and thus establishes itself as
meaning and becomes available for later operations.324
In the passage the soul is first introduced as a vital principle; the soul is form of the body
as a living mass of chemical components in interaction. However, soul is more than the
living principle of its body but also appears to be the biological milieu which sustains the
body. For Merleau-Ponty, the soul encompasses the environment specific to the human’s
vital survival. He sees the human being as irrevocably integrated into the fabric of the
world (or environment). The lived body is part of the world and upheld by the world to
such an extent that the world itself is taken as soul for the body, at least when we
consider it a mass of chemicals. But in the dialectic of body-soul relations what we have
just seen as soul becomes body; the living being in relation to the environment which
sustains it is body for the soul of the social subject and his/her group. Now, we are no
longer speaking about the soul in relation to its body, no longer talking about a singular
human being; rather “soul” refers to a societal structure that includes not only a particular
human subject, but the whole group to which he/she relates. This is taken to be the soul
of the living being and his biological milieu, that is, if we take Merleau-Ponty’s words at
324
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face value. But then Merleau-Ponty takes a confusing turn and goes back to a treatment
of the singular human being: “even all our habits are an impalpable body for the ego of
each moment.” Does he mean here that each moment is an ego or that at each moment the
ego acts? If we assume the latter, the “self” or “I” stands as soul to the habit body of the
human being, that body whose motor skills are trained to function in certain ways (e.g
daily exercise we do without much thought.)
At an ontological level Merleau-Ponty’s description of the body/soul relationship
does not make much sense. Barral describes it as “tantalizing.”325 It strikes me as
downright confusing, at least from the perspective of ontology, from the perspective of
one trying to identify the real make up of things in the world. In what sense is the body at
the same time the biological milieu and myself as a living being? What are the
distinctions between them if they are both ‘body?’ And how then does this dialectic
become soul for the mass of chemical components in interaction?
However, from the standpoint of conscious experience in which unseen
connections between things are experienced and symbolisms drawn which create unseen
unities between things Merleau-Ponty’s “tantalizing” description of the body-soul
relationship does make a bit more sense, although it does not become crystal clear by any
means. I can live as a body subject with a singular focus on satisfying biological needs
and here my soul, or animating principle, concentrates upon utilizing the body, “as a
mass of chemical components” for the satisfaction of my vital needs. At this level of
conscious experience my intentional drives are for survival; at these moments I

325

Mary Rose Barral, “Body-Soul-Consciousness Integration,” Analecta Husserliana,
Vol. XVI, ed. A-T. Tymieniecka, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983),
123. Hereafter referred to as: “Body-Soul-Consciousness Integration.”
189

experience my soul at a vital level. Now, as a social being, my concern is with living well
with other people. I might, for example, want to celebrate work with my colleagues over
a good meal. Here my experience of the soul is that it animates the body toward such
social ends. The body can be experienced as an organism given to its own biological
survival through the consumption of food, but we can also experience in ourselves a
social drive. Thus, we can orient a meal for the purposes of celebration and social
discourse; here we experience our drive to biologically survive as subordinate to our
social intentions. My point here is that we do have experiences of functioning in different
ways with our bodies. Surely Merleau-Ponty is not denying the concrete reality of distinct
physical organisms that we call bodies or that individual bodies are different than the
“body politic.” But our experience indicates that one’s particular body and soul do have
different modes of existence, that we live in our body in various ways, that at times our
conscious intentions are simply to consume food and in such cases the soul, if we
interpret it as animating principle, is about directing that body towards the food. These
various modes of conscious experience correspond to different ways for the soul to be the
soul and the body to be the body.
In commenting on the lengthy passage we have been addressing, Douglas Low
argues that it indicates Merleau-Ponty holds to what he calls “emergent materialism.” He
says that “in the Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty) develops a form of emergent
materialism to explain the appearance of a consciousness that can be understood neither
as a mere thing nor as a separate force somehow introduced from the outside.”326 He then
quotes from the first part of the same passage on which I have been commenting as
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evidence that consciousness somehow emerges from the body in interaction with its
environment. He also claims that, for Merleau-Ponty, it is “the body that intimately
integrates mind and matter.”327
Low may be right that Merleau-Ponty holds to a kind of emergent materialism
and believes that somehow consciousness was birthed in an evolutionary process. In
several places of the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty does make statements which
suggest this belief. He says, for example, that:
A normal man is not a body bearing certain autonomous instincts joined to
a ‘psychological life’ defined by certain characteristic processes—pleasure
and pain, emotion, association of ideas—and surmounted with a mind
which would unfold its proper acts over this infrastructure. The advent of
higher orders, to the extent that they are accomplished, eliminate the
autonomy of the lower orders and give a new signification to the steps
which constitute them. This is why we have spoken of a human order
rather than of a mental or a rational order. The so frequent distinction of
the mental and the somatic has its place in pathology but cannot serve for
the knowledge of normal man, that is, of integrated man, since in him the
somatic processes do not unfold in isolation but are integrated into a cycle
of more extensive action. 328
However, if Merleau-Ponty does believe that the mind is birthed through lower somatic
processes this would be more of a presupposition that he has than a position that he
proves. Why? Because, for Merleau-Ponty “The body and the soul are significations and
have meaning..only with regard to a consciousness.”329 The dialectic between soul and
body Merleau-Ponty discusses is not driven by the body, but by consciousness which is
able to understand and experience the various meanings of the body-soul dialectic which
it experiences the human being to be. There is a difference in meaning between the body
as a mass of chemical components and the body as a living being operating in its
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environment and as a social subject. There is also a difference in meaning between the
soul as the animation of the body in a chemical sense and as the animation of a living
being to accomplish social purposes. And the consciousness of the human being serves to
integrate these meanings into its own life. The human being is not a composite of
different substances as in Cartesian dualism, but a composite being of body and soul who
has the power through consciousness to tighten the bonds of integration or to loosen
them.
Moreover, the passage from which Low bases his claim that consciousness is
established by lower orders does not bear out his interpretation, but rather indicates the
point I am driving at: consciousness performs the integration of body and soul. Low does
not quote enough of Merleau-Ponty’s previously quoted passage regarding the meaning
of soul and body. Let us look again at one portion of this text that Low does not offer in
his article:
The body in general is an ensemble of paths already traced, of powers
already constituted; the body is the acquired dialectical soil upon which a
higher “formation” is accomplished, and the soul is the meaning which is
then established. The relations of the soul and the body can indeed be
compared to those of concept and word, but on the condition of
perceiving, beneath the separated products, the constituting operation
which joins them.330
What is the constituting operation which joins concept and word? Consciousness.
Likewise the dialectical relationship between soul and body is achieved in and by
consciousness. Bodies do not establish their own meaning, although they might hold out
meaning to be discovered, just as words do not form themselves into concepts by
themselves.
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If Merleau-Ponty’s beginning point is perception and our conscious relation to
nature (including our own bodies!) is through perception, then we cannot prove that
perception arose through evolutionary processes. Any consideration of those processes
would already have to be done on the basis of conscious awareness. Low does seem to
acknowledge that Merleau-Ponty’s starting point is always that of perception. He claims
that “Merleau-Ponty does not wish to maintain any form of vitalism and insists that the
more integrated and liberated forms of behavior are still seated in the material conditions
of the body…[but also] insists that the neurological functions of the human organism
cannot be understood without an appeal to the perceptual awareness of the perceiver.”331
Because of Merleau-Ponty’s stance within philosophy of consciousness or rather
because he has seen that any theory of body/soul relations must take place within the
purview of embodied consciousness it is clear that he is not arguing for emergent
materialism. Low cannot claim that Merleau-Ponty concludes, on the basis of perception
that it arises from simply bodily conditions.
Low does rightly point out that Merleau-Ponty rejects vitalism. The latter thinker
declares in The Structure of Behavior that “we are upholding no species of vitalism
whatsoever here [and that] we do not mean that the analysis of the living body encounters
a limit in irreducible vital forces.”332 This does not mean, however, that he embraces the
idea that consciousness emerges from matter, just that when consciousness first discovers
itself, it finds itself incarnated, embodied and caught up in a milieu of which it is a part
without being reduced to it.
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Merleau-Ponty cannot outrightly embrace or reject a materialist characterization
of the human being on the basis of his stance in perceptual consciousness. Nor can he
embrace or reject claims that the human being is, at least in part, an immaterial being. He
cannot prove that there is not an immaterial aspect of the human being and Mary Rose
Barral is right to say that “nothing prevents this form [i.e. the human soul] from being
nonmaterial.”333
In the foregoing discussion regarding the soul-body dialectic and the integrating
position of consciousness, a question arises about the distinction between the soul and
consciousness. If soul can be a social subject then it can obviously think and direct the
body, but this is a power of consciousness as we saw in Part I of this chapter. What
exactly is the distinction between soul and consciousness? Merleau-Ponty himself can be
imprecise about the use of these terms. We have already seen that he believes soul can
have different meanings, but at times he seems to confuse soul and consciousness. He
refers regularly to the fact of our experiencing vision in the context of consciousness.
And yet at one point in the Structure of Behavior he bluntly states that “it is the soul
which sees and not the brain.”334 Later, in the Phenomenology of Perception he declares
that “consciousness of the body invades the body, that the soul spreads over all its parts,
and behavior overspills its central sector.”335 Here he implies that the soul is
consciousness. And yet there are other passages where Merleau-Ponty marks a clear
distinction between the soul and consciousness. This distinction is apparent in the lengthy
passage we have been discussing where he addresses the meaning of body and soul. He
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also clearly differentiates them when he declares that “the body and the soul are
significations and have meaning, then, only with regard to a consciousness.”336
Let me propose, as an answer to questions about the distinction between soul and
consciousness, that consciousness and soul periodically overlap within the human being.
For Merleau-Ponty, as for most philosophers, soul is an animating principle. There are
times when consciousness functions as an animating principle. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty
will say that when human persons are most themselves—i.e. when their actions are
permeated with intellectual intentions—then consciousness functions as form of the
whole body. But of course there are times when consciousness is not overtly present
within the human being. For example, during times of sleep consciousness does not
function as a soul. We are still, however, maintained in our existence by our vital
ordering principle because even in sleep all of our organs are ordered around the human
being’s purpose to get rest. Here a vital soul must be at play which functions apart from
the overt and self-present direction of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty also seems to hold
that the human being has a psychic soul that can be distinguished from consciousness.
For example, there are times when we become aware through recollection of perceptions
that we had some time before but when they occurred we were not directly conscious of
them. But these perceptions occurred through a holistic ordering process that we call soul
or form because the various sensitive powers of the body were coordinated in them.
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Part III – Merleau-Ponty’s Teaching on the Integral Human Being in The
Phenomenology of Perception.
In The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty thematized the relationship between
body and soul. But, as we saw, the integral unity he discussed there was not specifically
between body and soul, as it is in Aquinas’s anthropology. Rather, body and soul
function for Merleau-Ponty in a dialectic with consciousness as a source of the dialectic.
We saw that consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, can be identified with the soul but it is
not strictly the soul itself, which can have many meanings depending upon the level of
dialectic. When human beings function at a level of basic biological survival the soul is
simply an animating principle given over to the vital drives of the human being and
consciousness descends as it were to this vital level. But consciousness can also lift up
the soul and therefore change the body-soul relationship so that the soul functions as a
social principle drawing the body into engagement with others and with other types of
societal intercourse.
Now, in The Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty moves away from
discussion about a body-soul relationship. Although he will speak about how “the soul
spreads over”337 all the parts of the body Merleau-Ponty does not strictly thematize
differences between the soul and consciousness. Instead, he concentrates more on how
human beings experience themselves as embodied. Consciousness takes on the function
of form of the body, as it did in the Structure of Behavior, but there is little discussion
about a dialectic between soul and body with consciousness functioning as the source of
the dialectic. In the later text consciousness appears to simply take on the function of
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form, of animating and directing principle over the body and the dialectic is between
consciousness and its own body.
With both the Structure of Behavior and The Phenomenology of Perception
Merleau-Ponty hoped to “restore the world of perception.”338 The former text sought to
accomplish this end by examining the relationship between consciousness and nature
primarily in the context of modern psychology and physiology. He explored the results of
various studies not primarily to gain clarity about the objects under investigation but to
more deeply understand what consciousness is vis-à-vis the natural world. This work
established that this relationship should not be understood as if consciousness were able
to stand apart from nature. Rather, Merleau-Ponty showed in this work that consciousness
is already a part of nature by being grounded in a body. Consciousness literally takes into
itself the very nature that it seeks to understand. Thus, his epistemology revealed key
facets of his anthropology. Our knowing is fundamentally perceptual, grounded in a
body, thus the knowing subject must be an integral union of body and soul. The Structure
of Behavior established that consciousness is grounded in a body and that our most basic
perceptions reveal an incarnate knowing subject. In The Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty digs down into perception like an archeologist. His purpose is not
expressly to show that the human being is an integration of consciousness and body;
rather, he reaffirms our experience of this fact. While he sheds light on perception and
gets down beneath the “sedimentation of later knowledge,”339 which buried basic
perception and thus buried an embrace of the human being’s primordial unity, he will
shed light on this unity in a variety of ways.
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In The Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty offers a host of insights
regarding the nature of perceptual consciousness which could be drawn upon as potential
sources for enriching Aquinas’s work. He comprehensively explores, for example, how
our experiences of space, time, motility, sexual expression, and language depend upon
our embodiment. In a word, he uncovers a wealth of phenomenological evidence of the
grounding consciousness has in the body and how our bodily comportment (in many
different ways) is infused with the purposes of a mind. I believe that much if not all of
these insights are compatible with Aquinas’s concept of the human being and that much
of it could be drawn upon in a project to enrich Thomistic anthropology. I offer below
three separate phenomenological analyses from Merleau-Ponty which I will apply in the
next chapter to show that he can be utilized to expand the experiential basis for Aquinas’s
conclusions about the composite nature of the human being.
A) The Human Being’s Relationship to Stimuli Reveals Consciousness as Form of
the Body
Merleau-Ponty believes that consciousness/soul340 is present throughout the parts
of the body and orders them as a form. We see this in his discussion of the human being’s
relationship to external stimuli. In a chapter of The Phenomenology of Perception entitled
“The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology,” Merleau-Ponty critiques the
machine-like notions of human sensation found in early modern scientific empiricism.
According to this latter perspective any object “exists partes extra partes [and
has]..between its parts, or between itself and another only external and mechanical
340
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relationships.”341 On the basis of this presupposition the body is as in-itself as any other
being in the physical world which means that a clear observable connection between
stimulus and perception is theoretically possible. Moreover, it was assumed, that there is
a “linear dependence of stimulus and receptor”342 so that the impairment of one receptor
(i.e. a nerve) would lead to the specific disruption of one sense power or one part of a
sense power.
The beginning step Merleau-Ponty takes to dislodge this position is not first
phenomenological but based on current (1945) scientific research, although as we will
see he confirms scientific research with phenomenological findings. Merleau-Ponty’s
methodology is an integration of contemporary findings from various scientific
disciplines including physics, biology, neurology, and psychology as well as
phenomenology. He often delves into the former research before confirming it in the
latter, although a first principle of his philosophy is that unreflective perception, explored
by phenomenology, is the primordial font for any scientific or philosophical claim. So,
although he here begins with scientific findings, Merleau-Ponty does believe that science
is a second order expression of basic perception.
In this case, he turns to various physiological studies of human perception. I want
to look briefly at two of them. I draw on the first to show Merleau-Ponty’s teaching that
the human being functions as a self-organizing whole in perception when the body is in
relationship to external stimuli. For example, injuries to visual perception in whatever
place along the sensory paths necessary for sight do not usually lead to the loss of
specific colors. Rather, all the colors are affected and their shade remains basically the
341
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same although the saturation of color decreases. In time, the spectrum of colors moves
from a nuanced palette to the basic shades of red, blue, yellow, and green. Lastly, the
person suffering from loss of vision experiences a kind of monochrome grey. Thus, the
“progress of the lesion in the nervous tissue does not..destroy, one after another, readymade sensory contents.”343 Instead, the whole gamut of visual sensation is affected by the
presence of a lesion in one part of the sensory pathways associated with sight.
This piece of research shows that sense perception is not a linear process but is
rather a dynamic and holistic process in which “elementary stimuli are spontaneously
organized among themselves.”344 There is no doubt that the lesion impacts visual
perception but rather than directly cause the loss of a discrete color or particular sense
power the whole nervous system interacts with the lesion and during perception brings
about a holistic response to it—i.e. the shades of all colors lose their saturation. The
suggestion here is that the human being, like the nervous system associated with visual
perception, is a whole that self-organizes each of its parts.
An example from a second study addresses how the body organism can actually
tune out certain stimuli:
If a given area of skin is several times stimulated with a hair, the first
perceptions are clearly distinguished and localized each time at the same
point. As the stimulus is repeated, the localization becomes less precise,
perception widens in space, while at the same time the sensation ceases to
be specific: it is no longer a contact, but a feeling of burning, at one
moment cold and the next hot. Later still the patient thinks the stimulus is
moving and describing a circle on his skin. Finally nothing more is felt. It
follows that the ‘sensible quality,’ the spatial limits set to the percept, and
even the presence or absence of a perception, are not de facto effects of
the situation outside the organism, but represent the way in which it meets
stimulation and is related to it. An excitation is not perceived when it
343
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strikes a sensory organ which is not ‘attuned’ to it. The function of the
organism in receiving stimuli is, so to speak, to ‘conceive’ a certain form
of excitation.345
If the human being were simply a machine-like entity in which an excitation at one point
of stimulus reception led automatically to a certain sensation the experience described
above would be difficult to explain. Instead, the whole body through each sensory organ
is either open or closed to stimuli. After repeated stimulation the human organism, as this
example shows, can actually tune out certain stimuli so that they cannot even be felt.
What do these pieces of scientific study have to do with the soul being present in all parts
of the body? The first one suggests that the human being functions as one structure, that
the human being forms its own nervous system as it interacts with stimuli. The second
goes further to show that sensory organs must be open to stimuli in order to receive them;
this suggests that the human being is active and purposive, not merely receptive.
Merleau-Ponty believes that in order for me to deeply understand what it means
for the human being to function according to a structure or to self-organize its parts or to
be “attuned” to various stimuli, I cannot think about these processes in the third person
but must enact them in the first person. While doing so we can begin to see the link
between his use of physiological studies in human perception and his claim that the soul
is in the parts of the body as its form. In the passage below he provides a
phenomenological description of enacting what he has tried to explain with examples
from claims established by science about the nervous system:
I cannot envisage this form which is traced out in the nervous system, this
exhibiting of a structure, as a set of processes in the third person, as the
transmission of movement or as the determination of one variable by
another. I cannot gain a removed knowledge of it. In so far as I guess
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what it may be, it is by abandoning the body as an object, partes extra
partes, and by going back to the body which I experience at this moment,
in the manner, for example, in which my hand moves round the object it
touches, anticipating the stimuli and itself tracing out the form which I am
about to perceive. I cannot understand the function of the living body
except by enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am a body which
rises toward the world. Thus, exteroceptivity demands that stimuli be
given a shape; the consciousness of the body invades the body, the soul
spreads over all its parts.346
Let’s say I am doing a car repair and have dropped a bolt into some cranny near the
engine block. I lean over the hood of the car so that my toes are barely touching the
ground and snake my hand down into the crevice anticipating the feeling of the steel bolt
and concentrating my senses upon this expected feeling. I touch it with one finger, poke
about a bit further with another, again anticipating the sense of having a grip on the bolt,
of pulling it out with two fingers and then safely folding it in my palm. This kind of
experience provides further illustration of what Merleau-Ponty is getting at above. I see
in it that consciousness invades my body and orients it and all my other senses in a single
direction. As I grope toward the bolt certain senses are downplayed because they are less
central to my purpose of getting the bolt. Although I can feel my toe on the ground or the
frame of the car thrusting into my belly these senses are less prominent to consciousness
because they are subordinate to my drive to feel the bolt in my fingers. Thus, I experience
in my body what Merleau-Ponty describes from the scientific studies touched on above.
My consciousness or my soul structures my body parts and subordinates them to my
objectives.
Merleau-Ponty does not, in the passage from which I have just quoted, make any
kind of distinction between consciousness and the soul. It is as if he equates the two and
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assumes that the experience I have of my consciousness permeating my body is
synonymous with the soul being within each of the parts of the body. My previous
suggestion that for Merleau-Ponty consciousness and soul overlap is apropos here;
consciousness takes on the function of animating principle. But regardless of the problem
of the proper distinction between consciousness and soul we should be able to see that,
for Merleau-Ponty, the body of the human being is fundamentally different from a
machine-like object because it can be infused with the life of the mind and appears in
experience as an integral union of consciousness or soul and body.
B) Lived Body as Subject of Perception Indicates Integral Union of Consciousness
and Body
The thinking and willing part of the human being is normally considered to be the
source of the human being’s acting. Those who hold with Aquinas that the intellectual
soul is the form of the body can agree with substance dualists like Descartes that the
thinking part of the human being directs the body. Merleau-Ponty also agrees but in the
text I am about to present he shows that we can sometimes experience our bodies as
subjects of perception which, in a sense, run ahead of consciousness in our tactile
engagement with the world. One preliminary comment is that in the passage MerleauPonty uses the experience of the body as subject of tactile perception to oppose the
intellectualist idea that the perceived object is posited by consciousness. This text comes
from a chapter Merleau-Ponty entitles “The Thing and the Natural World:”
The person who touches and who recognizes the rough and the smooth
does not posit either their elements or the relations between those
elements, nor does he think of them in any thoroughgoing way. It is not
consciousness which touches or feels, but the hand, and the hand is, as
Kant says, ‘an outer brain of man.’ In visual experience, which pushes
objectification further than does tactile experience, we can, at least at first
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sight, flatter ourselves that we constitute the world, because it presents us
with a spectacle spread out before us at a distance, and gives us the
illusion of being immediately present everywhere and being situated
nowhere. Tactile experience, on the other hand, adheres to the surface of
our body; we cannot unfold it before us, and it never quite becomes an
object. Correspondingly, as the subject of touch, I cannot flatter myself
that I am everywhere and nowhere; I cannot forget in this case that it is
through my body that I go to the world, and tactile experience occurs
‘ahead’ of me, and is not centred in me. It is not I who touch, it is my
body…I am able to touch effectively only if the phenomenon finds an
echo within me, if it accords with a certain nature of my consciousness,
and if the organ which goes out to meet it is synchronized with it.347
The first point I want to make is that the body to which Merleau-Ponty refers is what he
calls the “lived body,” “phenomenal body,” or the “body subject.” He is not saying that
the body is radically disconnected from a self-aware person during touch or that the body
is literally ahead of consciousness as if the mind were, in a Cartesian sense, connected
with its own body from above its feeling members through some part of the brain.
Second, his statement that it is the body, not “I” that feels points not to a radical
separation between body and consciousness but to the presence of different levels of
consciousness within us. There is, as he frequently indicates throughout The
Phenomenology of Perception, a pre-reflective consciousness intimately associated with
the body and a more self-aware or reflective consciousness which can be fixated in
thought on something and which can, at times, feel itself disassociated from the body (as
in times of meditation or contemplation). These two dimensions of consciousness are
another way Merleau-Ponty speaks of a distinction in intentionality between its operative
sense and intentionalities of act, a distinction addressed in Part I above. In this passage
pre-reflective consciousness aligns with the hand that feels “ahead” of consciousness
understood in its more reflective sense. For example, during a walk in the country I
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accidently drop my wedding ring onto the ground and it slips down a hole. I thrust my
hand into the hole not knowing precisely what to expect. There are certain substances that
I have frequently experienced and can immediately think about or imagine. I feel dirt
because my fingers recognize it and the phenomenon of the touch “finds an echo within
me.” It “accords with a certain nature of my consciousness,” understood here in its more
reflective sense. I have a memory of feeling dirt and am, therefore, attuned to what my
fingers announce to me when they touch it. But there are other substances in the hole
outside the range of my previous experiences or expectations of what ought to be there—
perhaps some kind of milky foam or a silk handkerchief. I cannot see these substances to
recognize them and although my hand feels them, it does not touch them effectively
because there is no resonance of recognition of what they are. I push further into the hole
and touch upon what feels like a metal band. I imagine it in my mind and experience a
synchronization between what my finger is touching and my thought of the ring.
Tactile experience, as explained by Merleau-Ponty in the preceding passage and
as just illustrated, shows not that body and consciousness are disconnected from one
another but, on the contrary, that they are integral parts of one another. The human being
is not only a self-reflective “I” peering out from an unlocatable area somewhere behind
the eyes, but is also able to dwell, in a sense, on the outer fringes of his/her body. The
unity between my various parts is first shown here because of the diversity of my
experiences coupled with the sure knowledge that each of them is mine. When my fingers
are groping along some unknown substance which does not resonate with me and which I
cannot clearly think about, “I” am not feeling, but my body is as it passively receives
according to its senses. In other words, there is a lack of synchronization between the

205

touch and what I am able to recognize or anticipate at the outer fringes of my body and
yet the touch of an unknown substance is still directed by the thinking part of me. But
when there is an echo of resonance between what I touch and my memory of the object
touched or my intentions or expectations regarding the object, then I can be more present
to what is at the outer fringes of my body and take it up directly into thought or
imagination. Of course, I also recognize this perception as my own. A second way the
tactile experiences just explained reveal the integral unity between my body and my
consciousness (understood in a general sense) is because they show that the body is
permeated with the intentions of consciousness even as it “runs ahead” of consciousness.
My hand searching for the ring gropingly feels certain unknown substances even though
they do not resonate with reflective consciousness and I am unable to clearly think about
them but the hand remains ordered and purposive. My hand, along with the rest of the
parts of my body, are all unified by my singular intention to find the ring, so even though
they are “ahead” of consciousness they remain formed by consciousness. Another way to
say this is that my operative intentionality functions even when I do not or cannot take a
stance towards objects I am sensing through an intentionality of act and yet I have
ordered my body in the receptive position of operative intentionality.
C) The Body Not Only Manifests But Also Completes the Expression of
Consciousness
For this final foray into Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological investigation of
embodied consciousness I turn to our experience of expression and, in particular, how the
expression of language reveals integral unity between consciousness and body. It may be
that the phenomenon of speech, as explained by Merleau-Ponty, challenges Aquinas’s
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correspondence theory of language. I touched upon this theory without directly
mentioning it in Chapter II, Part I, Section C while addressing Aquinas’s understanding
of truth as an adequation of thought and thing. The implication here is that we are able to
have concepts of things which directly correspond to those things. When we formulate
words for these concepts we are able to speak the truth. Words in this correspondence
theory of language are instruments for concepts already formulated. We will see that
Merleau-Ponty takes issue with the idea that words are mere instruments of the mind as
he examines the phenomenon of expression. However, I hope to show that this
phenomenon can also be used to support Aquinas’s idea that the human being is an
integral composite of intellectual soul and body. I begin with a lengthy passage from
Merleau-Ponty that comes from a chapter entitled “The Body as Expression, and
Speech:”
If speech presupposed thought, if talking were primarily a matter of
meeting the object through a cognitive intention or through a
representation, we could not understand why thought tends towards
expression as towards its completion, why the most familiar thing appears
indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its name, why the thinking
subject himself is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has
not formulated them for himself, or even spoken and written them, as is
shown by the example of so many writers who begin a book without
knowing exactly what they are going to put into it. A thought limited to
existing for itself, independently of the constraints of speech and
communication, would no sooner appear than it would sink into the
unconscious, which means that it would not exist even for
itself…[speaking] is indeed part of the experience of thinking, in the sense
that we present our thought to ourselves through internal or external
speech. It does indeed move forward with the instant and, as it were, in
flashes, but we are then left to lay hands on it, and it is through expression
that we make it our own.348
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What Merleau-Ponty does not say directly here but which is the sine qua non of linguistic
expression, whether spoken or written, is that it entirely depends upon the body or rather
is meaningless without the body. The act of speech is through and through a bodily act
involving not only the vocal cords of the throat but the cavern of the mouth, the lips, the
tongue, the teeth and even the limbs of the speaking person. Writing too is a physical act.
The bodily nature of speaking and writing perhaps need not even be stated and to do so
might be tautological, a little like saying that books are made with paper. But blazingly
obvious aspects of our existence are sometimes overlooked and by overlooking them we
can lose sight of fundamental truths of our nature. In this case Merleau-Ponty points to a
phenomenon that we all readily experience, that thinking requires speaking, that unless
an idea is articulated it really never exists, that the very formulation of an idea occurs in
the context of expressing it. Often, of course, this expression is inaudible but even in the
silent sanctuary of our own minds we say words in order to think concepts which means
that the body is never simply the instrument of consciousness but seamlessly interwoven
with it. In a word, consciousness actualizes itself through the body.
This is also made clear in Merleau-Ponty’s example of writing. Here we see a
further piece of phenomenological evidence for the fact of thought actually occurring in
bodily acts. Let’s say we have a certain basic idea developed no doubt through speaking
either aloud or to ourselves. For most writers the idea still remains latent, however, and
needs to be literally worked out in a physical process of putting pen to paper or fingers to
keyboard. Rarely do we begin an article with an idea perfectly formulated. Rather, the
ideas are fleshed out, made incarnate, as we write and type. We complete our thoughts by
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making them tangible; without the physical manifestation of the ideas they often remain
unclear.
In the first two phenomenological explorations we examined from Merleau-Ponty
I sought to show how the body is an ordered whole through the purposes of
consciousness. In this final phenomenological insight from Merleau-Ponty we also see
evidence for consciousness as form of the body. For example, as we type away the poise
of our back, the arch of our arms and the placement of our fingers are all oriented by the
drive of consciousness to express itself on the screen of the computer.
But this latest investigation also indicates that consciousness really is not itself
without the body. I do not mean here only that consciousness cannot achieve its purposes
without the body as its instrument. Surely we do have experiences which indicate that the
body is a tool for consciousness. For example, I find I am weary, but need to keep driving
and so pull into Starbucks for a cup of French Roast. Its caffeine stimulates my mind and
enables me to be alert as a driver; here the body is instrument for consciousness. But the
experience that thinking actually occurs in the physical acts of speaking and writing help
us to understand the integral nature of body and consciousness at a deeper level. At this
level it becomes necessary to move away from approaching body and consciousness as
dimensions of our existence that we can address separately. Rather, we must insist, at
least according to Merleau-Ponty, that the action of consciousness is inherently bodily
action.
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Conclusion to Chapter Three
Chapter Two of this dissertation demanded that I place Aquinas’s argument that
the intellectual soul is form of the body within the metaphysical context of his
philosophical system. For Aquinas the human being is best understood alongside the
other beings of the universe, in light of the creation of the whole universe by God, and in
light of the teleological orientation of the universe to return to God. It was only in the
latter half of Chapter Two that I specifically addressed Aquinas’s arguments regarding
the integral nature of the human being.
This chapter likewise demanded that I contextualize Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding of the integral nature of the human being. Here I did not so much explore a
metaphysical context for his philosophical anthropology, but an epistemological one. His
focus, both in The Structure of Behavior and in The Phenomenology of Perception, is
upon the depth and richness of perception. He wants to “restore the world of perception”
to a modern philosophical scene largely divided into empiricist and intellectualist
approaches. Merleau-Ponty believes both approaches fail to understand adequately the
meaning of perception.
As we saw in The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty argues that perception is
inherently embodied and that our knowing relationship to other beings in the universe is
always and already mediated by a consciousness that cannot be conceived of as purely for
itself but also as having an in-itself nature. We did encounter a strong ontological
dimension to this first book in Merleau-Ponty’s idea that every being is an ordered whole
and that organisms do not function according to external causality but as purposive
wholes. But this vision of the world is not separate from the human being’s perception of
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it and we saw that form is not exactly a real dimension of a thing but, in part, a
formulation of a knowing mind; form is not a discrete unchanging reality, but emerges
from a dialogue between consciousness and nature. Thus, there is a dimension of
idealism in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, in that he believes that we know objects of the
world according to our subjective filters and believes that objects take on certain
meanings through their engagement with the conscious human being. But his idealism is
not of a Hegelian sort in which consciousness ultimately is the world. Rather, for
Merleau-Ponty, the human being participates in the world and shapes this world via
his/her engagement and is, in turn, shaped by it.
It is in epistemological terms that Merleau-Ponty approaches the body-soul unity.
We see that our bodies are purposive and motivated and cannot be conceived of
according to scientific empiricism. Unlike our relationship to objects of nature, in which
the form emerges from the dialectic between consciousness and the natural thing, in our
relation to ourselves consciousness becomes the form or soul of the body. Rather than
detecting an ordering principle that it calls a thing’s form, consciousness itself becomes
the ordering principle of the body. And because it can order the body in various ways, the
soul of the body has a variety of meanings, as we saw in Merleau-Ponty’s difficult
explanation of the body-soul unity.
In The Phenomenology of Perception we looked specifically at various ways that
our experience reveals consciousness functioning as form of the body. We first examined
experiences of being affected by external stimuli and how the body is not simply a
passive receptor but actively involved, according to its own conscious purposes, in
reacting to this stimuli. We take in the world according to the form consciousness gives
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the body and as we go out into the world we are able to ignore certain stimuli depending
upon the orientation of our consciousnesses. We next explored how tactile experiences
show that the body is permeated with the intentions of pre-reflective consciousness (or
operative intentionality) even as it “runs ahead” of reflective consciousness (or
intentionality of act). Finally, we looked at Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insight
that thinking takes place in the context of speaking and writing which indicates that
consciousness not only orders the body around its intentions but realizes itself through
physical acts.
I am hopeful that the phenomenological insights we have encountered from
Merleau-Ponty will illustrate how his work can serve to enrich Aquinas’s philosophical
anthropology. But to do this it will be important to address each of the objections to such
a project that I offered in Chapter One of the dissertation. To those objections I now turn.
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Chapter Four – Merleau-Pontian Enrichment of Aquinas’s Philosophical
Anthropology
After surveying Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s respective understandings of the
integral human being in Chapters Two and Three, I turn again to the possibility of a
Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology that I raised in
Chapter One. There I wrote that this enrichment could only emerge if there is enough
compatibility between our two thinkers to make it feasible and I presented several
objections to this possibility. In Part I of this chapter I hope to overcome these objections.
In Part II I lay out areas of compatibility between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty which
should serve as a basis for a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical
anthropology: 1) common grounding in perception as the source of knowledge, 2)
common appeal to interior experience for understanding body/soul unity, and 3) the
syncretic nature of Aquinas’s methodology as an indicator of openness to MerleauPonty’s phenomenological insights. Finally, in Part III I argue that there are at least three
ways a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology can take
place: 1) Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights richly illustrate Aquinas’s position
that the intellectual soul is form of the body, 2) Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
descriptions can offer better examples for Aquinas’s arguments than he himself provides,
3), I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions can be used to extend
Aquinas’s claims regarding the intellect’s knowledge of itself.

213

Part I – Response to Objections that Fruitful Compatibility Between Aquinas and
Merleau-Ponty is Hindered by Fundamental Philosophical Differences
There is no doubt that Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty have very different
conceptions of philosophy and methods of practicing it. For example, although Aquinas
certainly practices philosophy legitimately—i.e. arguing on the basis of principles
established by human reason—he mainly uses philosophy in the context of his theology.
His whole vision of the universe is God-centered in that he sees it as created, sustained,
and in a process of return back to God. For Aquinas, the human being, along with every
other creature, participates in God’s very existence, albeit in limited ways according to
the constraints of each one’s individual essence. The human being is an imago dei in part
because he or she is able to help sub-rational creatures return to the fount of their
existence by knowing and bestowing goodness upon them. In contrast to Aquinas’s
systematic metaphysics of creation grounded in God, Merleau-Ponty insists that
philosophy is detached from religious faith, that the world has no absolute source which
contains and orders it or which holds out the promise of a final destiny. Further, MerleauPonty’s ontology or metaphysics is not systematic and he does not seek to uncover the
ultimate causes of beings; rather he makes ontological claims on the basis of
phenomenological investigations. For Merleau-Ponty, philosophy should concentrate on
what we can know and how we can know it through a close examination of human
experience and he is unwilling to speculate, through an examination of efficient causality,
about the nature of beings outside of our direct experience. These are but some of the
fundamental differences between our two thinkers with regard to the meaning of
philosophy. Significant differences do not necessarily translate into lack of compatibility
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but, as Robert Harvanek argues, there are some differences which do preclude it,
especially when they center on the very nature of the philosophical enterprise.349
A) Response to Claims that Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s Conceptions of
Philosophy and Philosophical Methods are Opposed to One Another
In Objection # 1, Part II, Chapter One, I presented Robert Harvanek’s argument
that “there is a basic difference in methodology” between Aquinas and phenomenology
(among other contemporary philosophical movements of his day) and “ultimately a basic
difference in the conception of philosophy.”350 I turn first to a summary of his comments
regarding their differing notions of experience. Harvanek believes that phenomenology is
restricted to a dependence upon immediate and subjective experience because of its
insistence on beginning without presuppositions: “this passion for the immediate in
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There is also a possible point of contrast between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty with
regard to the priority of sensual knowledge and intellectual knowledge. Roughly
speaking, Merleau-Ponty’s operative intentionality aligns with Aquinas’s sense
perception and his intentionality of act aligns with Aquinas’s intellectual knowledge. For
Merleau-Ponty, operative intentionality is the founding term in the act of knowing and
naturally unfolds into intentionality of act; what is implicit in the former becomes explicit
in the later. But, according to Merleau-Ponty, once we make an intellectual judgment
regarding objects brought to us through operative intentionality, such objects become part
of the sediment of consciousness at the operative level or, in other words, they become
part of our “horizon.” Then, the cycle of intentionality begins again with consciousness
never resting in an ultimate truth; rather, our horizon perpetually develops on the
foundation of operative intentionality which then unfolds into intentionality of act. Some
would say (e.g. Dr. Fred Evans of Duquesne University) that for Aquinas the founding
term in the act of knowing is intellectual consciousness insofar as gaining truth is the
final cause in this act. This would mean that Merleau-Ponty has a sort of “bottom-to-top”
epistemology, while Aquinas’s is more “top-to-bottom” with the founding term in the act
of knowing being intellectual consciousness and the founded term sense perception. I am
not sure I agree with Evans because Aquinas is clear that all knowledge begins in the
senses. And yet when we consider the possible contrast from an existential point of view,
Evans may be right. For Merleau-Ponty we experience ourselves fundamentally as lived
bodies whose basic sense perception naturally emerges into intellectual knowledge;
Aquinas emphasizes, in contrast, that the intellect directs the body as it seeks to know.
350
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Husserl is rooted in his search for a presuppositionless science.”351 In contrast, Thomists
and scholastic thinkers depend upon “the experience of Western man, or of the human
race, [or of] the developed interpretation of that experience as found in the philosophy,
theology, and literature, of the West and the East.”352 This is a mediate notion of
experience not in the sense that one’s personal self-awareness is filtered through
historical and cultural filters but in the sense that it involves traditions and movements of
thought outside of direct personal experience; it is, therefore, a communal and historical
notion of experience. The philosopher who depends upon the experience of Western
philosophical thinkers is oriented around truth as it has been articulated and developed
within the philosophical tradition.
While I agree with Harvanek that, generally speaking, phenomenology and
Thomism have divergent notions of experience, there are several reasons why his
comments do not fully apply to Merleau-Ponty and Aquinas. I will initially justify this
claim with regard to the former thinker, then the latter. First, phenomenology is a broad
philosophical movement, rather than a technical discipline with specific parameters.
Husserl may have wanted to establish rigid techniques of phenomenological analysis, but
what he launched with his Logical Investigations was a diverse array of thinkers all
taking the basic premise of phenomenology—rigorous study of experience to identify
structures of consciousness and the essences of things to which we are intentionally
related—in a number of different directions. Husserl’s supposed desire to make of
phenomenology a presuppositionless science was not shared by all of his followers,
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among them Merleau-Ponty.353 Husserl sought to discover the pure structures of
consciousness which would be at the root of any theoretical exercise, but Merleau-Ponty
emphasized how consciousness is grounded in our bodies and through our bodies in the
world. As I showed in Chapter Three, Merleau-Ponty was primarily interest in exploring
human perception and he keenly recognized that the world itself makes the first mark
upon consciousness as we receive basic unreflective knowledge of objects through our
senses. All of this means that consciousness is never in full possession of itself and that
the very beginning point of our knowing is laden with presuppositions that we have no
way of justifying. For Merleau-Ponty, we do not lay down the conditions of our knowing,
rather we find that the world with all its splendor and ambiguity is given to us and that
our task is to understand as best we can the relationship between consciousness and this
world. Merleau-Ponty is certainly not guilty of the charge that he sought to base
philosophy on a grounding without presuppositions; this for him would be impossible.
It is true that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the close exploration of subjective
experiences. His main argumentative strategy, as with other phenomenologists, is to
carefully study and describe his experiences in an effort to make them resonate with the
experiences of others. The phenomenologist might explore, for example, the feeling of
empathy as Edith Stein did so well and say to his or her reader: “Is it not also thus with
you?” But for Merleau-Ponty, experience is never, strictly speaking, one’s own. He
strongly resists the Cartesian binary of the pure knowing subject and the object “out
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there.” Rather, perceptual consciousness reveals that we exist in a continuous subjectobject dialogue with the world. As we gaze upon some object or situation we might be so
consumed with it that we have no sense of interiority at all. In Part I, Chapter Three, we
examined Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of the soccer player for whom “consciousness is
nothing other than the dialectic of milieu and action.”354 In this player’s consciousness the
field itself and his or her action upon it is present; his or her perception is a result of the
field imposing itself upon his or her mind, his or her actions altering that field, and so on
in dialectical form. Moreover, each of us develops layers and layers of “sedimentation” in
consciousness which are partly the result of the world’s action upon us. We are
inescapably influenced by the culture, historical place, society, etc. in which we are
placed so that they and not simply “I” are in my own experiences. For example, if I steep
myself in a study of Aquinas’s writings I can actually change the way that I see and
experience the world; his language and argumentation and insistence upon the good of
creation can all profoundly affect my mind so that Aquinas, through his writings, is in
some sense present in my experiences. My “subjective” experiences are not simply my
own.
Harvanek might grant this latter point but insist that it is irrelevant, that the
Thomist can quickly grant that one’s experiences reference self and others but that
Merleau-Ponty (and other phenomenologists) still concentrate on exploring their own
consciousnesses as immediately felt rather than on experience in a broader more mediate
sense—e.g. the philosophical tradition or the experience of “Western Man.” It is true of
course that the phenomenologist does explore his or her experiences and that this
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approach is different than the historical approach of Aquinas, but it is important to note
that I can find established interpretations, traditional responses to perennial questions,
schools of thought, etc. within my immediate experience. This fact should soften, at least
to some extent, Harvanek’s claim that the phenomenologist does not access experience in
a broader sense, in the sense that experience is laden with traditions, the influence of
others, etc.
But even if there was a gulf between philosophical methods based upon historical
notions of experience, as explained by Harvanek, and those grounded in explorations of
the philosopher’s own consciousness, this would not necessarily mean that a gulf lies
between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s respective methodologies. Aquinas himself draws
upon experience in its immediate sense for his own philosophizing. In Part III, Section C
of this chapter I will further explore how Aquinas utilizes the human being’s interior (and
obviously immediate) experiences and so here I only offer one passage from his work to
prove my point. I recall from Section C, Part II of Chapter Two, Aquinas’s argument that
the intellect’s knowledge of itself is best attained not through an examination of the
nature of the human mind as understood in the scholastic philosophical tradition but by
the mind perceiving itself in its own action: “the mind itself being the principle of action
whereby it perceives itself and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence.”355
There is not then an unbridgeable gulf between Aquinas’s notion of experience and that
employed by Merleau-Ponty. In order to understand at least one object, the intellect itself,
Aquinas argues that it is important for the philosopher to appeal to his or her own
immediate subjective experience.
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I now turn to a second claim made by Harvanek that there are strong
methodological differences with regard to argumentation between phenomenology and
Thomism. The “proof” for the phenomenologist is to describe adequately subjective
experience so that it resounds with others and finds confirmation in the sphere of their
own interior life. But for the scholastic or Thomist this is not philosophical proof, not a
demonstration of the causes of things. As Harvanek reports, “the middle term or the cause
is the instinctive and natural quest of the Aristotelian and the Scholastic. For every
statement a ‘because’ is looked for.”356 The Thomist might grant that perceptual
consciousness is relied upon to bring accurately individual objects in the world to the
intellect but perceptual consciousness provides just a first step in making a
philosophically valid proposition. Insofar as phenomenologists fail to identify causes or
demonstrate their claims their work is not philosophical in the sense acceptable to
Thomists.
There is no doubt that Merleau-Ponty sees phenomenology as a descriptive
method: “it is a matter of describing, not of explaining or analyzing.”357 However, as I
addressed in Part I, Section B of Chapter Three, Merleau-Ponty definitely practices
philosophical argumentation and takes phenomenology beyond mere description.
Merleau-Pony either boldly contradicts the phrase I have just quoted or he means by it
that phenomenology practices argumentation and explains certain things (e.g. selfhood)
primarily through the unveiling of conscious experiences. Merleau-Ponty was deeply
interested in overturning empiricist and intellectualist notions of the human being and,
although his arguments against them do not appear in neat syllogisms, he does employ
356
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deductively valid forms. For example, in his chapter entitled “Other Selves and the
Human World,” Merleau-Ponty provides an inferential argument for the existence of
others in the form of modus ponens. I will first provide his text and then show its
argumentative structure:
If, for myself who am reflecting on perception, the perceiving subject
appears provided with a primordial setting in relation to the world,
drawing in its train that bodily thing in the absence of which there would
be no other things for it, then why should other bodies which I perceive
not be similarly inhabited by consciousnesses?...Through
phenomenological reflection I discover vision, not as a ‘thinking about
seeing,’ to use Descartes’ expression, but as a gaze at grips with a visible
world, and that is why for me there can be another’s gaze; that expressive
instrument called a face can carry an existence, as my own existence is
carried by my body, that knowledge-acquiring apparatus.358
If I as a perceiving subject find myself within a body and through it in primordial relation
to other things (p), then there might be other perceiving subjects who are similarly
grounded in their own bodies and through them in relation to other things (q). But
through phenomenological reflection I do find that I am such an embodied subject (p).
Therefore, (q). There can be others like me as well. Merleau-Ponty’s style might be
undisciplined from the perspective of a logician, but there is no doubt that his
philosophical method is beyond mere description of conscious experiences. Indeed, the
whole chapter from which I have just quoted is dedicated to showing how
phenomenology can lead to a legitimate proof for the existence of other human selves
each of whom have their own experiences. It is true that he does not explain the ultimate
causes of human existence, but he does provide clear reasons for believing in the
existence of others. And he does so in a deductively valid way. Harvanek overgeneralizes
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in his claim that phenomenologists aim not for demonstrable propositions but simply for
descriptions of immediately experienced consciousness.
Harvanek claims that there is “a kind of opposition between the contemporary
philosophical trends [including phenomenology] and Scholasticism and Thomism.”359 To
substantiate this claim he argues that phenomenology depends upon immediate subjective
experience because of its insistence on beginning without presuppositions and that it fails
to offer demonstrable propositions. I have argued that these claims, which would have
been an obstacle to a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical
anthropology, are insubstantial. Merleau-Ponty does not follow Husserl in seeking for a
presuppositionless basis for science in “pure consciousness.” Further, he holds that
subjective experiences are not simply one’s own but are also expressions of others who
have influenced one’s thinking. This latter point does not mean that the
phenomenological method can be equated with the Thomist’s use of tradition. But in any
case, Harvanek’s claim of a disparity in method is overcome when we see how Aquinas
himself draws upon immediate subjective experience; Aquinas does not simply employ
experience in a mediate sense but also in an immediate subjective sense. Finally, we see
that despite Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on phenomenological description, he does use
deductively valid argumentative forms and looks, at least in certain cases, for the causes
of experiences.
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B) Response to Claims that Merleau-Ponty is Committed to a Purely Materialistic
Anthropology Incompatible with Aquinas’s Hylomorphism
In Objection #2, Part II of Chapter One I presented the separate positions of
Stephan Priest and Fred Evans that Merleau-Ponty holds to a strictly physicalist
anthropology. Priest, for example, claims that Merleau-Ponty “thinks subjectivity is
physical, or, to put it another way: I am my body.”360 Merleau-Ponty does not hold with
reductive materialists that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenal reality but neither
does he hold with intellectualists that the mind is a separate substance. “Like the
Cartesian dualist,” Priest says, he accepts the reality of consciousness and subjectivity
[but]…like the materialist he accepts that we are essentially physical beings.”361 Evans
also argues that Merleau-Ponty holds to a fundamentally materialistic anthropology, but
he addresses not so much how Merleau-Ponty’s anthropology is a hybrid of empirical and
dualistic notions of the human being but that the body itself is the source both of our
‘spiritual’ transcendence and our grounding in the world. For example, Evans writes that,
according to Merleau-Ponty:
The body subject is not a mind and a body: mind is merely a capsule
phrase for indicating the body’s ability to break with its immediate
activities and initiate (for example, to ‘imagine’) others at the ‘periphery’
of the immediate horizon of its activities; and body is merely a capsule
term for our inability to ever break completely with our immediate
situation in the world.362
Thus, the body is ultimately the explanatory principle for both our “mental” ability to
break with our surrounding environment and for our continual groundedness in the
concrete situations in which we find ourselves. Thus, consciousness finds its first

360

Priest, 6.
Ibid.
362
Evans, 129.
361

223

principle in the body to which it belongs. Or, in other words, “our ‘spirituality’ is..rooted
in our bodily existence despite the tradition that attempts to divorce spirit or mind from
all traces of ‘carnality.’”363
If Priest and Evans are correct that Merleau-Ponty is committed to a purely
materialistic anthropology and believes that the “soul” or “spirit” of the human being
expresses only a bodily capacity for self-organization and self-initiation, then it might be
difficult for us to find the kind of compatibility that would enable Merleau-Ponty’s ideas
to enrich Aquinas’s. In Aquinas’s notion of the body/soul unity the soul is an immaterial
principle that forms for its purposes the human body. For Aquinas it would be impossible
for the body to exercise the kind of initiative and self-organization that Merleau-Ponty
(according to Priest and Evans) attribute to it. How could an anthropology grounded in an
essential materialism (though not reductivistic) positively contribute to a philosophical
system which rejects the first principles of these ideas?
I begin my response with the admission that Merleau-Ponty clearly declares that
we are our bodies—e.g. “I am a body which rises toward the world”364—and that we
cannot consider consciousness a separate substance from the body that can be introduced
from outside it. Our experience indicates that consciousness is embodied; how then could
we possibly consider it as ontologically separate or separable from the body? However,
there is an important distinction Merleau-Ponty makes between what he calls the
“phenomenal body” and the “objective body” that I want to draw upon to respond to the
idea that Merleau-Ponty holds to a materialistic anthropology (at least through the
resources of phenomenology). From a chapter of The Phenomenology of Perception
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entitled “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility,” Merleau-Ponty writes the
following:
It is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body,
and there is no mystery in that, since our body, as the potentiality of this or
that part of the world, surges towards objects to be grasped and perceives
them.365
This passage applies to our discussion for at least two reasons. First, it helps us to see that
Merleau-Ponty’s explorations of the body are of that body as experienced, as lived out, as
accessed through the phenomena we have of it in consciousness. The “objective body” is
that which can be laid out on the scientist’s table for empirical investigation; it is the
body that takes up space, which can be measured and weighed, etc. In short, it is the body
as an object. When Merleau-Ponty refers to “the body” in his phenomenological
investigations it is the phenomenal body that is already infused with consciousness. It is
the physical body integrated with and experienced by consciousness. So, Merleau-Ponty
might say that the body “surges toward objects and perceives them” but this does not
mean that the body, understood in a materialistic sense, is the grounding principle for
consciousness. The passage aids our discussion in a second way because Merleau-Ponty
refers to our acting upon our phenomenal bodies and, in a footnote to this text, says that
“it is not a question of how the soul acts on the objective body, since it is not on the latter
that it acts, but on the phenomenal body.”366 So, we cannot say that the phenomenal body
is the grounding principle for consciousness because that body is already infused with
consciousness (e.g. it perceives). But a fortiori we cannot claim this because Merleau-
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Ponty believes that there is a guiding principle in the human being which directs this
“phenomenal body;” the soul acts upon it.
Is the body (understood in its phenomenal sense) then integrated with two forms
of consciousness? Yes. I touched on this already in Section C, Part III, Chapter Three
with Merleau-Ponty’s argument that the lived body can be a subject of perception in a
pre-reflective sense as it “runs ahead” of reflective consciousness. Merleau-Ponty also
describes this twofold aspect of consciousness as ‘sensible’ and ‘intellectual.’ The former
kind of consciousness is that in which raw perception occurs; in other words, we receive
objects from the world basically undifferentiated from one another. The latter kind of
consciousness is that in which the mind is self-aware and in which we deliberately take a
stance toward the world and act upon it.367 We can also understand these two modes of
consciousness according to the subject-object dialogue discussed in Part I of Chapter
Three. Sensible consciousness is operative intentionality by which we receive through
bodily awareness the concrete situation in which we are imbedded—the trees on my
periphery, the snaking road before me, the din of crickets, the vague smell of something
cooking in the air, all of the aspects of my situation which I am aware of in a prereflective sense and to which I do not pay explicit attention. Through sensible prereflective consciousness I receive the world. This is the first step of the subject-object
dialogue. It gives me the world that I can then take a stance toward through intentionality
of act which occurs in intellectual or reflective consciousness. When Merleau-Ponty
speaks above about the soul acting on the phenomenal body he is referring to how
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intellectual consciousness acts upon, guides, and directs the lived body or the body as we
experience it in sensible consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty does say that ‘I am my body’ and he does argue that the body can
break with its immediate surroundings. But it is able to do so through the resources of
consciousness with which the body is already infused. Merleau-Ponty might personally
believe in a kind of emergent materialism (as I allowed he does in Part II of Chapter
Three) but he neither describes nor proves this through his phenomenology. On the
contrary, the very beginning point of his investigations is perceptual consciousness, in
which body and consciousness are already seamlessly woven together. He does not argue
that the body, in a materialistic sense, gives rise to consciousness. As I argued in my Part
II, Chapter Three discussion with Douglas Low, this would be impossible because any
consideration of how the body gives rise to consciousness would already have to be done
on the basis of an embodied conscious awareness, a primordial givenness that we can
explore but not justify through the resources of phenomenology.
C) Response to Claims that Merleau-Ponty Has an Idealist Notion of Body/Soul
Integration Incompatible with Aquinas’s Philosophical Realism
The next major objection to compatibility between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty
emerged from the claim that the latter’s philosophical anthropology is based upon an
idealist foundation. Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty may both hold that the human being is
an integral union of body and soul but if Merleau-Ponty believes that this union is only
achieved as a mental construction and may not be really so then we have here a striking
difference between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty which would likely preclude
compatibility between them. Why so? Because the Thomist believes that he or she is
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drawing conclusions about the actually existing human being while Merleau-Ponty, if the
objection holds, addresses himself to the human as an idea. If our respective philosophers
are not even discussing the same object how could we find compatibility leading to
enrichment?
I first turn to David Braine’s claim, grounded in his analysis of The Structure of
Behavior, that Merleau-Ponty’s anthropology is an idealism. Braine believes that
Merleau-Ponty resists giving any metaphysically grounded concept of the human being
and instead rests his conceptions of nature (including the human being) upon a meaninggiving power of consciousness:
[Merleau-Ponty] quotes with agreement the saying of Goldstein that what
we are looking for in the idea of life ‘is not the terminal stone of a
building, but the building itself in which the partial phenomena, at first
insignificant, appear as belonging to a unitary, ordered and relatively
constant formation of specific structure…; we are not looking for a real
foundation (Seinsgrund) which constitutes being, but for an idea, a reason
in knowledge (Erkenntnisgrund) in virtue of which all the particular facts
become intelligible.’368
By “building” Goldstein and Merleau-Ponty mean a general conception of life. They both
allow that there are apparent natural structures but that identifying these should not be
equated with establishing a philosophy of being. Instead, they are looking for ideas,
mental constructions, which make sense out of the various facts of life established by
science. If Braine is right, Merleau-Ponty does not hold that we can have a
metaphysically grounded concept of the human being as an integral union of body and
soul. Whatever unity we discover among human beings is a construction of
consciousness, not something we can really attribute to them.
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But Braine’s position is faulty. First, the passage from which he argues that
Merleau-Ponty is an idealist is actually from a section of The Structure of Behavior where
Merleau-Ponty is giving an intellectualist account of the behavior of organisms. MerleauPonty’s writing style is difficult in that he often presents his opponent’s positions without
clearly indicating a distinction between them and his own position. The passage from
Goldstein is from a section where Merleau-Ponty is not presenting his own position.
Second, Merleau-Ponty is not primarily interested in ideas of behavior but in the forms of
behavior. “Behavior is not a thing,” he says, “but neither is it an idea.”369 Third, he is very
clear, as we saw in the discussion on forms in Part II of Chapter Three, that forms exist in
an interplay between consciousness and the perceived object, but they are not simply
ideas. Merleau-Ponty does not hold that the source of the intelligibility of objects is
simply in the mind of the knower, but that objects have their own meaning which they
hold out to the knower to explore. Merleau-Ponty is not a metaphysical thinker (at least
during the phenomenological phase of his career) in the sense that he does not establish a
theory for the ultimate causes of the being of the world. However, The Structure of
Behavior and The Phenomenology of Perception do present metaphysical claims. For
example, Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of immanent signification means that forms must
have a real foundation in objects, that objects are laden with their own meaning and are a
critical truth standard for consciousness which nonetheless draws out that meaning
through signifying concepts. I have already discussed this doctrine in Part II of Chapter
Three in the discussion on forms. What I add here as a quick aside is that there is an
ontological aspect of this doctrine because, although Merleau-Ponty does not speculate
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about the first principles of objects, he does say that that the being of objects is such that
“meaning gushes forth in them.”370
I turn now to the objection raised by Mary Rose Barral, which directly contradicts
the claim I just made about the meaning-giving nature of objects in the world. Barral
comes to the same conclusion Braine does—that Merleau-Ponty’s anthropology is rooted
in idealism—but she draws mainly draws from The Phenomenology of Perception and, in
particular, the preface to phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty provides at the beginning of
this work. As I did in Chapter One while presenting Barral’s position, I will first quote in
full a passage from Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception employed by
Barral to justify her position that he is an idealist. While describing the beginning point of
philosophical reflection Merleau-Ponty declares:
I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my
antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead, it moves
out towards them and sustains them, for I alone bring into being for
myself (and therefore into being in the only sense that the word can have
for me) the tradition which I elect to carry on, or the horizon whose
distance from me would be abolished—since that distance is not one of its
properties—if I were not there to scan it with my gaze.371
Barral comments on this passage in the context of a comparison between Merleau-Ponty
and Aquinas. She allows that both thinkers are interested in discovering essences through
an examination of things in their concrete particularity. However, Aquinas wants to nail
down the “ultimate explanatory principles and causes of the world of our experience,
causes and principles which phenomenology does not investigate.”372 Barral believes that,
for Aquinas, the position of the philosopher is irrelevant to the metaphysical causes of the

370

Ibid., 224.
Phenomenology of Perception, ix.
372
Mary Rose Barral, 208.
371

230

universe in the sense that his knowing or lack of knowing makes no difference to these
causes because the whole universe is subject to them, is formed according to them. But,
Barral writes, according to Merleau-Ponty, the presence of the subject is essential for
philosophical knowledge:
In a sense, it is as if he were saying: I am the cause of things and events,
but things and events do not cause me. He looks at the world from the
point of view of the subject, who can never be a pure spectator, as
Husserl’s epoché would require, or as could be said of Thomas’s
speculation. He is saying, in fact, that he is the one who gives meaning to
the world and to things in the world.373
For Barral’s Merleau-Ponty, the meaning of all things, including the human being, is not
something that can be established apart from the subject’s involvement with them. While
it may be true that there are definite structures, basically stable modes of being, typical
states of affairs, etc. in the world, I only know of them because they appear in my
consciousness according to the meaning which I bestow upon them. We could say, then,
that the human being for Aquinas exists on a totally different plane of reality than it does
for Merleau-Ponty. The integral unity that Aquinas sees between body and soul is a real
one, existing apart from the meaning giving power of my consciousness. But the plane of
reality in which Merleau-Ponty sees the human being as an integral unity is only within
our conscious life.
I begin my response by noting a distinction that Barral fails to make between
one’s personal being and the being of the world. By personal being I do not mean my
basic structure as an embodied consciousness or union of body and soul, but the
particular ways that I consciously live my life and the relationships, hobbies, habits etc.
that I have chosen to fill up my time. Yes, Merleau-Ponty says that “I am the absolute
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source,” but of what? If we look carefully at the passage from which Barral claims that
Merleau-Ponty believes “I am the cause of things and events,” we see that he actually
does not reference the being of objects in the world as such but realities that can be only
upheld by the person who lives them. He speaks of “the tradition that I elect to carry on,
or the horizon whose distance from me would be abolished..if I were not there to scan it
with my gaze.” For example, if I live as a Protestant Christian and choose to immerse
myself in the writings of Calvin and to articulate his notions of predestination I am the
source of this ongoing tradition in my ongoing conscious life. I can eliminate the being of
the Reformed tradition in me as I read the Church Fathers, grow in a love of liturgical
worship and consciously live according to Roman Catholic teaching. If I stand gazing at
Mt. Rainier and experience a certain distance between it and my perspective from Pike
Street Market in downtown Seattle I am the source of this experience of distance in the
sense that without me it would not be. The distance that I experience is not a property of
Mt. Rainier, but can only exist because of my “consciousness, through which from the
outset a world forms itself around me and begins to exist for me.”374
Barral and others might allow this distinction between the being of the world and
one’s personal being as it is consciously lived, but still point out that Merleau-Ponty
claims that consciousness is the “absolute source” which seems to declare that one’s
consciousness is prior to the objects of the world in our knowing them. Yes, it might be
true that my religious tradition or gaze upon the natural world as lived out depends upon
my particular consciousness, but St. Ignatius’s writings and Mt. Rainier exist outside of
me and obviously contribute in themselves to my experience of them. How can
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consciousness be the “absolute source” if realities in the world are a sine qua non of my
experiences along with consciousness itself?
It may be that Merleau-Ponty simply overstates himself in this passage from
which Barral quotes. In the broader context of the text Merleau-Ponty is attempting to
show that the human being is not part of the world as a physical object studied by
science, “not the outcome or the meeting point of numerous causal agencies which
determine my bodily or psychological make-up.”375 Rather, the human being is an
embodied consciousness whose experiences are prior to any scientific conclusion about
the world and whose consciousness is a necessary source for scientific knowledge itself:
All that I grasp (saisir) of the world, even through science, I understand
(saisir) from my own point of view or from an experience of the world
without which the symbols of science would be meaningless.376
Merleau-Ponty then goes on to say that “I am the absolute source..I alone bring into being
for myself..the tradition which I elect to carry on.” The emphasis here is that nothing we
know or experience is attained outside of our conscious perspective. Our consciousness is
truly a sine qua non for our personal lives. To call it the “absolute source” does fail to
acknowledge the central function of the world in providing for our experiences, but my
interpretation is that this is simply an error of hyperbole in Merleau-Ponty’s strenuous
resistance to scientific presuppositions that consciousness is ultimately an object, just like
any other object in the world.
It should be clear from Part I of Chapter Three, where I gave an overall
introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of consciousness, his understanding of
perception, as well as the subject-object dialogue that consciousness is not the “absolute
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source” in a radically idealistic sense. It is not in full possession of itself precisely
because it is open to a world that is ambiguous for us. It only comes to itself through
operative intentionality in which the objects of the world press upon us and offer their
meaning to us. Further, shortly after the passage from which Barral makes the claim that
Merleau-Ponty is saying “that [the human being] is the one who gives meaning to the
world and to things in the world,” Merleau-Ponty argues to the contrary:
When I begin to reflect my reflection bears upon an unreflective
experience; moreover my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an
event, and so it appears to itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a
changed structure in consciousness, and yet it has to recognize, as having
priority over its own operations, the world [emphasis mine] which is given
to the subject because the subject is given to himself..377
Here we see allowance that consciousness is creative or constituting, at least to a degree.
As I reflect upon an unreflective experience I recognize that I am acting and in some
sense causing an experience to happen insofar as I take an active stance toward the world
as it comes to me. But beneath this intentionality of act is the operative intentionality that
is foundational to it, the world as given to me through pre-reflective consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty is saying that the world itself is given to me and that I know this because
when I begin to reflect I recognize that my reflection depends upon an unreflective
experience (or perception) of the world that is given to me. Gaining knowledge and
therefore meaning is, prior to the actions of consciousness, a result of the givenness of the
world and its actions upon us.
Merleau-Ponty is not an idealist in any radical sense of the world, although there
are certainly themes of idealism in his work. He does not believe that the world and the
human being within it are fundamentally ideas constituted by consciousness. However,
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there is a meaning-giving aspect to consciousness according to Merleau-Ponty that I
addressed in Section D, Part I of Chapter Three in the discussion on the subject-object
dialogue. Objects are what they are in part because of their relationship with a human
knower. We have just discussed that objects are for me because of my conscious
relationship to them, a relationship that I can elect to carry on or not. I am able to draw
out their latent meaning and thus in a sense bestow meaning. This is the “creative act” of
consciousness, the intentional decision to attend to objects that first arise in pre-reflective
consciousness.378 We could also say that this is the subjective side of the meaningbestowing nature of consciousness. But while discussing the subject-object dialogue we
saw that the human being can also bestow meaning upon objects so that this meaning
becomes part of their objective reality, not perhaps part of their substantial reality (to use
a Thomistic category), but certainly a part of what they mean to other humans in the
world. We looked, for example, at New Hampshire’s “Man on the Mountain.” The
Native Americans or Colonial settlers who first saw an “old man” in the rocky face of
this “Man on the Mountain” shared their experience with others. From a geological
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235

perspective the rocky face was not changed by humans seeing it as a “man,” but
nonetheless the rocky object became imbued with meaning from the subjects who gazed
upon it. The object became a symbol and in one sense was enriched by Native Americans
or Colonial settlers imbuing the rock with the meaning of “old man.” Further, each
generation of viewers develops the symbol so that it now means more than simply “old
man in the rock” but also “historical landmark,” emblem of “New Hampshire,” and so
on. Thus, there is a sense in which consciousness literally bestows meaning upon the
objects of the world.
And, of course, these objects, altered by consciousness, in turn shape those who
partake of them. The subject-object dialogue is a continuous “give and take,” an ongoing
dialectical relationship. In Merleau-Ponty’s vision of the world human subjects and the
objects to which they relate exist in a state of mutual developmental flux. Human
consciousness continues to be altered by our engagement with the world and the meaning
of objects in the world continues to change due to our engagement with it.
At this point we are at the threshold of the ontological dimension of MerleauPonty’s work which is strongly intimated in his notion of the subject-object dialogue, a
primary interpretive key for understanding his phenomenological writings and which
connects these writings with his explicitly ontological work. What is this metaphysical
dimension? In a word, that being is twofold. It has an invisible aspect in the
consciousness of the knower and a visible aspect in the world that is known. The
knowing subject is infused by the meaning of particular beings in the world but also
infuses meaning into them. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty develops
these themes as he concentrates more and more on the unity of Being itself and criticizes
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what he sees as an unnecessary division between subject and object in his earlier
phenomenology. Being becomes an intertwining, a chiasm, not so much between subject
and object, but between its visible and invisible dimensions. Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological works intimate his metaphysics in part because they indicate that the
being of the world is in perpetual developmental flux or an ongoing mutual relationship
between what he calls the subject and object.379
But it is enough for this section of the dissertation to show that the world itself is
laden with meaning, according to Merleau-Ponty, and that he does not hold that the world
and its objects (in particular the human being) are simply ideas in consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is not directed toward the structures and corridors of
consciousness but upon perception in which the world declares its meaning to
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty believes that I cannot know the world unless I have
consciousness of it and so gives priority to consciousness over any scientific knowledge
of the world, but he also holds that the world has priority to consciousness, that without
the world consciousness could not even be itself. Further, our knowing, arising as it does
from receptive perception of real objects in the world, is fundamentally a gift of the
world.
I argued in my response to the first objection that Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology presents deductively valid arguments and a notion of experience that put
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him and Aquinas on comparable philosophical playing fields. I argued in my response to
the second objection that, at a phenomenological level, Merleau-Ponty has no way of
holding that the human is simply a physical being. We experience ourselves (and others
by inference) as embodied consciousnesses and we have no way getting beneath this raw
datum of perception to a “proof” that we are thoroughly material creatures. Rather,
experience indicates that there are two dimensions to the integral human being—a
principle of consciousness as well as a physical mode of existence--and this experience
accords with that articulated by Aquinas. In the third objection I dealt with the possibility
that Merleau-Ponty’s approach might be a form of radical idealism, in which case
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty would not even be directing their arguments to the same
thing.
We have found that Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty direct themselves to the same
object, the concretely existing human being, and that both believe the human is a
composite of an intellectual ordering principle of the body and the body itself. It is
possible that the kind of “graft” I hoped for at the beginning of Chapter One might be
realized.
However, there is one more potential hurdle that remains to be addressed and this
is the terminological difference between our two thinkers concerning the basic parts of
the human being, specifically the meaning of soul and consciousness, their functions as
form of the body, and the meaning of the body itself. I did not include this as a distinct
objection in Part III of Chapter One because I raised and partly answered these questions
in Part I of the first chapter as well as in Part II of Chapter Three. I now revisit these
discussions.
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In the first chapter I had said that there were potentially significant differences
between Merleau-Ponty’s notion of form as presented by Ellis and Aquinas’s notion of
form as presented by LaRock. For example, Aquinas believes that the form of the whole
body is the intellectual soul (a term not even mentioned by Ellis), that this soul is both
immaterial and incorruptible and that it acts as form both when the human being is
conscious and when he or she is not conscious. Ellis’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty is
that consciousness is a physical form and he implies that considering it to be a nonphysical entity would lead to Cartesian dualism. It turns out that Ellis’s interpretation is
incorrect, at least from the standpoint of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology; we come to
consciousness in its embodied state and have no phenomenological means of holding that
it is a purely physical entity. For Ellis’s Merleau-Ponty, consciousness as a formal power
seems confined to conscious states which would mean that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
form is much more restricted than Aquinas’s view in which the soul is the act of the body
during conscious and unconscious states.
I had argued in response to these differences about the basic parts of the human
being that there are enough similarities in how LaRock and Ellis draw, respectively, on
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty to suggest at least the possibility that these latter thinkers
have enough philosophical commonality for Merleau-Ponty to enrich Aquinas’s thought.
First, both thinkers recognize that a living material being is self-organizing because of its
form and that it is not a simple by-product of causal forces outside it. Both hold that via
its form an organism acts into its environment to achieve certain objectives and orders all
of its body parts toward these ends. In both cases the matter of the living being is for the
sake of the form and receives its direction from the form. Secondly, I had said that (if
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LaRock and Ellis are correct) both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty do not consider form and
body separate substances but inseparable parts of one integrated whole. For Aquinas the
inseparability of soul or form and body extends to both conscious and unconscious states.
Merleau-Ponty also argues that form and body are inseparable but Ellis restricted his
explanations of this inseparability to conscious states of living.
But the response I gave in Chapter One to differences in Aquinas and MerleauPonty’s use of soul, consciousness, and form may have been inadequate in light of our
discussion in Part II, Chapter Three of Merleau-Ponty’s difficult understanding of form
from The Structure of Behavior. In this text Merleau-Ponty is hesitant to say that forms
are in objects: “form is not a physical reality, but an object of perception.”380 He later says
that “the form of this or that thing..presents itself to me here and now.”381 It is clear that
he believes that objects in the world (including human beings) are ordered wholes which
express this meaning to humans who perceive them. We saw that he does not believe
forms are natures in an “in-itself” empirically objectivist fashion because objects are
always part of a changing milieu. For this reason (and perhaps for others) Merleau-Ponty
holds that we cannot say forms are in objects. If forms are not in human beings according
to Merleau-Ponty, but for Aquinas they are the substantial principle of human unity then
we have a significant difference of meaning in a core anthropological term.
The second place I took up the question of significant terminological differences
concerning the core aspects of the human being was in Part II of Chapter Three towards
the end of the discussion about Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of soul and body unity.
There I had dealt with the problem of Merleau-Ponty’s imprecision about the distinction
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between soul and consciousness. I proposed that consciousness and soul periodically
overlap within the human being. For Merleau-Ponty, as for most philosophers, soul is an
animating principle. There are times when consciousness functions as an animating
principle. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty will say that when human persons are most
themselves—i.e. when their actions are permeated with intellectual intentions—
consciousness functions as form of the whole body. But of course there are times when
consciousness is not overtly present within the human being. For example, during times
of sleep consciousness does not function as a soul. We are still, however, maintained in
our existence by a vital ordering principle because even in sleep all of our organs are
structured around the human being’s need to get rest. Here a vital soul or animating
principle must be at play which functions apart from the direction of consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty also seems to hold that the human being has a psychic soul that can be
distinguished from consciousness when it is functioning according to intentionality of act.
This would be consciousness in its pre-reflective state. For example, there are times when
we become aware through recollection of perceptions that we had some time before but
when they occurred we were not directly conscious of them. But these perceptions must
have occurred through a holistic ordering process that we can call a soul because the
various sensitive powers of the body were coordinated in them.
I need to take up the issue again of what precisely Merleau-Ponty means by the
basic parts of the human being and how they relate to Aquinas’s understanding of these
basic parts. This would be minimally necessary as a summary before heading into an
argument that Merleau-Ponty’s integral anthropology can enrich Aquinas’s anthropology.
But the issue has not been adequately resolved, especially in light of the metaphysical
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aspects of the subject-object dialogue most recently discussed at the end of Part I of this
chapter. For Merleau-Ponty, the whole world is a changing flux whereby subject and
object affect one another and continually develop in light of their dialectical relationship.
We saw his reluctance to say that forms inhere in things because each thing is ultimately
inseparable from other objects so that changes in the whole milieu of the world lead to
changes in the parts. This suggests that Merleau-Ponty believes the human being cannot
be demarcated from his or her world as a substantial whole as he or she can be so
identified within Aquinas’s metaphysical vision of the universe. It implies also that the
human being does not have a given universal essence that applies across times and
cultures. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty holds that “man is an historical idea and not a natural
species” and that “all that we are, we are on the basis of a de facto situation which we
appropriate to ourselves and which we ceaselessly transform by a sort of escape which is
never an unconditioned freedom.”382 And in the very last sentence of The Phenomenology
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The Phenomenology of Perception, 198. Aquinas also holds that the human being, in a
universal sense, is an idea. Human nature, as such, does not concretely exist. Human
nature, as individuated in this or that particular human being does of course exist. But
Aquinas still differs from Merleau-Ponty regarding the human being as a universal
essence because he holds that the substantial form of each human is essentially human
and that this essence is the same from generation to generation. Merleau-Ponty allows
that there are common features of human existence which he will call an ‘essence’ in the
phenomenological sense, otherwise anthropological study would not be possible, but that
there is no abiding human essence. Humans from 2,000 years ago might be capable of
symbolic thought just like humans today, but given evolutionary processes contemporary
humans add to this common denominator and are literally different as a result. This
notion of evolutionary development expresses a Marxist orientation in Merleau-Ponty’s
thought. He holds to a kind of historical materialism; he does not believe that historical
materialism is completely deterministic in nature. The human being is part of a necessary
unfolding of history, but is also able to reconfigure aspects of his or her particular
situation. See Merleau-Ponty’s extensive footnote #18 in Part I, Chapter Five, of The
Phenomenology of Perception, “The Body in its Sexual Being,” 198-201.
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of Perception, he declares, quoting Saint-Exupéry, that “‘man is but a network of
relationships.’”383
Merleau-Ponty presents us with a metaphysics of contingency and radical
interconnectedness such that he defines the human being not as a substantial whole, but
as a network of relations. For Aquinas, the human being exists because an immaterial and
universal human form created by God is made commensurate with what he calls
dimensive quantity or designate matter and so individuated as this or that particular
human.384 Each one has an eternal individual essence, therefore, by which he or she is
both human and this particular human being. Each one is, by virtue of his or her
particular substantial form, an independent and contingent existent, a concrete whole
within the whole of the world. The accidental features of the human being describe those
aspects of his or her human existence which are integrated with the substance and are
capable of change—e.g. skin color, virtues or vices. This is not to imply that substance is,
for Aquinas, a static or inert principle. Accidents can literally come and go and thus
express changes in the human being. But, as Aquinas tersely says “every substance exists
for the sake of its operations.”385 The human being as substance is in a state of selfcommunicative act seeking to engage the world to fulfill its potentialities. As its
potentialities are fulfilled it necessarily develops and therefore changes while retaining its
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essential identity.386 Merleau-Ponty never describes the human being as a substantial
whole and he denies that each one has any permanent essence. For Merleau-Ponty the
human is more like a part of the whole world which changes as the world develops but
which also has an effect upon this world. It appears that our two thinkers have radically
different notions of form both as a general term and insofar as this word applies to the
human being. For Aquinas the form is a necessary dimension of the human, what makes
the human be who he or she is and as such does not essentially change. For MerleauPonty the form of the human is an organizing principle but not an existential actualizing
principle. Merleau-Ponty is reluctant to say that any object has its own form because
every object exists in developmental flux and because the form exists in a dialectical
relationship between consciousness and the object that consciousness seeks to know.
It may be, however, that Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty are closer together than the
aforementioned difficulties seem to indicate. One of the problems we have encountered is
Merleau-Ponty’s difficult notion of form. He says that the form is not in an object in a
physical sense, but dwells in a dialectic between consciousness and objects. The “form is
not a physical reality, but an object of perception.”387 We also saw that later in The
Structure of Behavior he confusingly states that “the form of this or that thing presents
itself to me”388 which implies that the form is a literal dimension of the object. But what
is not unclear and what should help us to align Merleau-Ponty closer with Aquinas is that
Merleau-Ponty does hold that forms can be present in the human being because he or she
386
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is a conscious being. If form emerges in a dialectical relationship between consciousness
and the object and the object is one’s own self then form is obviously an integral part of
the human being.
But what kind of a part is it? To respond we must step into Merleau-Ponty’s mode
of phenomenological description and recognize that he concentrates more on shedding
light on the depth and richness of our perception than he does on clearly defining the
ontological implications of this perception. As soon as we are capable of self-reflection
we recognize that we are, to some degree, ordered toward biological survival, that we are
drawn to eat and drink and find shelter. Thus we discover a vital ordering principle in us.
This, Merleau-Ponty says in the difficult definition of body/soul relations from The
Structure of Behavior, can be understood as a soul, as an ordering principle that declares
the meaning of form. I perceive this principle in myself and identify a form. Insofar as
consciousness perceives a vital principle (or psychic principle as it may be) within the
being of the human the form is not strictly consciousness itself but a “perceived whole.”
But it is critical to note that consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, is the driver of integration
between the various ways its body can be formed and its body. When consciousness
accedes to the vital drives of the body and wills to pursue them strictly for their own sake,
then consciousness becomes the vital form of its own body.389 But the form is not “in” the
body as a physical object; it could not be found if scientists were to dissect the body. The
form is consciousness as it experiences its own vital drives and orients its body toward
fulfilling them. Now, consciousness can also subsume its vital drives under a new
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Normally we do not think of consciousness as “willing.” But Merleau-Ponty has an
expanded notion of consciousness as explained in Section A, Part I of Chapter Three; he
holds that consciousness is the principle both of thinking and of willing.
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ordering principle—e.g. toward cultural or intellectual pursuits. When this happens, the
form of the human being changes. Merleau-Ponty does not say that the human being can
have multiple forms present in itself at any one time because the form by its very nature
describes the whole ordering of a being around a unified purpose. When consciousness
subsumes the vital drives of its body around a cultural pursuit it orients the body in a new
direction and thus gives the body a new soul or form. It can steer itself toward, for
example, a celebration banquet for the completion of the Ph.D., and thus alter the
meaning of its body. In this context he or she does not consume food for biological
survival but rather to express joy and experience communion with friends and family. So,
consciousness is able to order its body in a variety of different ways and therefore be
itself in a variety of different ways. Consciousness is the changing form of the human
which means that we cannot speak of the form of the human as if it were a permanent
principle of ontological identify. Rather, it is a changing ordering principle through the
changing actions of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty also allows that consciousness can be
itself as it preserves its own identity and seeks to maintain a consistent course of life. He
allows that through the sedimentation of consciousness developed through our life
histories that we can have a stable sense of self. And yet he insists that, even if we wanted
to, we could not maintain ourselves in the same exact way given the fact that we are
caught up in a changing world that necessarily impacts us.
Now, Merleau-Ponty moves from this phenomenological description to
ontological claims, in particular that there is no abiding essence of the human being—e.g.
“man is an historical idea and not a natural species” and “all that we are, we are on the
basis of a de facto situation which we appropriate to ourselves and which we ceaselessly
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transform.”390 Or “man is but a network of relationships.”391 He says this because he finds
no perduring human form within his experience. As we engage objects of the world they
declare their meaning to us which we absorb; we act into the world thereby altering it; we
receive the world changed by our action and the action of others upon it and thus
experience new change and so on ad infinitum.
Aquinas would go along with Merleau-Ponty that consciousness, insofar as it is
the intellectual principle of the human, is the form of the body and that it does change and
order its body in countless different ways. He would affirm also the phenomenological
descriptions Merleau-Ponty offers as an experiential basis for these ontological claims.
There is no lack of compatibility between them on the meaning of consciousness as form
so long as we understand that consciousness is, for Merleau-Ponty, the principle of
intellect and agency in the human being and understand that this aligns with Aquinas’s
intellectual soul which can be aware of itself and thus also be a principle of
consciousness.
Of course Aquinas does not follow all of Merleau-Ponty’s ontological claims
regarding the nature of the human being. The form of the human being for Aquinas, as
discussed above, is a substantial form and an immaterial essence that retains its own
identity despite the contingencies of history. It functions when the human being is
conscious and when he or she is not. It literally makes the body be what it is. As we
discussed above in Chapter One when introducing Ralph Ellis’s use of Merleau-Ponty,
the latter thinker holds that consciousness (understood in its reflective sense) functions as
form when it is directly present in the human being but, for example, during periods of
390
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sleep it does not. As far as I know, Merleau-Ponty does not address how the human being
is ordered and purposive when he or she is not conscious. Perhaps, he holds that a prereflective consciousness is at play in such cases functioning as form of the body. In any
case, because it is an immaterial subsisting entity that gives its act to the body, Aquinas’s
intellectual soul is more of an ongoing formal principle than Merleau-Ponty’s
consciousness. Indeed, when the intellectual principle of the human is separated from its
body at death, it remains ordered to its specific body. Despite this Aquinas would hold
with Merleau-Ponty that the intellectual principle can be likened to consciousness (both
are self aware, intellectual principles of agency) and he would certainly hold with
Merleau-Ponty that this consciousness serves as an integral form of the body. Thus, at
one level their positions are compatible.
But at this point Aquinas might press Merleau-Ponty and argue that even though
the latter thinker says that the human being is a network of relationships existing in
continuous flux his phenomenological insights actually belie his ontological claims. Yes,
we have experiences of constantly developing, but we also experience ourselves as a
locus of these changes. We have memories of ourselves in a variety of developmental
stages and such memories indicate a singular being who has them. We act ethically or
unethically and recognize that each is an “I” and morally responsible for our actions
whether we did them 10 minutes or 10 years ago. To be sure, each one recognizes that he
or she has layers of sedimentation in his or her consciousness but these occur in a
consciousness. There is something about each person which retains its identity
throughout all of the change which characterizes our lives. We experience ourselves as
having independent, singular, and concrete existence; thus, we experience ourselves in
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some measure as a substance. The human being cannot be a mere network of
relationships for the simple reason that relationships cannot occur unless there are things
that are related. There must be some permanent dimension of the human being that
enables him or her to enter into relationships. And Merleau-Ponty is clear that the human
being does actively enter into relationships, that he or she is a free source of his or her
own action even though this source undergoes regular change. Thus, Aquinas would say
that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions lead to an ontology of substance.
We do experience in ourselves our own concrete independent existence even as we
interact and receive from the world and we must have language to describe this abiding
dimension of ourselves. Insofar as Merleau-Ponty fails to provide such language he fails
to justice to his own phenomenological insights.392
I have addressed a critical point of terminological compatibility between our two
thinkers on the nature of the form of the human being, at least from the perspective of the
Thomist seeking a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s thought. Insofar as the form
is an ordering principle of the body our two thinkers are together and Aquinas can
confirm the phenomenological descriptions Merleau-Ponty uses to claim that
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Although Merleau-Ponty does not employ substance ontology, he does have a concept
of “style,” which is relatively undeveloped in his work but does imply that he accepts
some enduring ontological core in the human being. He writes: “I am a psychological
and historical structure, and have received, with existence, a manner of existing, a style.
All my actions and thoughts stand in a relationship to this structure, and even a
philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold on the world, and what
he is. The fact remains that I am free, not in spite of, or on the hither side of, these
motivations, but by means of them” (Phenomenology of Perception, 529). Thus,
Merleau-Ponty does seem to recognize that each person has an enduring manner of
existing which provides the basis for engaging the world while remaining open to change.
One’s style necessarily changes because the human fundamentally exists as a temporal
being; the action of each moment leaves “sedimentation” in consciousness as time and
the human move on to future moments and the “sedimentation” that they will bring.
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consciousness is form of the body. Aquinas further believes that “consciousness”
understood as the self-aware intellectual soul is also a substance and the principle of the
human being’s abiding identity. Merleau-Ponty does not use the language of substance
and although he describes the human being as an independent concrete existence, which
is the free source of its own personal acts, he does not have adequate ontological
terminology to make sense of these descriptions. His claim that the human being is but a
network of relationships would not be acceptable to Aquinas, but Aquinas need not
follow him in these claims to make use of one critical aspect of his anthropology, that
consciousness as form or soul is united to and orders its body according to its purposes.
Thus far I have not specifically addressed whether or not Aquinas and MerleauPonty have compatible notions of the body and so I must treat this topic before launching
into the next section. As I mentioned a moment ago the body, for Aquinas, cannot even
be unless it is informed by the intellectual soul. There is no such thing as a body unless it
is informed by the act or esse of the soul as substantial form. The corpse is not a body but
has become something essentially different at the parting of the soul. The body is that by
which the intellectual soul has access to the world. It has independent concrete existence
by virtue of the soul.
There are points of critical commonality between Aquinas’s notion of body and
Merleau-Ponty’s. For both thinkers the self-aware intellectual principle is able to order
the body around its intentions and to be seamlessly integrated into it. For both thinkers
the body can be imbued with conscious or spiritual intentions as well as enable the
human intellect to be itself. Merleau-Ponty will not say that consciousness is substantial
form of the body and thus there is likely a stronger sense of the unity between soul and
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body in Aquinas than in Merleau-Ponty. For the later thinker when consciousness
awakens to itself it is embodied and the body is always experienced as an integral part of
being human, but he does not say that the body is always what it is because of the
intellect functioning as its substantial form. Merleau-Ponty also holds with Aquinas that
it is through bodily perception that intellect or consciousness dwells in the world. Further,
both hold that perception is foundational for any knowledge. Thus, both affirm the
necessity of the body for philosophy.
This section began with addressing each of the three objections to the possibility
of compatibility between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty which could lead to a MerleauPontian enrichment of Aquinas’s thought. But after treating these objections it was
necessary to address another difficulty that had emerged at several points, that of
terminological differences in fundamental anthropological terms. I am content that these
differences are resolved and I now turn to areas of commonality between our two thinkers
which should lay the groundwork for a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s
philosophical anthropology.
Part II –Compatibility Leading to Enrichment
After responding to foregoing objections, I now turn to two areas of strong
compatibility between our two thinkers which should lead to a Merleau-Pontian
enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. To use the example from
horticulture with which I began, a successful graft demands that a scion have enough
genetic similarity to the woodstock in which it inheres. They must have a comparable
nature, otherwise the scion will not “take” to the woodstock onto which it is grafted. With
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty my attempt is to bring together their respective teachings
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about the integral human being; do Merleau-Ponty’s insights regarding the human accord
enough with Aquinas’s anthropology to have a fruitful place in the latter’s teaching?
There are two major questions that need to be addressed in order to answer
whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s work can fruitfully enrich Aquinas’s. First, do they
address themselves to the same object? On the basis of responding to the objections of
Chapter One in the foregoing section I am convinced that our two thinkers do address
themselves to the same object. Second, are their means of making philosophical
conclusions about the human being compatible? I note here that I am not concerned in
this dissertation with whether or not Aquinas’s methodology is acceptable to MerleauPonty, but whether the latter’s methodology would accord with Aquinas’s own. In this
section I argue that indeed Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical approach would be acceptable
to Aquinas because they actually share the same approach at fundamental levels. First,
for both of them perception is foundational to any philosophical knowledge whatsoever.
Secondly, with regard to the knowledge of human beings, both thinkers agree that the
philosopher appeals to his/her own subjective experience to draw conclusions about
human nature.
A) For Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty Perception is the Basis for Knowledge and the
Source of Their Conviction that the Human Being is an Integral Union of Body and
Soul
At several points in Chapter Two, especially in Part I, Section C on Aquinas’s
epistemology, I addressed how Aquinas’s philosophy depends upon his basic trust in
sense perception. In Chapter Three, especially in Part I, Section C, I addressed the
foundational importance of perception for Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. I now
revisit these points to show how our two thinkers stand at the same philosophical
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beginning point, that both trust this common grounding in perception, and that both
believe it strongly indicates the composite nature of the human being.393
Before launching into this I note that both thinkers make a distinction between
sense and intellectual perception and that both hold that each form of perception involves
the whole human being. Sense perception is our basic awareness of the world through our
senses; intellectual perception depends upon sense perception (whereas the reverse is not
the case) but it involves abstraction from or judgment regarding objects that are sensed.
The two forms of perception should not be understood, for both thinkers, as disconnected
from one another in any radical way. Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty would say, for
example, that the sense mode of perception naturally leads to the intellectual mode. For
example, we walk down the path and feel various elements of the natural world in a
variety of ways (sense perception). We are drawn by a particular sound, recognize it, and
judge that it comes from a woodpecker at work (intellectual perception).
How does Aquinas ground his philosophy in sense perception? He frequently
quotes Aristotle’s dictum that “the beginning of our knowledge is in the senses
(principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu).”394 Our knowing, contra Plato, never takes
place without the foundational involvement of our bodily comportment toward the world.
393

One major difference between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s use of perception is that
the former thinker draws on it to infer the existence of God, a necessary being who exists
outside the range of direct personal experience (at least at a philosophical level), whereas
the latter thinker denies the possibility of such a philosophical proof of God’s existence.
For Merleau-Ponty, we can only access contingent realities. Aquinas is willing to put a
lot of speculative weight on efficient causality and thus argues in his “five ways” for the
necessary existence of an ultimate first cause or first mover. Merleau-Ponty seems to
suffer from a Humean and basically modern reluctance to believe that one can infer the
existence of efficient causes outside of our direct personal experience.
394
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Aristotle’s Metaphysics, i.1 and his Posterior Analytics, ii.15.
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We have no other alternative (naturally speaking) than to draw upon our senses. The
philosopher can only move forward to explain and draw out the implications of our sense
knowledge, but he or she cannot justify it. The human intellect is a tabula rasa, a clean
slate, and, according to Aquinas, does not have any innate knowledge of the intelligible
species, the forms of things and their common matter—e.g. knowledge of the form of a
horse and its orientation to a horse body. Because it is embodied, the intellect can operate
only through the limitations and advantages of the body. It can know nothing by itself
without access to material singulars that are presented to it through phantasms formed by
the imagination from the senses. According to Aquinas, the intellect cannot even know
itself apart from an act of understanding directed toward a material being and made
possible through the senses. This is so because we can understand only what is in act and
the intellect starts out in a state of pure potentiality. We therefore have knowledge of our
own intellects only after they have been actualized through understanding. Thus, Aquinas
would agree with Merleau-Ponty that Descartes’s project of confirming the existence of
his mind by doubting sense perception and everything else but his own doubt is an
impossible task because the mind could not even understand itself unless it first
performed an act of understanding that depended upon the senses.
Merleau-Ponty’s position regarding the foundational importance of sense
perception is essentially the same as Aquinas’s. A fundamental epistemological fact
revealed by examining perception phenomenologically is that all knowledge begins with
it. “All knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up by perception.”395 The
first premise of any argument about the nature of anything, of any statement about the

395

Phenomenology of Perception, 241.
254

world, of any declaration of truth is first of all grounded in perception. If phenomenology
is about the study of essences for the sake of knowing the world, as Merleau-Ponty
argues, and we gain such essences only on the seedbed of living concrete experience,
then this experience is the sine qua non of phenomenology. Further, perception is the
result of the world acting upon us through our bodily senses. Through perception we are
open to the world and able to gain, as Merleau-Ponty says, “knowledge of existing
things.”396 The experience of perception is a phenomenon immediately tied to the real
world. For Merleau-Ponty, we can have no doubt that the world we perceive is “out
there” in concrete form. In fact, the only way to understand, for example, the
phenomenon of hallucination or perceptual vagueness is against the backdrop of our faith
in perception’s ability actually to grasp things. If perception did not have this faith, then
the very question—“what is a hallucination or not?”—would not even arise. Moreover,
Merleau-Ponty believes that discerning the difference between an authentic vision and a
hallucination does not necessarily occur through appeal to a separate faculty of judgment.
Merleau-Ponty certainly allows that consciousness can retreat from its perceptual
immersion in the world and think about what is gained from this immersion. But he holds
that human perception is not simply animal sensation. He believes that a mistaken
[human] perception, like a hallucination, does not offer the same phenomenal meaning as
a true perception and that if we attend closely to the perception itself we normally discern
correctly whether it is authentic or not.397
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writes: “Now if we see what we judge, how can we distinguish between true and false
perception? How will it then be possible to say that the sufferer from hallucinations or the
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Another critical aspect of sense (as well as intellectual) perception is that for both
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty it involves the whole human being, not just his or her bodily
parts. This is perhaps easier to grasp from the standpoint of Aquinas’s anthropology in
which the body can be a body only through the informing esse of its substantial form.
The sensitive powers of the soul orient the body to feel; thus one senses through his or
her whole being not simply through his or her body. Merleau-Ponty discovers through
phenomenology that perception can be pre-reflective and occur without our immediate
reflexive awareness of it, but when we awaken to basic perception we recognize it as our
own. We are able to take it up within the full light of reflective consciousness and live in
the perception so that it obviously involves the whole human being. Merleau-Ponty, like
Aquinas, trusts our sense of being perceptual actors, of being directly faced with the
world that comes to us through sight, sound, motility, etc.398

madman ‘think they see what they do not see’? Where will be the difference between
‘seeing’ and ‘thinking one sees’? If the reply is made that the sane man judges only by
adequate signs and completely coherent material, it is then, because there is a different
between the motivated judgment of veridical perception and the empty judgement of false
perception. And as the difference is not in the form of the judgement but in the sensible
text to which it gives form, to perceive in the full sense of the word (as the antithesis of
imagining) is not to judge, it is to apprehend an immanent sense in the sensible before
judgement begins. The phenomenon of true perception offers, therefore, a meaning
inherent in the signs, and of which judgement is merely the optional expression.” See
also: Robert Doud, “Sensibility in Rahner and Merleau-Ponty,” The Thomist 44 (July
1980): 372-89. Doud argues that the nature of perception is an integration of bodily and
intellectual powers. If perception is such then the human being who is the subject of
perception must be a composite of a body and an intellectual principle.
398
David Braine explores how both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty believe that the sense
perception of humans is essentially different than that of primates or higher animals. Both
understand that for humans perceived objects have symbolic meaning which is not
grasped by primates or higher animals. Thus, sense perception is already not simply sense
perception but reflects an intellectual capacity for abstract thought. See his The Human
Person: Animal and Spirit, pp 305-06.
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So, for both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty perception is the doorway through which
human beings come to knowledge. A corollary point is that human beings are naturally
ordered toward the knowledge of sensible things, which does not preclude the possibility
that some things might have immaterial (or “invisible”) aspects to their sensible natures.
This is perhaps superfluous to add while speaking of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy which
is so focused on the exploration of contingent and material things. But given Aquinas’s
Christian philosophy and insistence that the end of human life is the beatific vision, one
might wonder whether for him the human being is naturally ordered toward a knowledge
of sensible realities. However, Aquinas does insist that the human being is most naturally
ordered to know beings of a sensible nature because it is a being of a composite nature:
“The power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known…[and thus] the proper
object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in
corporeal matter.”399
The human being is a sensible thing and thus naturally ordered to know himself or
herself as such. But when humans seek to understand what it means to be human (i.e.
what is our nature?) we are in a unique position because our inquiry turns inward as well
as outward. Both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty argue that perception reveals that the
human being is an integral union of a body and an intellectual principle that is self-aware
(for Aquinas, the intellectual soul, for Merleau-Ponty, consciousness) through two
different modes of perception.
The first way is object-directed. We look upon our friends, family members,
fellow citizens, etc. and recognize that they are not simply physical beings but also

399

Summa Theologica Ia.84.7.
257

rational ones and that their bodies manifest their minds. A human being can consider
himself or herself as an object (for example, in examinations of conscience) but in this
mode of perception I consider how, for both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty, perception of
others indicates their composite nature. For example, in Summa Contra Gentiles II.57,
“The Position of Plato Concerning the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body,”
Aquinas’s primary response to Plato is that “animal and man are sensible and natural
realities.”400 If the soul is the entire essence of the human being, as Plato claims, and
simply uses the body as a man uses his clothes, then we could not say that we sensibly
encounter a human being “for the soul is neither a sensible nor a material thing.”401 But
this is impossible, Aquinas declares, because it completely contradicts our perception that
the human we encounter is a thinking creature of flesh and blood. Thus, we see in
Aquinas a willingness to ground philosophical claims in basic sensible awareness of
objects outside the human being. Merleau-Ponty makes the same presumption and argues
in various ways that perception reveals humans as incarnate beings, visible objects who
express spiritual or invisible aspects in their physical nature. Merleau-Ponty describes
this incarnation in a description of our experience of another’s gestures:
Faced with an angry or threatening gesture, I have no need, in order to
understand it, to recall the feelings which I myself experienced when I
used these gestures on my own account. I know very little, from inside, of
the mime of anger so that a decisive factor is missing for any association
by resemblance or reasoning by analogy, and what is more, I do not see
anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture,
I read anger in it. The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger
itself.402
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This example of perceiving the emotional gesticulations of another shows us the
thoroughly composite nature of the human being. Of course sub-intellectual animals can
also appear angry, but what Merleau-Ponty has in mind here are how specifically human
emotions are not behind the parts of the body but are what they are in bodily gestures. To
continue with the example of anger, we also experience how controlling our bodies is
control of the anger itself. Rage grows when it is physically expressed, but can often be
tempered and pass away if we keep our limbs at peace. The point here is that in MerleauPonty’s own phenomenological way he holds with Aquinas that perception indicates for
us that human beings we encounter in objective fashion are revealed as an integral unions
of body and soul.
Both of our thinkers also hold that perception can be inwardly focused and that
we can perceive how the human being, namely oneself, is experienced as an integral
union of body and soul. Here, to use language from John Crosby, we are able to have a
subject-subject relation with ourselves; we know ourselves in the very act of being
subjects or we perceive ourselves reflexively. Another term for getting at this kind of
inward perception is what, in Western Christian traditions of prayer, is called
recollection. The recollected person gathers himself or herself together, dwells with
himself or herself not in a solipsistic gaze but in an awareness of oneself as an acting
person. I addressed the significance of this reflexive perception for Aquinas in Chapter
Two, Part I, Section C when we addressed the intellectual soul’s knowledge of itself.
There, I showed that Aquinas holds that the presence of the mind to itself is a simple and
sufficient path to self-knowledge. Such self-knowledge does not, however, indicate that
one’s own being is composite. But in another place, the conclusion of Chapter Two,
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Aquinas does say that the human being can perceive himself or herself as having a
composite nature:
If anyone however wishes to say that the intellectual soul is not the form
of the body he must explain how it is that this action which is
understanding may be the action of this man for everyone knows by
experience that it is himself who understands.403
Here Aquinas indicates that each one can perceive himself or herself to be an integral
union of body and soul because each can recognize that the flesh he or she carries is the
flesh of a thinking being who orients it toward his or her own intellectual purposes. It
would perhaps be superfluous to show how Merleau-Ponty holds with Aquinas that
humans perceive themselves as composite beings since the phenomenological method
itself is devoted to the exploration of consciousness. But then again noting the distinction
Merleau-Ponty makes between perception of others and perception of oneself can
reinforce the fact that his phenomenology is not a solipsistic exercise, not strictly devoted
to examining the structures of consciousness, but to our lived body experience through
which we both experience ourselves and the objects of the world.
We see then that both Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty stand together in beginning
their philosophical investigations on the basis of initial sense perception of objects in the
world. A significant corollary point is that for both thinkers it is the world which
philosophy seeks to understand. The world comprises all that is for Aquinas and MerleauPonty. The later thinker does not believe that we can infer on the basis of contingent
things the existence of a necessary being, God, and in this he differs markedly from
Aquinas. Nonetheless, our two thinkers share a conviction that the philosopher seeks to
know the world and that perception is the basis for any knowledge of it. For most objects
403
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of the world perception enables us to gain knowledge by being object-directed. But when
humans seek to understand themselves perception is both object and subject-directed.
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty share a critical point of commonality in their embrace of
perception in both forms and it is through perception, in large part, that a MerleauPontian enrichment of Aquinas’s anthropological thought is possible.
B.) Common Appeal to Interior Experience for Understanding Body/Soul Unity
At the end of Chapter Two and directly above in the section on perception in its
inwardly directed or subject-subject sense I explored a latent phenomenological aspect of
Aquinas’s anthropology. At this point in the dissertation I had initially hoped to explore
more fully this dimension of Aquinas’s thought. But if the central question I have been
addressing all along is whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights can
enrich Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology, then it is enough for me to show that there
is room for the former thinker’s methodology within the latter thinker’s philosophical
modus operandi. I do not at this point intend to explore the extent to which Aquinas’s
thought may be phenomenological. My claim is that Aquinas is open to it because he
himself makes a subjective turn in his philosophy as discussed above.404 By “subjective
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The subjective aspects of Aquinas’s thought are wonderfully brought out and
developed in the following three studies. The first came to my attention thanks to Thérèse
Bonin: Charles de Koninck, “Introduction à l’étude de l’ame,” Laval Théologique et
Philosophique 3 (1947): 9-65. Here de Koninck shows that, for Aquinas, one must first
come to an understanding of his or her own soul through reflexivity and interior
experience before understanding the souls of others—i.e. that others have souls. A second
study is by Joseph de Finance, Being and Subjectivity, trans. Norris W. Clarke, Cross
Currents 6 (1946): 163-78. De Finance argues against those who would regard Thomism
as strictly a philosophy of the object, that Aquinas recognizes the deep significance of
subjectivity for understanding Being as act: “I know being only because I myself am a
sharer in being. Identity in the intentional order presupposes connaturality in the real
order…the idea of being includes at once being as present to the mind in its role as object
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turn” I mean simply that he draws philosophical meaning about the nature of the world
through exploring interior experiences. Broadly speaking, this is what phenomenology is.
Now, it is possible to draw philosophical conclusions about the non-human
objects of the world through phenomenology. For example, Merleau-Ponty helps us to
see the splendor and inexhaustible nature of objects by exploring how we know them in
perspective. He concludes through phenomenology both that we are ordered to know
objects and that they cannot be adequately grasped by the human mind given our
embodied condition. But when the object under consideration is the human being himself
or herself the resources of phenomenology become all the more useful because the very
nature of the topic aligns so well with the nature of the methodology. I can certainly gain
a great deal about things in the world (including humans) by considering them
objectively, but I can significantly deepen my understanding if I consult my own lived
experience of being human. And this is exactly why we see Aquinas appealing to internal
experience in his discussion of the intellect’s knowledge of itself as intellect and as
substantial form of the body. Just as he refers to our experience of other objects as he
discusses their truth, so in the case of the body/soul union he refers to experience of the
object, but in this case it is the very self of the human being.
Even if Aquinas were simply a philosopher of the object and considered the
nature of human beings as if from arm’s length, it may be possible to show a Merleau-

and being grasped immediately as constituting the very reality of the ego (p. 168).” A
third book-length study is entitled Subjectivity and Knowledge in the Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas by Mariasusai Dhavamony S.J., (Roma: Gregorian University Press,
1965). Dhavamony takes issue with those, among them Merleau-Ponty, who assume that
subjectivity is a modern discovery. On the contrary Aquinas’s entire metaphysical project
depends, at least in part, on subjective reflection.
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Pontian enrichment of his thought. However, I have shown, albeit to a limited degree,
that Aquinas himself appeals to interior experience and thus demonstrates openness to the
rich phenomenological insights of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. But when we consider the
bulk of the arguments from Chapter Two, mostly taken from the discussions on the
body/soul unity in Summa Contra Gentiles II, we also see that Aquinas does not
frequently make the “subjective turn.” So, the fact that he makes limited appeal to interior
experience in his philosophical anthropology while remaining open to it suggests that his
thought could be bountifully enriched through a grafting of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological insights onto it.
C.) The Syncretic and Nature of Aquinas’s Methodology Indicates Openness to
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Insights
In Chapter Two, Part II, Section D, I addressed the open-ended nature of
Aquinas’s philosophical system. Yes, he believes that it is possible to make eternally
valid statements about the nature of reality. But, as I showed from Josef Pieper’s essay,
“The Timeliness of Thomism,” Aquinas does not believe that his own propositions are
fully adequate and that we can gradually grow in our knowledge of things. Although we
can never know the essences of things insofar as they emerge from the mind of God,
there is, as Pieper says, a “hope structure” in Aquinas’s thought. We are in “a condition
[of hope] that by its very nature cannot be fixed: it is neither comprehension and
possession nor simply non-possession, but ‘not-yet-possession.’”405 Now, in his own
developing understanding of the truth of the world, Aquinas was a thoroughgoing
syncretist. Perhaps no other thinker in the history of Western philosophy has presented
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such a blending of diverse strands of philosophical thought. Although the cornerstone of
Aquinas’s philosophical thought comes from Aristotle, his philosophy is so much more
than simply baptized Aristotelianism. For example, the master concept of his Summa
Theologica, that of the universe participating in its creative source and existing in a
movement of return to God, comes directly from Neo-Platonic sources. To be coherent
such a synthesis must present shared agreement between various perspectives but also
indicate areas of disagreement; effective synthesis can be achieved only by discarding
ideas which contradict the whole of a thinker’s position and by utilizing others which are
able to cohere with it. Thus, Aquinas disagrees with Neo-Platonic thinkers regarding the
nature of the human being—the human is not essentially his or her soul, as Plotinus held,
but a composite—while drawing upon their metaphysics of participation. He disagrees
with Augustine about the relationship between faith and reason, for example, but
constantly draws upon him in his Treatise on Man to establish his own positions. There is
in Aquinas a philosophical stance of openness to growing in the truth and a syncretic
approach to this growth. For example in Chapter One of De Veritate Aquinas provides
his own theory of truth and then shows how this theory is suggested in a variety of
interpretations of truth that have come down through history. As Pieper says:
Not one of the traditional formulae is rejected entirely or accepted as
exclusively valid. Though they are in no way fully concordant, he can
appreciate the particular validity of each. What actually is happening
here? It happens that St. Thomas is, in effect, placing himself within the
stream of traditional truth nourished by the past; without claiming to give
a final solution, he leaves the way open for future quest and discovery as
that stream flows onward toward the yet unknown.406
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Given this generous syncretic approach to philosophy is there any doubt that Aquinas
would not welcome insights from Merleau-Ponty that accord with his own anthropology
while also enriching it? I turn now to specific examples of how this can be achieved.
Part III – A Merleau-Pontian Enrichment of Aquinas’s Philosophical Anthropology
In this section I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions to show
how they can enrich Aquinas’s argument that the intellectual soul is the substantial form
of the body in three different ways. First, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
insights richly illustrate Aquinas’s position that the intellectual soul is form of the body.
Second, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions can offer a better
experiential base for Aquinas’s arguments than he himself provides. Third, I argue that
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions can be used to extend Aquinas’s claims
regarding the intellect’s knowledge of itself.
A) Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Insights Richly Illustrate Aquinas’s Position
that the Intellectual Soul is Form of the Body
The first way that Merleau-Ponty can be of service to Aquinas is simply through
the provision of examples and illustrations of the lived body informed by its soul. We can
begin to see this by reflecting upon the different styles of argumentation employed by
both of our thinkers. Aquinas’s approach, as I described at the beginning of Chapter
Three, is cosmological and largely object-directed. By cosmological I mean that he
considers the ontological makeup of the human being as part of a vast description of all
the beings in the universe. When Aquinas begins his argument in Summa Contra Gentiles
II regarding the composite makeup of the human being he does not start with an
examination of the human soul, but rather with the nature of intellectual substances as
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such. He argues that intellectual substances are endowed with will, that they are
immaterial, that in them there is act and potentiality, and so on. Thus, he begins by
showing how the human intellect, not the composite human being, is like the angelic
intellect. We are like the angels insofar as we are rational beings. He then examines the
possibility that intellectual substances can be united to bodies. He argues that humans are
like the sub-intellectual animals insofar as we have bodies. This cosmological approach is
also object-directed in the sense that Aquinas generally appeals not to the subjective
experience of being human but, for example, to logical conclusions which follow from
the nature of intellects as such, to the nature of forms as they are observed in all living
things, to our basic experience of humans as sensible wholes. In brief, his argument
proceeds on the basis of looking upon human beings and their place in the hierarchy of
the universe, rather than through looking at the human from within. This is certainly not
always the case, as we saw with his appeal to interior experience in the Summa
Theologica Ia.76.1, but as we saw in our lengthy exposition of his arguments from
Summa Contra Gentiles II, it is largely the case. Perhaps because of this cosmological or
object-directed approach, Aquinas seldom draws upon examples of experiencing
ourselves as composite beings. Nor does he often illustrate his conclusions with such
examples.
In contrast to Aquinas’s methodology, we have Merleau-Ponty’s almost exclusive
appeal to subjective experience for his argument that consciousness is form of the body. I
noted three distinct phenomenological descriptions for this position in Part III of Chapter
III. I note here that these illustrations are just a minor sampling of the insights MerleauPonty provides through close attention to lived body experience. He comprehensively
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explores, for example, how our experiences of space, time, motility, sexual expression,
and language express how our bodily comportment is what it is because of the informing
power of consciousness. Now, if we accept the conclusions of Part I of this Chapter that
Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of consciousness as form coheres with Aquinas’s argument
that the intellectual soul is form of the body, then all of Merleau-Ponty’s subjectively
oriented descriptions of the integral human being can be used to illustrate Aquinas’s more
cosmologically oriented teaching. We could say that Merleau-Ponty “fleshes out”
Aquinas’s arguments or that he adds a subjective dimension to it or that he shows the
myriad implications in our practical lives of having composite natures through the
informing power of the intellect.
B) Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Descriptions Can Offer a Better Experiential
Base for Aquinas’s Arguments than He Himself Provides
As I mentioned at the outset of the dissertation my purpose is to show that
Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology can be enriched by Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology, not to exhaustively demonstrate all of the ways that such an enrichment
could take place. In this section I point to just one critical place in the Summa Theologia
Ia.76.1 where Aquinas begins an argument on a subjectively experiential basis. I have
argued in Chapter One and in Part II above that this appeal to interiority indicates
openness to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions. I now argue that by
drawing upon Merleau-Ponty, the Thomist can have an even stronger basis for the kind of
argument Aquinas provides in the Summa Theologia Ia.76.1.
First let us revisit the argument. In this article Aquinas asks “Whether the
Intellectual Principle is United to the Body as Its Form?” Aquinas answers in the
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affirmative and in the first part of his response he gives Aristotle’s demonstration that the
intellectual principle is the form of the body. It is in the second stage of Aquinas’s
response where he makes a latently phenomenological appeal. After giving Aristotle’s
demonstration he states that:
If anyone however wishes to say the intellectual soul is not the form of the
body he must explain how it is that this action which is understanding may
be the action of this man for every one knows by experience (experitur)
that it is himself who understands.407
I, as a particular being made up of flesh and blood and existing at a given time and place,
recognize that I myself understand, that understanding somehow emerges from this
concrete, manifestly embodied creature. I am conscious of being the same one who both
senses and thinks. Aquinas believes that this basic experience suggests that the intellect is
the form of the body, but it is not a complete argument for there may be other
explanations to account for it.
Now, it is certainly the case that the kind of experiences Aquinas appeals to
indicates a profound connection between body and soul. I also agree with Aquinas that
the only possible explanation for it is that the soul is form of the body. And yet the
experience itself does not as directly show the composite nature of the body as other
experiences could demonstrate. The experience does not shed immediate light on the
forming power of the intellect; it only directly shows that I understand and my action of
understanding is the action of this particular creature of flesh and blood.
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I submit that we can draw out of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
investigations better examples for the experiential base of Aquinas’s argument in Summa
Theologica Ia.76.1 than the one provided by Aquinas. Let us look again at a passage
quoted in Section C, Part III of Chapter Three from Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the
lived body as expression and speech. He writes that:
If speech presupposed thought, if talking were primarily a matter of
meeting the object through a cognitive intention or through a
representation, we could not understand why thought tends towards
expression as towards its completion, why the most familiar thing appears
indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its name, why the thinking
subject himself is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has
not formulated them for himself, or even spoken and written them.408
Later on in the same chapter Merleau-Ponty makes a similar argument, but this time he
references a position that seems to be taken by Aquinas himself and then shows its
inadequacy:
It has always been observed that speech or gesture transfigure the body,
but no more was said on the subject than that they develop or disclose
another power, that of thought or soul. The fact was overlooked that, in
order to express it (thought or soul), the body must in the last analysis
become the thought or intention that it signifies for us.409
In both of these passages Merleau-Ponty points to a phenomenon that we all readily
experience, that thinking requires speaking, that unless an idea is articulated it really
never exists, that the very formulation of an idea occurs in the context of expressing it.
Often, of course, this expression is inaudible but even in the silent sanctuary of our own
minds we say words in order to think concepts which means that the body is never simply
the instrument of consciousness but seamlessly interwoven with it. The intellect
actualizes itself through the body. To admit this is not, of course, to deny Aquinas’s
408
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position that intellectual operations themselves are not bodily in nature. This cannot be
because we grasp universals in our understanding and the body is inherently unable,
because of its singularity, to grasp universals. But the point here is that our experience of
thinking requiring the body to be complete provides a better experiential basis for Summa
Theologica Ia.76.1 because it shows that our thinking does not simply take place in a
bodily being but that it actually becomes itself in bodily acts of expressing. This simply
could not be unless the intellect was form of the body.
C) Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Descriptions Can Be Used to Extend
Aquinas’s Claims Regarding the Intellect’s Knowledge of Itself
For this section I turn to Aquinas’s position on the intellect’s knowledge of itself.
I introduced his argument in Section C, Part I of Chapter Two in a discussion about
intellectual perception and I now briefly revisit this argument. Aquinas explains that once
the intellect engages sensible beings outside of itself it becomes actualized and is then in
a position to know itself. Aquinas explains that this can happen in two ways:
In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he
has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the
second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human
mind from knowledge of the intellectual act.410
The first way that the intellect knows itself is reflexive and takes place within the
subjective experience of the individual human person. I can perceive that I have an
intellectual soul in the very act of understanding something. While figuring out a
geometry problem and reaching a solution I can recognize in myself my own intellect at
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work. The second way that the intellect can understand itself in its own act is a more
abstract and objectively oriented route. In this case I consider the human intellect in its
universal sense and draw out the logical implications of the intellectual act. Aquinas
notes a difference between the two different paths to intellectual self-knowledge and
stresses that the first way, attained through immediate subjective experience, is superior
to the second:
There is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it
consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first;
the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself,
and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the
second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice,
and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are
ignorant of the soul’s nature, and many have erred about it.411
The superiority of the first route to the intellect’s knowledge of itself is found in its
simplicity. I need only perceive my own action of understanding to know my intellect.
The errors to intellectual self-knowledge which can arise through the various steps of
“subtle inquiry” are precluded by the immediacy of “the mere presence of the mind” to
itself.
I turn now to Merleau-Ponty and the possibility of applying Aquinas’s insights
about the two separate forms of intellectual self-knowledge to two different forms of the
intellect’s knowledge of itself as form of the body. Aquinas says that the intellect as a
substance can understand itself either through an objectively oriented “careful and subtle
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inquiry” or through its mere presence to itself. What is to prevent the intellect as
substantial form from knowing itself in these two ways?
I submit that the main arguments I outlined from Aquinas in Part II of Chapter
Two regarding our knowledge of the composite nature of the human being fall into the
“careful and subtle inquiry” category of argumentation. Clearly, in the Summa Contra
Gentiles II Aquinas is not appealing to the intellect’s direct presence to itself as form. But
in Summa Theologica Ia.87.1 Aquinas quotes an admonition from Augustine regarding
self-knowledge:“Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern
itself as present—i.e., to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its
essence and nature.”412 Now, part of the nature of the human intellect is to be a subsisting
thing, but another part of its nature is to be the substantial form of the body. We can
apply Augustine’s admonition to Aquinas and his investigations of the intellect as
substantial form. We ought to strive to see the intellect present to itself as substantial
form of its body so that it can immediately grasp the meaning of itself as substantial
form.
Merleau-Ponty argues that when we dig down into perception we find that
consciousness can be directly aware of itself as form of the body. In Part III of Chapter
Three we looked at various descriptions Merleau-Ponty makes in The Phenomenology of
Perception of how we immediately experience consciousness functioning as form of the
body. We first examined experiences of being affected by external stimuli and how the
body is not simply a passive receptor but actively involved, according to its own
conscious purposes, in reacting to this stimuli. We take in the world according to the
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form consciousness gives the body and as we go out into the world we are able to ignore
certain stimuli depending upon the orientation of our consciousness. At times, of course,
we are subject to sense experiences that we cannot control. But even in these situations
we are able to turn away and partly shut ourselves off from the offending stimuli. We
also explored how tactile experiences show that the body is permeated with the intentions
of pre-reflective consciousness (or operative intentionality) even as it “runs ahead” of
reflective consciousness (or intentionality of act). We also looked at Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological insight that thinking takes place in the context of speaking and writing
which indicates that consciousness not only orders the body around its intentions but
realizes itself through physical acts.
I submit that when we attend to the sort of experiences to which Merleau-Ponty
draws our attention, the intellect can be directly present to itself as form of the body and
therefore understand itself as form of the body. Aquinas insists that a thing cannot be
known unless it is in act. But the lived body is the intellect as substantial form providing
the body with the intellect’s own act. Perhaps the soul separated at death cannot
immediately understand itself as substantial form of the body, although it would certainly
recognize its inclination to be form of the body. But when the soul exists in its natural
state the intellect can be, Merleau-Ponty shows, directly present to itself as form of the
body. Through Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology we are able to enrich Aquinas’s
argument from the Summa Theologica Ia.87.1. Not only can the intellect be immediately
aware of itself as a substance, but it can also be aware of itself as substantial form of the
body.
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Conclusion to the Dissertation
In Chapter Two, Part I, Section D “On Aquinas’s Open Philosophical System,” I
argued that Aquinas’s philosophy is profoundly open not only to insights from other
thinkers with whom he otherwise disagrees, but that he understands that philosophy is an
ongoing growth in the truth. Moreover, Aquinas does not assume that his own
propositions are completely adequate to express the truth of the objects under his
consideration and at times he offers several definitions of the same thing—e.g. the
meaning of truth—cognizant that each proposition expresses something slightly different
about this meaning. He also sees great value in showing agreement among thinkers and in
revealing that his own positions are in harmony with philosophers who have preceded
him.
Contemporary Thomists, who wish to follow Aquinas’s lead, should look for
areas of compatibility between Aquinas and contemporary thinkers, especially when it
leads to an enrichment of his thought. In this dissertation I have attempted to do that by
arguing that certain of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights into the lived body
experience—in particular that consciousness is form of the body—can be engrafted into
Aquinas’s teaching that the intellectual soul is form of the body. I have not attempted to
create some sort of hybrid anthropology on the basis of their respective insights into the
nature of the human being as an integral unity. Rather, I have argued that Aquinas can
draw upon Merleau-Ponty to exemplify and to extend his own positions. My intention has
certainly not been to show all the ways that such an enrichment could take place, but to
argue that it is possible, as well as desirable, and to indicate a few ways it can occur.
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I began in Chapter One with an exposition of how two contemporary mind-body
theorists, Eric LaRock and Ralph Ellis draw on our two thinkers in strikingly similar
ways. LaRock, an analytical Thomist, argues that Aquinas’s notion of form enables us to
understand the human being as an integral union of body and intellectual soul while
avoiding certain objections brought against Cartesian dualism: 1) the dualistic interaction
objection (how can the mind cause brain functioning if its properties are so radically
different?); 2) the neural dependence objection (how can mind and brain be separate if
consciousness depends upon neurochemistry in the brain?) Ellis holds that Merleau-Ponty
is a useful resource to shed light on the nature of the unity between mind and body. He
argues, on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological investigations of the lived
body, that consciousness must be understood as form of the body and he holds also that
consciousness as form avoids the same objections leveled against Cartesian dualism
regarding dualistic interaction and neural dependence with which LaRock dealt. LaRock
and Ellis, therefore, introduce us to some ostensibily close similarities between Aquinas
and Merleau-Ponty regarding the nature of the human being. Certainly, many questions
arise in light of such apparent similarity. For example: would contemporary
neuroscientists who draw on Merleau-Ponty also be open to Thomistic insights into the
mind-body problem? Or, is it possible that their two accounts could work together to
continue the happy demise of computational models of mind? The question I have
addressed also naturally rises: if Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty stand together on critical
points of anthropology, perhaps insights from the latter thinker, unknown to Aquinas,
might be fruitfully integrated into Aquinas’s own philosophical anthropology?
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Now, one of the impetuses for my work is the call made by John Paul II for
philosophers in the Catholic intellectual tradition to show continuity (where possible)
between traditional Catholic philosophy and contemporary thought while avoiding
eclecticism and in fact overturning it by pointing to common truths which transcend their
historical frameworks. Thus, it was necessary to deal with objections to the possibility of
a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s thought, rather than naively put their ideas
together regardless of philosophical differences between them. I presented the work of
Robert Harvanek, who argues that drawing Aquinas together with phenomenology at a
philosophical level is highly problematic. Harvanek claims that philosophy, for Aquinas,
is a matter of syllogistic demonstration, while the phenomenologist merely describes
experience, and that Aquinas depends upon a notion of historical experience that is quite
different from the phenomenologist’s insistence on immediate personal experience as the
right ground for philosophy. I argued, to the contrary, that although Aquinas certainly
draws on a more mediate sense of experience—i.e. that of “Western Man”—he also, at
times, appeals to the human being’s own immediate personal experience. Thus, Aquinas
appears to be open to phenomenological insights. I further argued that Merleau-Ponty
does not simply describe experience, but draws on it to make deductively valid claims
about the nature of the human being.
Now, it is at this point that I need to make an admission. After arguing in Part I of
Chapter Four that Merleau-Ponty goes beyond phenomenological description to
deductively valid arguments about the nature of the human being and that such a mode of
argumentation places him on the same philosophical playing field as Aquinas (with
regard to deductively valid demonstrations), I did not then draw on any Merleau-Pontian
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arguments in Part III of Chapter Four while arguing that Merleau-Ponty could enrich
Aquinas’s anthropology. In defense of this, let me simply state that part of my purpose
for the dissertation is to show philosophical compatibility between Merleau-Ponty and
Aquinas leading not only to the examples of enrichment I gave in Part III of Chapter Four
but possibly to other ones as well. In my own examples of Merleau-Pontian enrichment I
did not draw on complete arguments from Merleau-Ponty, but chose rather to show how
his phenomenological descriptions of intellectual principle as form could supplement
Aquinas’s own modes of argument as well as better illustrate his conclusions. It turns out
then that it was not strictly necessary to show that Merleau-Ponty makes deductively
valid arguments in order to show how his phenomenology can enrich Aquinas’s
philosophical argument. But I suspect this tangent may be forgiven if it vindicates
Merleau-Ponty of at least one charge Harvanek and other Thomists have leveled against
phenomenologists. Unburdening others from ignorance was one of the duties of
philosophy, Aquinas thought; he would applaud efforts to correct mistakes made by those
who call themselves “Thomists.”
I raised and answered two other objections to the possibility of a Merleau-Pontian
enrichment of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. Some have claimed that, although
Merleau-Ponty is not a reductive materialist, he believes nonetheless that the human is
essentially a physical being, that consciousness directs the body but is not immaterial in
nature. If Merleau-Ponty’s anthropological ideas are grounded in an essential materialism
(though not reductivistic), how could they positively contribute to a philosophical system
that rejects the first principles of these ideas? In response to the physicalist interpretation
of Merleau-Ponty I had argued that the nature of his phenomenological enterprise
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precludes any assertion that the human is a wholly physical being. I argued that it would
be impossible to show this on phenomenological grounds because any consideration of
how the body gives rise to consciousness would have to be done on the basis of an
embodied conscious awareness, a primordial givenness that we can explore but not
justify through the resources of phenomenology. The phenomenologist would have to
take himself or herself outside of phenomenology to claim that the human being is
essentially physical. Thus, the Thomist seeking to draw on Merleau-Ponty does not have
to pit himself or herself against a supposed materialistic doctrine of the human being in
his work. It is true that Merleau-Ponty uses phenomenology to establish deductively valid
arguments about the human being, but none of these (to my knowledge) are directed
toward the ultimate metaphysical principles which make up the human being. He argues
that the human being cannot be an assemblage of parts in a reductively materialistic sense
and that the human being cannot be a parallel structure of mind essentially detached from
body because our experience belies these claims. But he never argues that the embodied
consciousness I find myself to be is at core a physical process and he never closes the
door to the possibility that the human being is partly made up of an immaterial
dimension, although he would certainly oppose any claim that the intellect can subsist
apart from its body or that the lived body is what it is through the infusion of a spiritual
principle.
Another obstacle I raised was the claim that Merleau-Ponty is an idealist who
does not direct himself to the human being as a concrete existent, but as an idea. Thus,
Merleau-Ponty and Aquinas, if the objection held, would direct themselves to different
objects. Merleau-Ponty would concentrate on the appearance of the human in
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consciousness, the human as constituted by his mind. Aquinas would concentrate on
defining the nature of the really existing human. The one would be directed towards a
nature as created in his own mind; the other toward nature as given. If our respective
philosophers do not even address themselves to the same object how could we find
compatibility leading to enrichment?
While working through this objection it was necessary to allow that there is a
degree of idealism in Merleau-Ponty’s work, but not of a radical sort. He does not cut off
the world through a Husserlian époche, but instead holds that phenomenology ought to
draw out the meaning of the world as it is given. Further, Merleau-Ponty is clear that the
world acts first upon the human being through the receptivity of pre-reflective
consciousness. Thus, our knowing is directed towards the world and depends upon the
world. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that every human knower
necessarily approaches the world through his or her own subjective perspective (which
normally does not preclude a grasp of shared universal meaning) and also imputes
meaning onto the objects of the world (as we saw in the “Man on the Mountain”
example). Merleau-Ponty holds that the meaning of objects in the world does not simply
emerge isolated from the context of their involvement with humans. But this kind of
idealism, if it can even be called such, is not the sort of radical idealism that would put
Merleau-Ponty’s “human being” on a different plane of reality than the one to whom
Aquinas directs himself. Both of our thinkers find themselves grounded in this concretely
existing world and both come to the conclusion that actually existing human beings are
composite in nature, integral unions of an intellectual principle and a body.
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Finally, it was necessary to address to what extent Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding of core anthropological terms are compatible. I argued that there is no lack
of compatibility between them on the meaning of consciousness as form so long as we
understand that consciousness is, for Merleau-Ponty, the principle of intellect and agency
in the human being and understand that this aligns with Aquinas’s intellectual soul which
can be aware of itself and thus also be a principle of consciousness. I also argued that
there are points of critical commonality between Aquinas’s notion of body and MerleauPonty’s. For both thinkers the self-aware intellectual principle is able to form (not merely
direct!) the body around its intentions and to be seamlessly integrated into it. For both
thinkers, the body is therefore essentially different than the body of a sub-rational animal;
the human body indicates that it is formed by an intellectual principle. For Aquinas this
intellectual principle is the substantial form of the body. Merleau-Ponty will not say that
consciousness is substantial form of the body and thus there is a stronger sense of the
unity between soul and body in Aquinas than in Merleau-Ponty. For the later thinker
when consciousness awakens to itself it is embodied and the body is always experienced
as an integral part of being human, but he does not say that the body is always what it is
because of the intellect functioning as its substantial form. There are certainly many areas
of critical overlap between Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty in the meaning they assign to key
anthropological terms. This bodes well for the Thomist as he or she seeks to draw on
Merleau-Ponty.
In the context of addressing the various objections to the possibility of a MerleauPontian enrichment of Aquinas’s anthropological thought in Part I of Chapter Four I
necessarily indicated areas of compatibility between our two thinkers—e.g. that each
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thinker draws conclusions about the nature of the human being on the basis of immediate
personal experience. But because my purpose in Part I was simply to overcome
objections to the possibility of my overall project, I did not adequately dwell on these
areas of compatibility. In Part II of Chapter Four I did shed more light on areas of
common ground between our two thinkers which pave the way for a Merleau-Pontian
enrichment of Aquinas’s thought. I argued that our two thinkers share a conviction that
the philosopher seeks to know the world and that perception is the basis for any
knowledge of it. For most objects of the world perception enables us to gain knowledge
by being object directed. But when humans seek to understand themselves perception is
both object and subject directed. Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty share a critical point of
commonality in their embrace of perception in both forms and it is through perception, in
large part, that a Merleau-Pontian enrichment of Aquinas’s anthropological thought is
possible.
Finally, in Part III of Chapter Four I offered three ways that such an enrichment
can take place. First, I argued that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights richly
illustrate Aquinas’s position that the intellectual soul is form of the body. Second, I
argued that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions can offer a better
experiential base for Aquinas’s arguments than he himself provides. Third, I argued that
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions can be used to extend Aquinas’s claims
regarding the intellect’s knowledge of itself.
Now, Aquinas is one of the most succinct writers in the history of Western
philosophy and does not usually dwell on practical examples for introducing the
problems he addresses or for illustrating his solutions to these problems. Some might
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respond that Aquinas is so terse because the examples are merely a way of helpfully
describing the philosophical issues but do not have much to bear on the content of the
argumentation itself. In this same vein some may question the usefulness of
phenomenological descriptions to enrich Thomistic arguments when they already have,
so it is assumed, adequate experiential bases or practical illustrations.
One brief response to those who might doubt the usefulness of the kind of
Merleau-Pontian enrichment I have proposed here is that integrating Merleau-Ponty’s
rich phenomenological insights of the lived body experience with Aquinas’s arguments
serve to show agreement between our two philosophers and Aquinas was always wont to
show agreement where it existed. When two separate lights come together and shine in
the same direction the beam they produce is greater than it would have been had they
remained separate. When philosophers from two very different traditions and
methodologies come to the same conclusions about core aspects of the human being, it
advances the truth, at least from a Thomistic perspective, to show agreement between
them. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions of lived unity
between body and soul corroborates Aquinas’s own position and serves to demonstrate
this agreement.
A second response emerges as we consider the purpose of the philosopher.
Aquinas himself is clear that a primary objective of the philosopher is to teach truth and
oppose falsehood.413 Effective education demands that the teacher make himself or
herself as understandable as possible to his or her audience. Students must be able to
clearly grasp the concepts being introduced to them in order to grow in the truth being

413

See his Summa Contra Gentiles I.1.3., “The Office of the Wise Man.”
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presented. I am not suggesting here that the contemporary person is unable to fruitfully
study Aquinas’s medieval style of argumentation or to recognize the contemporary
relevance of the issues he addresses. However, there is a strong contemporary
preoccupation both with the subject and with the body. Human beings today often
emphasize validating philosophical claims with subjective experiences and often have
great difficulty thinking of themselves as anything more than complex arrangements of
matter. I suggest, therefore, that an effective approach the Thomist can take to teaching
the contemporary person is to show how Aquinas’s arguments (in this case his position
on the integral union of body and soul) are verified in subjective experiences, especially
those that emphasize the lived body. So, if Merleau-Ponty provides a rich account of how
we actually experience ourselves as a union of soul and body by virtue of the intellect’s
informing power over the body this could be useful to Thomists as they teach Aquinas’s
philosophical anthropology. There is of course a difference between the Thomist using
Merleau-Ponty to more effectively present Aquinas’s positions and using him to enrich
Aquinas’s actual arguments. I have not suggested in the final Part of this dissertation that
Merleau-Ponty simply does the former; I have argued that he can actually extend
Aquinas’s arguments. But the pedagogical point is significant when we consider that one
of the chief purposes of the philosopher, according to Aquinas, is persuading others to
abandon false positions and accept true ones.
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